Wyer v. Tesla, Inc.

1

DAVID WYER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. TESLA, INC., et al., Defendants and Respondents.

G062810

California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, Third Division

May 31, 2024

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, No 30-2019-01118759 Richard Y. Lee, Judge.

David Wyer, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Burke Williams & Sorensen, Cheryl Johnson-Hartwell and Keiko J Kojima for Defendants and Respondents.

OPINION

GOODING, J.

After his employment at Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) was terminated, David Wyer sued. Based on an arbitration provision in Wyer's employment agreement, Tesla obtained an order from the trial court compelling arbitration of Wyer's claims. The arbitrator found Wyer failed to prove any of his claims and awarded him no relief. On Tesla's petition, the trial court confirmed the arbitration award and entered judgment. Wyer appealed.

We affirm. Wyer has not established he was substantially prejudiced by the arbitrator's limits on permissible discovery and on the time allotted for the arbitration hearing. Nor can he show there was any ambiguity about which arbitration provision governed his claims or that the applicable provision was unconscionable.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Wyer was hired by SolarCity Corporation (SolarCity) in 2015 as an AutoCAD software engineer. Tesla acquired SolarCity in 2017, and Wyer's employment was transferred to Tesla. Wyer's employee transfer agreement (Agreement), which he signed on June 2, 2017, included an arbitration provision stating in relevant part as follows: "[T]o ensure the rapid and economical resolution of disputes that may arise in connection with your employment with Tesla, you and Tesla agree that any and all disputes, claims, or causes of action, in law or equity, arising from or relating to your employment, or the termination of your employment, will be resolved, to the fullest extent permitted by law by final, binding and confidential arbitration in your city and state of employment conducted by the Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services/Endispute, Inc. ('JAMS'), or its successors, under the then current rules of JAMS for employment disputes; provided that: [¶] . . . [¶] The arbitrator shall have the authority to compel adequate discovery for the resolution of the dispute and to award such relief as would otherwise be permitted by law . . . ."

Wyer's employment with Tesla was terminated on January 18, 2019. In December 2019, Wyer (who was then represented by counsel) sued Tesla and two of its employees, Wyer's direct supervisor, Christopher Rollins, and Wyer's coworker, Carson Schafer. Wyer asserted claims against the defendants for discrimination, harassment, and retaliation in violation of California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, § 12940 et seq.); failure to prevent discrimination, harassment, and retaliation under FEHA; failure to provide reasonable accommodations in violation of FEHA; failure to engage in a good faith interactive process to determine effective reasonable accommodations in violation of FEHA; declaratory judgment; wrongful termination in violation of public policy; negligent supervision and retention; intentional infliction of emotional distress; retaliation (Lab. Code, §§ 1102.5, 1102.6); failure to pay wages (id., §§ 201, 1182.12, 1194, & 1194.2); failure to indemnify (id., § 2802); failure to provide itemized wage statements and waiting time penalties (id., §§ 201-203, 226 et seq.); and unfair competition (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200). Wyer's first amended complaint, which is the operative complaint, was filed in February 2020.

Tesla filed a petition to compel arbitration and motion to stay the litigation pursuant to the arbitration provision in the Agreement, which the trial court granted.

The arbitrator limited each party to five depositions as part of the discovery plan and allowed the parties to seek leave to take additional depositions on a showing of good cause. Eight months after the discovery plan was approved, and two months before the scheduled arbitration hearing, Wyer had taken three of his five depositions. At that time, he sought leave to depose another six individuals, as well as Tesla's person most knowledgeable (PMK) on four separate topics-for a total of at least seven, and potentially 10, additional depositions. The arbitrator found "no good cause for increasing the number of depositions at this late stage."

The arbitrator initially ordered the arbitration hearing would occur over 10 days, but the report of the preliminary hearing and scheduling order noted the length of the hearing was "[s]ubject to reconsideration."^[1] The arbitrator later ordered the case could be tried in a total of five days, rather than 10. In refining the time limits, the arbitrator "urged [the parties] to be selective about the witnesses they present, to introduce evidence through oral testimony when there is no other more effective means of doing so, and to stipulate as much as possible to uncontested facts." At the final status conference, the arbitrator limited the parties to 15 hours each at the arbitration hearing.

The arbitration took place via Zoom on April 29 and May 2 through 5, 2022. Wyer called 10 witnesses, including seven fact witnesses and three experts. The total time used by Tesla at the arbitration hearing was 13 hours and 34 minutes, while the total time used by Wyer was 16 hours and 17 minutes; with Tesla's concurrence, the arbitrator allowed Wyer more than the 15 hours allotted. The arbitrator issued the final award on October 4, 2022, finding Wyer failed to establish any of his claims.

Tesla filed a petition to confirm the final arbitration award pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1285, and Wyer filed a petition to vacate the arbitration award pursuant to section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(5).^[2] After a hearing, the trial court granted Tesla's petition to confirm and denied Wyer's petition to vacate. Judgment confirming the arbitration award was entered and Wyer, now in propria persona, filed a timely notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

"The party seeking to vacate an arbitration award bears the burden of establishing that one of the six grounds listed in section 1286.2 applies and that the party was prejudiced by the arbitrator's error." (Royal Alliance Associates, Inc. v. Liebhaber (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 1092, 1106.) We review the trial court's order on the petition to vacate the arbitration award de novo, and we review the court's determinations of disputed factual issues for substantial evidence. (Ibid.)

"Where a party files a petition to confirm an arbitration award pursuant to section 1285 et seq., 'the court shall confirm the award as made' unless it 'vacates the award or dismisses the proceeding.' [Citation.] To the extent the trial court makes findings of fact in this decision, 'we affirm the findings if they are supported by substantial evidence,' but if 'the trial court resolved questions of law on undisputed facts, we review the trial court's rulings de novo.'" (Rivera v. Shivers (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 82, 89.)

To be clear: To say our review on this appeal is de novo does not mean we may reconsider the arbitrator's award, much less the evidence that was or was not before the arbitrator. "'The merits of the controversy between the parties are not subject to judicial review.' [Citations.] More specifically, courts will not review the validity of the arbitrator's reasoning. [Citations.] Further, a court may not review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting an arbitrator's award. [Citations.] [¶] Thus, it is the general rule that, with narrow exceptions, an arbitrator's decision cannot be reviewed for errors of fact or law." (Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 11.) Our de novo review is of the trial court's determination that none of the statutory grounds for vacating the arbitration award applied.^[3]

II. Analysis

"[T]he court shall vacate the [arbitration] award if the court determines . . .: [¶] . . . [¶] The rights of the party were substantially prejudiced by the refusal of the arbitrators to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown therefor or by the refusal of the arbitrators to hear evidence material to the controversy or by other conduct of the arbitrators contrary to the provisions of this title." (§ 1286.2, subd. (a)(5).) Wyer argued in his petition to vacate he was substantially prejudiced by (1) the arbitrator's refusal to allow him to conduct necessary discovery, (2) the arbitrator's reduction of the number of hearing days from 10 to five, and (3) the arbitrator's failure to determine which arbitration agreement applied.

A. Discovery

Wyer argues the arbitrator substantially prejudiced him by limiting the number of depositions he could take prior to the arbitration hearing. The arbitrator initially ordered that each party could take five depositions. The arbitrator found there was not good cause for Wyer's later request-made less than two months before the arbitration hearing date-for leave to take as many as 10 additional depositions. The arbitrator did, however, permit Wyer to exceed the five deposition limit if more than one person from Tesla was required to address the topics set forth in Wyer's PMK notice of deposition.

The parties' arbitration provision here does not authorize full discovery rights. (See § 1283.1, subd. (b); Aixtron, Inc. v. Veeco Instruments Inc. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 360, 396-397.) The arbitration provision provides the JAMS rules apply. Those rules provide: "Each Party may take at least one deposition of an opposing Party or an individual under the control of the opposing Party. The Parties shall...