Wynne v. Liberty Trailer

2022 Ark. 65

641 S.W.3d 621

Terry WYNNE, Appellant

v.LIBERTY TRAILER and Death and Permanent Total Disability Trust Fund, Appellees

No. CV-20-699

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

Opinion Delivered: March 31, 2022

M. KeithWren, Little Rock, for appellant.

Worley, Wood & Parrish, P.A., by: Jarrod S. Parrish, Little Rock, for appellee.

JOHN DAN KEMP, Chief Justice

Appellant Terry Wynne appeals the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission's denial of his claim for additional medical benefits. For reversal, Wynne argues that because he requested the additional benefits within one year of the last payment of compensation, his claim was timely pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-9-702(b)(1) (Repl. 2012). We reverse and remand.

I. Facts

On November 11, 2015, Wynne fell from a ladder while working as a trailer technician and certified welder for Liberty Trailer. He sustained a compensable right-shoulder injury. As a result of the fall, he underwent two shoulder surgeries—one on February 2, 2016, and a second one on February 17, 2017. He reported no improvement following the second surgery. Wynne continued with physical therapy and began treatment with Dr. Charles Pearce. He underwent a functional capacity evaluation on October 27, 2017. On October 30, Dr. Pearce determined that Wynne had reached maximum medical improvement and released him to light-duty work with permanent restrictions. Wynne's last receipt of payment for medical benefits was on December 5, 2017, for services provided by Dr. Pearce on October 30. However, he continued to receive disability benefits. The last payment of disability benefits to Wynne was for the period of November 11 through December 14, 2018, by check issued January 17, 2019.

On February 25, 2019, Wynne filed a Form AR-C with the Commission requesting additional temporary total disability, additional temporary partial disability, additional permanent partial disability, additional medical expenses, rehabilitation, and attorney's fees.¹ A hearing was held before the administrative law judge (ALJ) on January 8, 2020. The ALJ subsequently issued an opinion denying Wynne's claim for additional medical treatment and finding that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations. The Commission affirmed and adopted the ALJ's opinion.

Wynne appealed the Commission's decision, and the court of appeals reversed the denial of additional medical benefits. Wynne v. Liberty Trailer , 2021 Ark. App. 374, at 10, 636 S.W.3d 348, 354. It held that Wynne's claim for additional medical treatment was filed within one year of the date of the last payment of compensation and, therefore, was not barred by the statute of limitations. Id. at 9–10, 636 S.W.3d at 354. Liberty Trailer filed a petition for review with this court, which we granted. When we grant a petition for review, we consider the appeal as though it had originally been filed in this court. Davis Nursing Ass'n v. Neal , 2019 Ark. 91, at 4, 570 S.W.3d 457, 460.

II. Statute of Limitations

In his sole point on appeal, Wynne argues that the Commission erred in determining that his claim for additional medical benefits was barred by the statute of limitations. Wynne argues that his claim was timely because he filed it within one year from the last payment of compensation.² He asserts that under section 11-9-702(b)(1), when more than two years has passed since the date of the injury, a claim for additional compensation, i.e., disability or medical benefits, must be made within one year of the date of the last payment of compensation, i.e., disability or medical benefits. Liberty Trailer argues that Wynne's claim for additional medical benefits is time-barred because he did not file his claim within one year of his last payment for medical benefits.

When the Commission adopts the ALJ's opinion, it makes the ALJ's findings and conclusions its findings and conclusions. White Cty. Judge v. Menser , 2020 Ark. 140, at 6, 597 S.W.3d 640, 644. We consider both the ALJ's opinion and the Commission's majority opinion. Id. , 597 S.W.3d at 644. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commission's decision and affirm that decision if it is supported by substantial evidence. Brookshire Grocery Co. v. Morgan , 2018 Ark. 62, at 5, 539 S.W.3d 574, 578.

The present appeal involves the interpretation and application of a statute. The correct interpretation and application of an Arkansas statute is a question of law, which we decide de novo. White Cty. Judge , 2020 Ark. 140, at 7, 597 S.W.3d at 644. This court decides what a statute means. Id. , 597 S.W.3d at 644. When we construe the workers’-compensation statutes, we must strictly construe them. Id. , 597 S.W.3d at 644 ; Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-704(c)(3) (Repl. 2012). Strict construction is narrow construction and requires that nothing be taken as intended that is not clearly expressed. Myers v. Yamato Kogyo Co., Ltd. , 2020 Ark. 135, at 6, 597 S.W.3d 613, 617. The doctrine of strict construction requires this court to use the plain meaning of the language employed. Id. , 597 S.W.3d at 617.

The statute of limitations applicable to Wynne's request for additional workers’-compensation benefits is set forth in Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-9-702(b)(1) :

(b) TIME FOR FILING ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION.

(1) In cases in which any compensation, including disability or medical, has been paid on account of injury, a claim for additional compensation shall be barred unless filed with the commission within one (1) year from the date of the last payment of compensation or two (2) years from the date of the injury, whichever is greater.

This court has stated that a claimant must prove that he or she acted within the time allowed for filing a claim for additional compensation. White Cty. Judge , 2020 Ark. 140, at 8, 597 S.W.3d at 645.

Here, section 11-9-702(b)(1) provides that if "any compensation" is paid, then a claim for additional compensation must be made "within one (1) year from the date of the last payment of compensation." We agree with Wynne that, under a plain reading of section 11-9-702(b)(1), the statute of limitations on a request for additional benefits commences when the last payment, whether for disability or medical benefits, is made. The last payment of benefits to Wynne was a check for disability benefits issued on January 17, 2019. Thus, his February 25, 2019 claim for additional medical benefits was timely.

We are unpersuaded by Liberty Trailer's argument that Stewart v. Arkansas Glass Container , 2010 Ark. 198, 366 S.W.3d 358, and Flores v. Walmart Distribution , 2012 Ark. App. 201, 2012 WL 723252, compel a different result. Stewart and Flores involved the tolling of the statute of limitations. Tolling temporarily delays or suspends the statute of limitations; it does not reset it. Section 9-11-702(b)(1) does not explicitly discuss tolling. However, in Stewart , we addressed tolling and held that when a request for additional compensation is not acted upon, the statute of limitations is tolled, but only for the particular type of compensation requested. Stewart , 2010 Ark. 198, at 11, 366 S.W.3d at 364. Stewart's timely request for additional medical benefits did not toll the statute of limitations for all other claims of benefits that were not timely requested. Id. , 366 S.W.3d at 364 ; see also Flores , 2012 Ark. App. 201, at 5–7, 2012 WL 723252 (applying tolling principles from Stewart and holding that a claim for additional medical benefits did not toll the statute of limitations on claim for additional disability benefits).

The court of appeals extended our tolling caselaw to a non-tolling case in Kirk v. Cent. States Mfg. Inc. , 2018 Ark. App. 78, 540 S.W.3d 714. There, Kirk was injured in July 2006 and received medical compensation through August 14, 2014, although he had ceased receiving disability benefits almost seven years earlier. Id. at 2, 6, 540 S.W.3d at 715, 717. Kirk filed a claim requesting additional disability benefits on August 18, 2014, and the court of appeals concluded that his claim for additional compensation was barred by the statute of limitations. Id. at 8, 540 S.W.3d at 718. It reached this conclusion even though Kirk's August 2014 request for additional disability benefits was within one year of the last payment of medical benefits. Id. at 5, 540 S.W.3d at 717. Kirk was not a tolling case; it involved the commencement of the statute of limitations for additional benefits. Thus, its holding conflicts with the plain language of section 11-9-702(b)(1). To the extent that Kirk holds that the statute of limitations on a claim for additional benefits commences upon last payment of the specific type of benefit claimant sought, rather than from the date of the last payment of compensation, we overrule it.

The present case also concerns the commencement of the statute of limitations—not tolling. Again, Wynne's last receipt of payment for disability benefits was from November 11 through December 14, 2018, by check issued January 17, 2019. Thus, he filed his February 25, 2019 claim for additional medical benefits within one year of the last payment of compensation relating to his November 2015 right-shoulder injury. We hold that under a plain reading of section 11-9-702(b)(1), Wynne's claim for additional medical benefits was timely. Accordingly, we reverse the Commission's decision and remand for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded; court of appeals’ opinion vacated.

Special Justice Megan Hargraves joins in this opinion.

Wood, J., dissents.

Webb, J., not participating.

Rhonda K. Wood, Justice, dissenting.

Because the majority's interpretation of the statute upends our stable precedent and contradicts the statute's purpose of limiting the time for filing additional benefits, I dissent. This case requires us to interpret whether "of compensation" in Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-702(b)(1) means of any compensation or of such compensation. This statute states,

In cases in which any

...