Wrigley v. State

195 Wash.2d 65

455 P.3d 1138

Jessica WRIGLEY, individually, and as Personal Representative for the Estate of A.C.A, Deceased, and O.K.P., a minor child, and I.T.W., a minor child, by and through their biological mother, Jessica Wrigley, Respondent,

v.STATE of Washington; Department of Social & Health Services; Donald Watson & "Jane Doe" Watson, husband and wife, individually and the marital community thereof; Alessandro Larosa & "John Doe" Larosa, husband and wife, individually and the marital community thereof; Rachel Whitney & "John Doe" Whitney, husband and wife, individually and the marital community thereof; Jennifer Gorder & "John Doe" Gorder, husband and wife, individually and the marital community thereof; "John Doe" Social Worker & "Jane Doe" Social Worker, husband & wife, individually and the marital community thereof, 1 through 5, Petitioners.

No. 96830-6

Supreme Court of Washington.

Argued October 10, 2019

Filed January 23, 2020

Allison Margaret Croft, Attorney General's Office, 800 Fifth Ave., Ste. 2000, Seattle, WA, 98104-3188, Allyson Zipp, Washington Attorney General's Office, 7141 Cleanwater Ln Sw, Olympia, WA, 98504-0126, Elizabeth A. Baker, Office of the Attorney General, 7141 Cleanwater Dr Sw, Po Box 40126, Olympia, WA, 98504-0126, for Petitioner.

Gary Alan Preble, Attorney at Law ,2120 State Ave. Ne, Olympia, WA, 98506-6500, for Respondent.

Daniel G. Lloyd, Vancouver City Attorney's Office, Po Box 1995, 415 W 6th St., Vancouver, WA, 98668-1995, for Amicus Curiae on behalf of Washington State Association of Municipal Attorneys.

JOHNSON, J.

¶1 This case requires us to interpret former RCW 26.44.050 (1999) to determine whether the Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS)¹ received a "report concerning the possible occurrence of abuse or neglect" sufficient to invoke its duty to investigate. Here, Jessica Wrigley brought a negligent investigation claim against DSHS based on the placement of her son, A.A., with his biological father, Anthony Viles, during dependency hearings. Within three months of the placement, tragically, Viles killed A.A. The superior court dismissed the claim on summary judgment, finding that the duty to investigate was never triggered. In a split opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed and held that the duty was triggered by Wrigley’s prediction that Viles would harm A.A. We reverse the Court of Appeals. Under the facts of this case, a report predicting future abuse absent evidence of current or past conduct of abuse or neglect does not invoke the duty to investigate under former RCW 26.44.050.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 A.A. was the six-year-old son of Wrigley and Viles. A.A. lived with his mother and stepfather, the Wrigleys, until DSHS received its sixth referral alleging abuse and neglect by the Wrigleys and removed him from the home. A.A. was placed in shelter care, and DSHS filed a dependency petition.

¶3 At a family team decision-making meeting in early October 2011, Wrigley reported to DSHS representatives that Viles had a criminal history, reputation for domestic violence, and a record of previously abusing alcohol and drugs. She described that six years before, he had dragged her by the hair and threatened to kill her by cutting off her head and running her over, which led her to obtain a restraining order against him. Then, in late October, Wrigley called the assigned social worker, Don Watson, and notified him of the prior restraining order and that Viles had a criminal history, had been arrested for providing alcohol to a minor, and had never met A.A.

¶4 In November 2011, DSHS notified Viles of A.A.’s shelter care status, and Viles requested placement of A.A. with him, although he had no prior contact with A.A. Viles, who lived in Idaho, promptly provided six references; they all offered positive perspectives on his parenting skills with his biological daughter and fiancee’s daughters.² DSHS ran a background check and found nothing disqualifying, although he had some criminal history.

¶5 Viles formally petitioned for placement, and the court held two hearings—Wrigley did not attend either one. At the first hearing on January 30, 2012, the only concern about Viles was the lack of a preexisting relationship. Wrigley’s counsel represented, "[M]y client has no strong position either way." Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 305. The court temporarily placed A.A. with Viles for 30 days. On February 13, 2012, Wrigley called Watson, opposing the placement and claiming she never told her attorney she had no objections. She insisted that if A.A. remained with Viles, " ‘he would be dead within six months.’ " CP at 880, 1516.

¶6 A week later, at the follow-up hearing, Watson and A.A.’s therapist reported the placement was positive. The court dismissed the petition with Wrigley’s attorney in agreement. A.A. remained with Viles. In a tragic turn of events, A.A. died in April 2012 after Viles struck him on the head.³

¶7 Wrigley brought suit against the State and DSHS and asserted numerous claims: negligent investigation based on former RCW 26.44.050, wrongful death, outrage, loss of consortium, negligent misrepresentation, survival action, negligent training/supervision, and publication of private facts. The superior court found that all negligence-based claims arose under former RCW 26.44.050 and granted DSHS’s partial summary judgment motion, dismissing all claims except outrage, negligent misrepresentation, and publication of private facts. It found that the only allegations of abuse were against the Wrigleys and that DSHS did not owe a duty to plaintiffs because it never received a sufficient report to trigger that duty. It subsequently dismissed the remaining claims on summary judgment.

¶8 In a split published-in-part opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed the order of summary judgment as to the negligence claims based on former RCW 26.44.050 and remanded for trial.⁴ The Court of Appeals concluded that DSHS’ duty to investigate under former RCW 26.44.050 is triggered by "reports suggesting a reasonable possibility of future abuse or neglect if the placement [decision] is made." Wrigley v. State , 5 Wash. App. 2d 909, 929, 428 P.3d 1279 (2018). It held that Wrigley’s communications triggered the duty to investigate because they suggested a "palpable danger to A.A. if he were placed with Viles." Wrigley , 5 Wash. App. 2d at 931, 428 P.3d 1279. The interpretation was grounded in the statute’s purpose as laid out in Tyner v. Department of Social & Health Services, 141 Wash.2d 68, 1 P.3d 1148 (2000), and the scope of the duty analyzed in M. W. v. Department of Social & Health Services, 149 Wash.2d 589, 70 P.3d 954 (2003).

¶9 The Court of Appeals’ dissent opined that the majority’s interpretation of "report" expands the scope of DSHS’ duty to investigate too far and that Wrigley’s statements did not trigger the duty. The dissent concluded that the communications did not allege any acts of abuse or neglect of a child by Viles as required by the statutory definitions of "abuse or neglect" and "negligent treatment or maltreatment," as provided under former RCW 26.44.020(1) and (14) (2010). Under the facts of this case, the dissent reasoned, " RCW 26.44.050 imposes no such duty here." Wrigley , 5 Wash. App. 2d at 940, 428 P.3d 1279 (Sutton, J., dissenting in part).

¶10 DSHS petitioned for review on the sole issue of whether Wrigley’s predictions of future abuse constituted a "report concerning the possible occurrence of child abuse or neglect" invoking its duty to investigate under former RCW 26.44.050.⁵ Pet. for Review at 12. We granted review. Wrigley v. State , 193 Wash.2d 1008, 439 P.3d 1065 (2019).

ANALYSIS

¶11 This case involves the somewhat unique issue of what statements qualify as a "report" and, more specifically, can a prediction of future harmful conduct against a parent trigger the duty to investigate. The Court of Appeals has briefly touched on the scope of a duty-triggering report, properly recognizing that the issue should be resolved on a case-by-case basis. Yonker v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs. , 85 Wash. App. 71, 81, 930 P.2d 958 (1997).

¶12 Generally, a report initiates the dependency process. The duty to investigate cannot be invoked until receipt of a report. Former RCW 26.44.050. DSHS argues that its duty to investigate is invoked by reports alleging past conduct of child abuse or neglect, and Wrigley’s statement that if A.A. was left with Viles he "would be dead within six months" contained only future predictions that are insufficient to warrant further investigation. Wrigley defers to the Court of Appeals ruling and argues that her communications constituted a report "suggesting a reasonable possibility of future abuse or neglect." Resolution of this issue requires interpretation of former RCW 26.44.050.

¶13 The statute provides, in relevant part:

Upon the receipt of a report concerning the possible occurrence of abuse or neglect, the law enforcement agency or the department of social and health services must investigate and provide the protective services section with a report in accordance with chapter 74.13 RCW, and where necessary to refer such report to the court.

Former RCW 26.44.050. Our inquiry focuses on the language "report concerning the possible occurrence of abuse or neglect."

¶14 The meaning of a statute is reviewed de novo. Our ultimate objective is to ascertain and carry out the legislature’s intent. Plain meaning is discerned from the language, the statute’s context, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole. Gorre v. City of Tacoma , 184 Wash.2d 30, 37, 357 P.3d 625 (2015). We construe the statute as a whole, giving effect to all of the language used and interpret provisions in relation to one another.

Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC , 146 Wash.2d 1, 9-12, 43 P.3d 4 (2002).

¶15 First, the ordinary meaning of "report concerning the possible occurrence of abuse or neglect" is ambiguous as to whether it encompasses...