Xu v. Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc.

655 F.Supp.3d 1214

Michael XU and Daniel Vaz-Pocas,individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. PORSCHE CARS NORTH AMERICA, INC., a Delaware corporation, Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:20-CV-0510-SEG

United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division

Signed January 17, 2023

David James Worley, James M. Evangelista, Kristi Stahnke McGregor, Evangelista Worley, LLC, Atlanta, GA, Paula R. Brown, Pro Hac Vice, Timothy G. Blood, Pro Hac Vice, Blood Hurst & O'Reardon, LLP, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiffs.

Anika Brunson, Pro Hac Vice, Lee Hong Degerman Kang & Wainey, Newport Beach, CA, Brendan Gerard Krasinski, Christopher G. Campbell, DLA Piper LLP, Atlanta, GA, Matthew A. Goldberg, Pro Hac Vice, Timothy Paul Pfenninger, Pro Hac Vice, DLA Piper U.S. LLP, Philadelphia, PA, for Defendant.

ORDER

SARAH E. GERAGHTY, United States District Judge

This case is before the Court on two motions for summary judgment from Defendant Porsche Cars North America, Inc. ("PCNA"). (Docs. 76, 78.) Each motion is directed at the claims of one of the two named plaintiffs in this case. Each has been fully briefed, with responses in opposition filed by Plaintiffs Xu and Vaz-Pocas (Docs. 100, 101) and replies filed by PCNA (Docs. 111, 112). There are several other pending motions in this case, including a motion for class certification (Doc. 86) and three motions to exclude expert reports (Docs. 96, 117, 118). The Court addresses each of these motions in the order that follows.

This is a products liability action regarding an alleged defect in the engine cooling systems of model year 2010-2014 Porsche Panameras with V6 or V8 engines and model year 2011-2014 Porsche Cayennes with V8 engines. The Court, following the parties' practice, refers to the alleged defect as the "Cooling System Issue" and the relevant cars as the "Subject Vehicles." Plaintiffs Michael Xu and Daniel Vaz-Pocas bring this action under California law, New Jersey law, and the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act on their own behalf and that of a purported class of similarly situated Porsche owners. In a prior order, this Court found that all of Plaintiff Xu's claims and some of Plaintiff Vaz-Pocas' claims survived PCNA's motion to dismiss.¹ (Doc. 34.) But each of those claims had potential timeliness problems. Plaintiff Xu's claims were all dependent on his entitlement to equitable tolling of state statutes of limitations. Plaintiff Vaz-Pocas' claims depended, among other things, on the Court's inference that he purchased an extended warranty when he bought his used Porsche Cayenne. These were all, the Court noted, "factually intensive matters that may, with the introduction of evidence at summary judgment, cut off Plaintiffs' claims at the pass." (Doc. 34 at 48.)

After having carefully reviewed the parties' briefing and the extensive evidentiary record in this case, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs' claims cannot overcome the hurdles identified in its prior order. The law and undisputed facts dictate that Plaintiff Xu is not entitled to fraudulent concealment tolling of the statute of limitations, and each of his California law claims is therefore time-barred. (His Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act claim fails, in turn, for lack of a viable state-law warranty cause of action.) PCNA is therefore entitled to summary judgment on Xu's claims. Discovery has also revealed that Plaintiff Vaz-Pocas purchased his vehicle after the expiration of the original warranty's time/mileage limitations on express and implied warranty claims, and that Vaz-Pocas did not purchase an extended warranty. His unconscionability defense to the time/mileage limitation on implied warranty claims fails as a matter of law, so PCNA is also entitled to summary judgment on Vaz-Pocas' remaining claims.

For these reasons, elaborated below, the Court GRANTS both of Defendant's motions for summary judgment (Docs. 76, 78). As a result, the pending motion for class certification (Doc. 86) is DENIED, and the motions to exclude the associated expert reports (Docs. 96, 118) are DENIED AS MOOT. The Court decides the other pending motions just below and then proceeds to its discussion of the summary judgment issues.

I. Motion to Exclude the Expert Report of Jericho Moll, Ph.D., and Serge Gregory, Ph.D.

The parties have offered several expert reports in connection with their briefing on Plaintiffs' motion for class certification. (Docs. 86-46, 97-4, 97-5.) Both parties have moved to exclude the other's experts. (Docs. 96, 117, 118.) Two of these reports are not relied upon at all in the briefing on the motions for summary judgment, so the Court does not address them here.² PCNA does, however, introduce the report containing the opinions of Jericho Moll, Ph.D., and Serge Gregory, Ph.D., as an exhibit to one of its summary judgment reply briefs. (Doc. 111-3.) The Court will therefore consider Plaintiffs' motion to exclude these opinions under Fed. R. Evid. 702 prior to ruling on the summary judgment motions.

For expert testimony to be admissible under Rule 702, the proponent of the testimony must show that: "(1) the expert is qualified to testify competently regarding the matters he intends to address; (2) the methodology by which the expert reaches his conclusions is sufficiently reliable as determined by the sort of inquiry mandated in Daubert; and (3) the testimony assists the trier of fact, through the application of scientific, technical, or specialized expertise, to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 563 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing Fed. R. Evid. 702; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993)).

The report in question contains the opinions of Jericho Moll, Ph.D., a materials scientist, and Serge Gregory, Ph.D., a mechanical engineer. The majority of the report's final conclusions are attributed to Dr. Moll, at whom Plaintiffs target the majority of their arguments. The expert report concludes, among other things, that "manufacturing variability, not material selection" was the source of the alleged defect in the engine cooling systems of the subject vehicles.

Plaintiffs first argue that Dr. Moll is unqualified to offer any opinions on this case because her professional background as a materials scientist renders her not even " 'minimally qualified' to offer opinions on automotive engine cooling systems." (Doc. 119 at 11.) The Court disagrees. Dr. Moll's material extensive scientific expertise in adhesives, polymers, and composites and their failures is clearly relevant here, in a case with alleged adhesive failures at its core. Other courts faced with similar questions have come to similar conclusions. See Simmons v. Ford Motor Co., No. 18-CV-81558-RAR, 2022 WL 168540 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 18, 2022); see also Natl. Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh PA v. SPX Flow US, LLC, 428 F. Supp. 3d 1334, 1337-38 (S.D. Fla. 2019) (considering testimony of materials science expert regarding alleged defect in boat engine).

Plaintiffs next argue that Dr. Moll's methodology is unreliable, because she "cherry picks" evidence and relies on evidence that those in her field would not reasonably rely upon. (Doc. 119 at 11.) They cite to evidence from the record that Dr. Moll allegedly ignored in reaching her conclusions. But the report's appendix does list the cited records among the materials that Dr. Moll considered. A trier of fact would of course be free to draw any reasonable conclusions about the report's treatment of the documents to which Plaintiffs point and to measure Dr. Moll and Dr. Gregory's conclusions in light of them. But the Court cannot say that the failure to quote or cite these records, despite averring that they were reviewed, renders Dr. Moll's methods unreliable. This is especially so in a case with a very large body of record evidence. Nor can the Court agree that Dr. Moll relies exclusively or excessively on the testimony of PCNA representative Erich Metzler. The report cites to the Metzler deposition, but its opinions about the gradual degradation of the cooling system parts are evidently based on a wide variety of evidence from the record, physical inspection of the parts, and scientific studies. (See Doc. 97-4 at 15-29.)

Finally, the Court finds—and Plaintiffs' papers do not seriously dispute—that the Moll/Gregory report would assist the trier of fact. The case is about alleged adhesive failures in car engine cooling systems, and the report offers competent opinions about the cause and nature of those failures.

Plaintiffs' motion to exclude the report of Dr. Moll and Dr. Gregory (Doc. 119) is therefore DENIED.³

II. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment "should be rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). "[T]he Court must view all evidence and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing summary judgment." Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Haves v. City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th Cir. 1995)). "An issue of fact is 'material' if it is a legal element of the claim under the applicable substantive law which might affect the outcome of the case." Allen v. Tyson Foods Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). A factual dispute "is 'genuine' if the record taken as a whole could lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party." Id.

The moving party has the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact under Rule 56(c). Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (...