Yager v. State

362 P.3d 777

Christopher James YAGER, Appellant (Defendant),

v.The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).

No. S–15–0045.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

Oct. 30, 2015.

Representing Appellant: Kevin K. Kessner and Christopher M. Sherwood, Yonkee & Toner, LLP, Sheridan, Wyoming. Argument by Mr. Kessner.

Representing Appellee: Peter K. Michael, Attorney General; David L. Delicath, Deputy Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Joshua C. Eames, Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Mr. Eames.

Before BURKE, C.J., and HILL, DAVIS, FOX, and KAUTZ, JJ.

BURKE, Chief Justice.

[¶ 1] Appellant, Christopher Yager, challenges his conviction of third-degree sexual assault. He contends Wyoming's sexual assault statute does not apply to sexual contact between probation officers and probationers. We affirm.

ISSUE

[¶ 2] Appellant presents one issue which we have restated:

Is a probation officer an "employee ... of a state ... correctional system" under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6–2–303(a)(vii) ?¹

FACTS

[¶ 3] Appellant was employed as a probation and parole agent by the Wyoming Department of Corrections, Division of Field Services. In that capacity, Appellant supervised probationers and parolees. In May 2011, Appellant began supervising M.C. as a result of her participation in a drug court treatment program. Appellant's supervision of M.C. ceased after her completion of the treatment program in August 2012. M.C.'s probation was scheduled to expire on April 27, 2013. However, on April 11, M.C. tested positive for methamphetamine, and the State moved to revoke her probation. After a hearing, the district court found she had violated the terms of her probation. As a result, the court revoked M.C.'s probation and re-imposed her original sentence of 18 to 24 months. The court imposed an additional 45–day term in jail and suspended the balance of the sentence in favor of 18 months probation conditional on M.C.'s re-application to and completion of the drug court program.

[¶ 4] Appellant continued to have contact with M.C. after she completed her initial drug treatment program and the two began a romantic relationship in January 2013. Appellant visited M.C. at her residence to "hang out." In February 2013, Appellant and M.C. began a sexual relationship. At least one of their sexual encounters occurred in Appellant's office. Appellant's sexual relationship with M.C. ended in May 2013. Although Appellant was not M.C.'s supervising agent during the period of their sexual relationship, he was aware that she was under the supervision of another agent employed by the Wyoming Department of Corrections.

[¶ 5] M.C. reported her relationship with Appellant to her probation officer. That report ultimately resulted in the State charging Appellant with second-degree sexual assault pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6–2–303(a)(vii) (LexisNexis 2011).² That statute provided as follows:

§ 6–2–303. Sexual assault in the second degree.

(a) Any actor who inflicts sexual intrusion on a victim commits sexual assault in the second degree if, under circumstances not constituting sexual assault in the first degree:

...

(vii) The actor is an employee, independent contractor or volunteer of a state, county, city or town, or privately operated adult or juvenile correctional system, including but not limited to jails, penal institutions, detention centers, juvenile residential or rehabilitative facilities, adult community correctional facilities, secure treatment facilities or work release facilities, and the victim is known or should be known by the actor to be a resident of such facility or under supervision of the correctional system[.]

Appellant moved to dismiss the charge under W.R.Cr.P. 12(b)(2), asserting that the statute does not apply to probation officers or probationers. Following a hearing, the district court denied the motion.

[¶ 6] In accordance with a plea agreement, Appellant entered a conditional guilty plea to an amended charge of third-degree sexual assault under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6–2–304³ , which requires "sexual contact" under any of the circumstances set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6–2–303. He reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss. Appellant was sentenced to 18 to 36 months in prison, suspended in favor of two years of probation. This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶ 7] In this case, we must determine whether Appellant is an "employee ... of a state ... correctional system" under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6–2–303. Resolution of this issue involves a question of statutory interpretation. We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Spreeman v. State, 2012 WY 88, ¶ 6, 278 P.3d 1159, 1161 (Wyo.2012).

DISCUSSION

[¶ 8] In his only issue, Appellant contends the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss because Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6–2–303(a)(vii) does not apply to his conduct. Appellant claims that he was not an "employee ... of a state ... correctional system" within the meaning of the statute. Appellant concedes that he was an employee of the Department of Corrections. He claims, however, that he was not an employee of a "correctional system" under the unambiguous meaning of that term. Relying on the principles of ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis, he contends the term "correctional system" should be interpreted in light of the facilities listed in the statute. He notes that each of the listed facilities involves confinement of the person under supervision of the correctional system, whereas probation does not.

[¶ 9] Appellant further claims that interpreting "correctional system" to encompass probation is contrary to the intent of the legislature. He also addresses the final element in the statute, which requires that "the victim is known or should be known by the actor to be a resident of such facility or under supervision of the correctional system." He asserts that "under supervision of the correctional system" does not mean supervision of probationers. Appellant acknowledges that the statute's reference to work release facilities and community correctional facilities includes persons who are not physically confined, but he asserts that these examples are different from probation because probationers are not in "official detention" under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6–5–201(a)(ii). In sum, he claims that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6–2–303(a)(vii) was intended to protect inmates, residents, or certain other supervisees, but not probationers.

[¶ 10] In response, the State contends that Wyoming law forbids a probation officer from having sexual relations with a probationer. The State contends Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6–2–303(a)(vii) is unambiguous and that the ordinary meaning of "correctional system" includes probation officers and probationers. The State further claims that, had the legislature intended to limit the meaning of the term "correctional system" to facilities that detain inmates, it could have used the phrase "correctional facility," as it has in other statutes. The State also contends that the principle of ejusdem generis is not applicable because the statute expressly states that employees of a state correctional system are "not limited to" employees of the enumerated facilities. The State asserts that the rule of noscitur a sociis also does not apply because the statute is not ambiguous. With respect to the last phrase of the statute, the State claims that by defining victims to include persons "under supervision of the correctional system" the legislature clearly intended to include probation agents and probationers.

[¶ 11] In determining whether Appellant is an employee of a state correctional system, we apply our usual rules of statutory interpretation: "Our paramount consideration is the legislature's intent as reflected in the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used in the statute. Initially, we determine whether the statute is clear or ambiguous." Spreeman, ¶ 10, 278 P.3d at 1162.

A statute is unambiguous if its wording is such that reasonable persons are able to agree as to its meaning with consistency and predictability. Unless another meaning is clearly intended, words and phrases shall be taken in their ordinary and usual sense. Conversely, a statute is ambiguous only if it is found to be vague or uncertain and subject to varying interpretations. In determining whether a statute is ambiguous we begin by making an inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed according to their arrangement and connection. We construe the statute as a whole, giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence, and we construe all parts of the statute in pari materia. When a statute is sufficiently clear and unambiguous, we give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words and do not resort to the rules of statutory construction.

Jones v. State, 2011 WY 115, ¶ 11, 256 P.3d 536, 541 (Wyo.2011). As noted above, both parties assert that the statute is unambiguous.

[¶ 12] We must determine what the legislature intended by the phrase "employee ... of a state ... correctional system." It is undisputed that Appellant is an "employee" of the "state." The controversy in the present case is limited to the meaning of "correctional system." Although "correctional system" is not defined in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6–2–303, the common definition of "correctional system" is "A network of governmental agencies that administer a jurisdiction's prisons and parole system." Black's Law Dictionary 420 (10th ed.2014). We also note that the term "corrections" is commonly defined as "The punishment and treatment of a criminal offender through a program of imprisonment, parole, and probation." Id.

[¶ 13] In Wyoming, the entity primarily responsible for administering Wyoming's correctional system is the Department of Corrections. Wyoming's prisons are assigned to the Department of Corrections. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 9–2–2012(c). The departments of probation and parole have also been assigned to the Department of Corrections....