Xxl of Ohio, Inc. v. City of Broadview Heights

341 F.Supp.2d 765

XXL OF OHIO, INC., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF BROADVIEW HEIGHTS, et al., Defendants/Third Party Plaintiff,

No. 1:01CV2514.

United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Eastern Division.

January 13, 2004.

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Douglas J. Maragas, Bend, OR, Paul A. Mastriacovo, Canton, OH, for Plaintiff.

Kevin P. Weiler, Sr., Weiler & Associates, Brecksville, OH, Carl E. Cormany, Mazanec, Raskin & Ryder, Solon, OH, James A. Climer, Robert F. Cathcart, IV, Mazanec, Raskin & Ryder, Cleveland, OH, for Defendants.

Kevin P. Weiler, Sr., Weiler & Associates, Brecksville, OH, Robert F. Cathcart, IV, Mazanec, Raskin & Ryder, Cleveland, OH, for Third Party Plaintiff.

Carl E. Cormany, Mazanec, Raskin & Ryder, Solon, OH, Timothy D. Johnson, Weston, Hurd, Fallon, Paisley & Howley, Cleveland, OH, for Third Party Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND ORDER

MATIA, Chief Judge.

This action is before the Court upon Magistrate Judge Patricia A. Hemann's Report and Recommendation (Doc. 85).

It is not necessary to duplicate Magistrate Judge Hemann's thorough and exhaustive review of the law here. The Court, after lengthy de novo consideration of the objections filed by the defendants (Doc. 87) and the plaintiff (Doc. 89), overrules said objections and approves and adopts the report and recommendation — with two exceptions.

The Court does not agree with the magistrate judge's recommendation that the defense of qualified immunity should not be available to the mayor and members of the city council of Broadview Heights. "[T]o find a clearly established constitutional right, a district court must find binding precedent by the Supreme Court, its court of appeals or itself." Ohio Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n v. Seiter, 858 F.2d 1171, 1177 (6th Cir.1988). "For a right to be clearly established, `[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.'" Centanni v. Eight Unknown Officers, 15 F.3d 587, 588 (6th Cir.) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1236, 114 S.Ct. 2740, 129 L.Ed.2d 860 (1994).

The Court finds that the law was not — indeed, is not — clearly established in this area. Although a prior case in this district struck down a similar ordinance, North Olmsted Chamber of Commerce v. City of North Olmsted, 86 F.Supp.2d 755 (N.D.Ohio 2000), there has been no decision by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. In fact, certain aspects of the Broadview Heights sign code were previously upheld by this Court. Sims v. City of Broadview Heights, No. 1:91cv1070 (N.D. Ohio filed March 11, 1993), rev'd and remanded, 41 F.3d 1507, 1994 WL 637806 (6th Cir. Nov.14, 1994), No. 1:91cv1070 (N.D. Ohio filed Aug. 7, 1995), appeal dism'd per stipulation, No. 95-3957 (6th Cir. filed June 10, 1997). Additionally, other district courts have disagreed with the North Olmsted analysis. E.g., Granite State Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Clearwater, Florida, 213 F.Supp.2d 1312, 1328 (M.D.Fla.2002), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded, 351 F.3d 1112 (11th Cir.2003). Thus it cannot be said that the law was clearly established when the city officials took the action that led to this complaint.

The Court also declines to overturn Chapter 1479 of the Certified Ordinances of Broadview Heights ("the sign ordinance" or "the ordinance") en toto or order the alteration of the ordinance. The undersigned doesn't think a judge should order a legislative body to alter an ordinance. The magistrate judge has indicated how the sign ordinance could be changed to pass constitutional muster,¹ but the decision whether to do so is properly left to the council.

Moreover, this Court wishes to make it perfectly clear that it does not agree with the current state of the law with respect to First Amendment protection for commercial speech. However, the Court is bound to follow Supreme Court interpretations, no matter how mistaken they may be. Accordingly,

1. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 57) is GRANTED and defendants' motion for summary judgment (Doc. 67) is DENIED as to the following claims:

a. the ordinance unconstitutionally restricts non-commercial speech and impermissibly discriminates as to non-commercial speech according to its content;

b. the ordinance impermissibly discriminates as to commercial speech according to content;

c. the ordinance is an impermissible prior restraint of speech;

d. the selective prohibition on pole signs in the sign ordinance makes impermissible content-based distinctions; and

e. The City of Broadview Heights violated the plaintiff's right to procedural due process in removing the pole sign.

2. Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Doc. 67) is GRANTED as to the plaintiff's claim that Broadview Heights' application of the sign ordinance violates the equal protection clause.

3. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 57) is GRANTED IN PART and defendants' motion for summary judgment (Doc. 67) is GRANTED IN PART as to:

a. the plaintiff's claim that certain terms in the ordinance are void for vagueness (as described on pp. 806-08 of the Report and Recommendation); and

b. the plaintiff's claim that the sign ordinance facially violates the equal protection clause (as described on pp. 810-12 of the Report and Recommendation).

4. The Court declines to rule on the arguments regarding whether Broadview Heights' sign ordinance violates Ohio's ban on retroactive zoning changes because they involve issues of state law made moot by the Court's resolution of the plaintiff's federal claims.

5. The named individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

6. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 57) and defendants' motion for summary judgment (Doc. 67) are DENIED as to all other claims.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Docket 57, 67

HEMANN, United States Magistrate Judge.

                                             I. Outline
    Magistrate judge jurisdiction ......................................................................774
    Background .........................................................................................774
    General questions of law ...........................................................................777
    First Amendment claims .............................................................................777
         Standing and overbreadth ......................................................................778
         Standards of review ...........................................................................780
             Non-commercial speech .....................................................................780
                 Content-based restrictions on non-commercial speech ...................................780
                 Content-neutral restrictions on non-commercial speech .................................782
             Commercial speech .........................................................................783
         The ordinance and content discrimination ......................................................784
             Content discrimination in the ordinance and non-commercial speech .........................784
                 Content-based restrictions on speech in the ordinance .................................784
                 The extent of content-based restrictions on non-commercial speech .....................785
                 Content-based restrictions on non-commercial speech and strict
                 review ................................................................................789
             Content discrimination in the ordinance and commercial speech..............................792
                 Standard of review ....................................................................792
                 Restrictions on commercial speech and the time, place, and manner
                 test ..................................................................................792
                       Content-based restrictions on commercial speech .................................792
                       Content-based restrictions on commercial speech not narrowly
                       tailored ........................................................................794
         The ban on pole signs .........................................................................795
         The ordinance and prior restraint .............................................................797
             Permits and prior restraint ...............................................................797
             The permit scheme in Broadview Heights' sign ordinance ....................................798
             Broadview Heights' sign ordinance as a system of prior restraint...........................801
         Severability ..................................................................................803
             The standard for severability .............................................................803
             Severability and violations of the First Amendment in the ordinance........................804
         Conclusions ...................................................................................804
    Vagueness claim ....................................................................................805
         The standard for determining impermissible vagueness ..........................................805
         Vagueness in the sign ordinance ...............................................................806
         Severability of impermissibly vague terms .....................................................808
         Conclusions

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