Yahtues v. Old Colony Corr. Ctr.

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Malachi I. Yahtues v. Old Colony Correctional Center et al.

No. 21-cv-533-SE

Opinion No. 2024 DNH 031

United States District Court, D. New Hampshire

March 29, 2024

ORDER

SAMANTHA D. ELLIOTT UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Pro se petitioner Malachi Yahtues brings a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his state conviction and sentence. He alleges that his conviction pursuant to New Hampshire's Armed Career Criminal Act is no longer valid because a Massachusetts state court vacated his conviction for one of the underlying predicate offenses that formed the basis of that charge. The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's order denying Yahtues's motion to vacate or set aside his sentence, concluding that Yahtues still qualified as an armed career criminal for the purpose of New Hampshire law even without the vacated conviction. Yahtues challenges that determination in his § 2254 petition, and the defendants move for summary judgment.

Standard of Review

A petitioner seeking habeas relief from a state court decision under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) faces a demanding burden. Cooper v. Bergeron, 778 F.3d 294, 299 (1st Cir. 2015). Under AEDPA, habeas relief “shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless” the petitioner shows that the decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2); see also Bebo v. Medeiros, 906 F.3d 129, 134 (1st Cir. 2018).

To be deemed “contrary to clearly established federal law,” a state court decision must “announce[ ] a rule of law that directly contradicts existing Supreme Court precedent or . . . reach[ ] a different result than the Supreme Court on materially indistinguishable facts.” Cronin v. Comm'r of Prob., 783 F.3d 47 50 (1st Cir. 2015) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000)). An unreasonable application also occurs if “the state court identifies the correct governing legal rule . . . but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner's case.” White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 425 (2014) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 407-08). “For purposes of § 2254(d)(1), an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (citation omitted). To merit a writ of habeas corpus the petitioner must show that “the state court's ruling on the claim presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there [is] an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Id. “The state court's ruling may be objectively reasonable even if the federal habeas court, exercising its independent judgment, would have reached a different conclusion.” Gomes v. Silva, 958 F.3d 12, 20 (1st Cir. 2020) (citation omitted); see also Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 17 (2003) (per curiam) (holding that federal court sitting in habeas jurisdiction “may not overrule a state court for simply holding a view different from its own, when the precedent from [the Supreme] Court is, at best, ambiguous”).

In assessing whether a state court's decision “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented” under § 2254(d)(2), “the fundamental principle of deference to [a state court's factual] findings still applies.” Hensley v. Roden, 755 F.3d 724, 731 (1st Cir. 2014). A federal habeas court “may not characterize [challenged] state-court factual determinations as unreasonable merely because [it] would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.” Brumfield v. Cain, 576 U.S. 305, 313-14 (2015) (citation omitted). Additionally, under § 2254(e)(1), the federal court must presume that a state court's factual findings are correct unless the petitioner overcomes that presumption by providing “clear and convincing evidence.”^[1] 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

With that framework established, the court turns to the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A material fact is one that “carries with it the potential to affect the outcome of the suit.” French v. Merrill, 15 F.4th 116, 123 (1st Cir. 2021) (quotation omitted). A material fact is in genuine dispute if “a reasonable jury could resolve the point in the favor of the non-moving party.” Id. The court construes the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Benson v. Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P., 14 F.4th 13, 17 (1st Cir. 2021). In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court may review materials cited in the motion and other materials in the record. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(3).

Background

On September 2, 2016, Yahtues was convicted and sentenced on a number of felony offenses in the Hillsborough County Superior Court, Northern District (“HCSC-ND”), pursuant to a plea agreement in a state criminal case, State v. Yahtues, No. 216-2014-CR-709 (HCSC- ND). As part of the plea agreement, Yahtues pleaded guilty to being an Armed Career Criminal (“ACC”), for possessing a firearm after having been convicted of three or more qualifying felonies.

New Hampshire's ACC statute, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. (“RSA”) § 159:3-a, I, provides:

No person who has been convicted of any combination of 3 or more felonies in this state or any other state under homicide, assault, sexual assault, arson, burglary, robbery, extortion, child sexual abuse images, or controlled drug laws, shall own or have in his or her possession or under his or her control, a pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, or any other firearm.

As is relevant to Yahtues's arguments in this case, the New Hampshire Supreme Court (“NHSC”) has held that to be convicted under 159:3-a, a defendant must have “qualifying convictions from three or more criminal episodes,” rather than merely three qualifying felony convictions. State v. Folds, 172 N.H. 513, 524 (2019).

During Yahtues's sentencing hearing before the HCSC-ND, the State proffered the following with respect to Yahtues's status as an ACC:

The final thing, I believe you need for the offer of proof, Your Honor, is the Defendant does have a criminal history. Among other things it does include -- it includes an assault and battery with a dangerous weapon, and an armed assault. It includes another assault with a dangerous weapon, an assault on a police officer, possession of Class B substances with intent to distribute; these are Massachusetts charges. Possession to distribute Class B substances, 2011 distributing controlled substances cocaine, certainly qualifying offenses for the armed career criminal statute.

Doc. no. 1-2 at 71-72. Yahtues and his counsel represented to the court that Yahtues understood the charges, did not disagree with the State's offer of proof, and was making a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his rights. Id. at 82-90. The court sentenced Yahtues to a ten-to-twenty-year prison term on the ACC charge, the mandatory minimum sentence for that offense. See RSA 159:3-a, II.

In January 2019, a Massachusetts state court granted Yahtues's motion to vacate one of his prior drug convictions.^[2] Doc. no. 18-3 at 54. On August 7, 2019, the District Attorney's Office entered a nolle prosequi for that charge. Id. at 55.

Yahtues subsequently filed a motion to vacate or set aside his sentence on the ACC charge in the HCSC-ND. He asserted that “because a prior conviction ‘relied upon' by the State as a predicate conviction for the armed career criminal charge has been nolle prosequied by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, his conviction on the armed career criminal offense must be vacated.” Doc. no. 1-2 at 5. The superior court denied Yahtues's motion. The court noted that Yahtues and his counsel did not contest the prosecutor's listing of the prior convictions or indicate that they did not qualify as predicate offenses. Id. at 6. The court also stated that Yahtues had been provided in discovery with “certified copies of several convictions” from Massachusetts, as well as a “copy of his Massachusetts Criminal History compiled by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Department of Justice Information Services.” Id. at 6. It concluded:

The defendant was put on notice of the qualifying conviction[s] in the discovery provided. Defendant did not contest the sufficiency of the predicate offenses at his plea and sentencing hearing and, even without the one drug conviction which has been vacated by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, there were sufficient additional offenses to establish 3 or more convictions for the offense of armed career criminal.

Id. at 7 (citation omitted). Yahtues filed a motion to reconsider, which the court denied.

In June 2020, Yahtues appealed the orders denying his motion to vacate his sentence and for reconsideration to the NHSC. Yahtues argued “that the trial court erred by denying his motion to vacate because: (1) the State, in its offer of proof in the 2016 proceeding, did not provide certified copies of the predicate prior convictions; and (2) one of the predicate convictions was later vacated.” Doc. no. 1-2 at 149.

The NHSC affirmed the superior court's “well-reasoned” orders. Id. The court stated:

Although the defendant asserts that, without the vacated conviction,

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