Yarbrough v. Brooks

JAMES D. YARBROUGH AND TARRIS WOODS, Appellants v. JAMES C. BROOKS, Appellee

No. 14-19-00748-CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, Fourteenth District

September 2, 2021

On Appeal from the Probate Court Galveston County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. PR-0078656-A

Panel consists of Chief Justice Christopher and Justices Jewell and Poissant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Kevin Jewell Justice

This appeal involves the validity of real property conveyances in Galveston, Texas. Appellee James C. Brooks sued to set aside two deeds transferring property once owned by his mother. Brooks was identified on the first deed as the grantor, but he claims both deeds are void. The trial court agreed with him and granted summary judgment voiding the two deeds. The court also ruled that two subsequent purchasers, appellants James D. Yarbrough and Tarris Woods, never obtained any legal interest in the property. The trial court implicitly denied a cross-motion for summary judgment filed by Yarbrough on his affirmative defenses and claims.

We conclude summary judgment in Brooks's favor was improper. Based on the record before us, he did not conclusively establish that the deeds were void for the reasons advanced in his motion for summary judgment. Additionally, genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment for Yarbrough, so the court did not err in denying Yarbrough's cross-motion. Accordingly, we affirm in part reverse in part, and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

Background A. Summary of facts and allegations

In an application to determine heirship, Brooks alleged his mother Hilda Brooks, died intestate on or about June 18, 2007. At the time of her death, Hilda owned property located at 2919 Avenue K in Galveston (the "Property"). Brooks asserted that Hilda had seven children besides himself Clinton W. Brooks, Jr. (deceased with living children) Frederick Brooks (deceased with living children); Sandra Jacqou; Veronica Brooks (deceased with living children); Michael Brooks (deceased with living children); Samuel K. Brooks; and Carl A. Brooks (deceased).

In June 2011, the sheriff sold the Property based on a judgment for unpaid taxes. The sale was recorded in the official Galveston County real property records on June 24, 2011. However, the Property was redeemed on September 12, 2011. That day, Brooks purportedly transferred the Property by warranty deed to appellant Woods (the "Woods Deed"). The Woods Deed was recorded on September 23, 2011. The Woods Deed is the first deed at issue in this appeal.

Our record contains an affidavit of heirship, signed by Barbara Baldwin on July 29, 2011, and recorded on September 16, 2011 (the "Baldwin Affidavit"). The Baldwin Affidavit provided:^[1]

1. My name is Barbara Baldwin and I live at____. ^[2] I am personally familiar with the family and marital history of Mrs. Hilda Mae Brooks, and I have personal knowledge of the facts stated in this affidavit.

2. I knew Mrs. Brooks over 50 yrs years [sic]. She died on June 18, 2005, in Galveston, Texas. At the time of her death, she lived at 2919 Avenue K, Galveston, Texas.

3. Mrs. Brooks was married to Mr. Clinton Woodrow Brooks, (now decease[d])

4. Mr. and Mrs. Brooks had the following children:

James Clinton Brooks

Veronica Brooks (decease[d])

Samuel Brooks (decease[d])

The Baldwin Affidavit differs factually from Brooks's heirship application in at least two respects. First, the Baldwin Affidavit listed Brooks as Hilda's only surviving child, whereas Brooks has identified other living heirs. The Baldwin Affidavit also reflected that Hilda died on June 18, 2005, rather than June 18, 2007, as Brooks alleged in his heirship application. Additionally, the Baldwin Affidavit omitted certain information heirship affidavits generally include. See Tex. Est. Code § 203.002 (Form of Affidavit Concerning Identity of Heirs).

Approximately two years after the Woods Deed and the Baldwin Affidavit were recorded, Woods transferred the Property by warranty deed with vendor's lien to appellant Yarbrough on September 12, 2013 (the "Yarbrough Deed"). The Yarbrough Deed was recorded the next day. According to our record, Yarbrough currently possesses the Property. The Yarbrough Deed is the second deed at issue in this appeal.

Nearly five years later, on April 11, 2018, Brooks instituted the present proceeding by filing an application to determine heirship and for a declaratory judgment in which he sought to have the Baldwin Affidavit and both the Woods and Yarbrough Deeds declared void for multiple reasons, discussed below. In amended pleadings, Brooks named Yarbrough and Woods as defendants, but the record does not show service of process on either defendant.

Yarbrough filed a petition in intervention on June 18. Yarbrough contended that the deeds were not void but at most were voidable and that Brooks's claims were barred by the statute of limitations. Yarbrough also asserted he was a bona fide purchaser who took the Property in good faith for valuable consideration and, separately, that he owned the Property through adverse possession. Yarbrough sought a declaratory judgment to quiet title and for equitable subrogation.

B. Summary judgment proceedings

Brooks and Yarbrough filed cross-motions for summary judgment. In Brooks's motion, he sought summary judgment on his claim to declare the Woods and Yarbrough Deeds void. His key assertions for our purposes pertained to the Woods Deed, which he claimed was void for several reasons pertaining to alleged forgery or the omission of certain required information. We discuss his arguments in detail below. Because the Woods Deed was void, Brooks continued, the Yarbrough Deed was also void. Separately, Brooks argued the Baldwin Affidavit was void because it did not comply with Estates Code section 203.002, regarding the form of an affidavit concerning the identity of heirs. Brooks attached his affidavit, which generally supported his version of events set forth in the motion. He also attached copies of the recorded Woods Deed and Yarbrough Deed.

Yarbrough moved for partial summary judgment on his limitations defense and his trespass to try title claim. He argued that neither the Woods Deed nor the Yarbrough Deed was void because each deed sufficiently described the Property, conveyed it to and from existing persons, was signed, and was not forged. At most, according to Yarbrough, the deeds were voidable as obtained through fraud. But because neither Brooks nor anyone else sought to set aside the voidable deeds during the four-year limitations period, ^[3] the deeds operated to transfer the Property to him. As to his trespass to try title claim, Yarbrough claimed that he had peaceably and adversely possessed the property under color of title for more than three years.

The record does not indicate that Woods was served with, or had notice of, the summary judgment proceedings. When the trial court heard the cross-motions, Woods still had not been served with process.

The trial court granted Brooks's motion for partial summary judgment. The order includes the following pertinent rulings:

(1) the Baldwin Affidavit was "defective and shall be corrected in a court hearing to determine heirship, which will produce a proper judgment naming all the heirs";

(2) both the Woods and Yarbrough deeds were void as a matter of law, though the order does not identify the specific ground on which the court found both deeds void; and

(3) neither Woods nor Yarbrough ever had any legal interest in the Property.

The order does not say so, but we construe it as implicitly denying Yarbrough's cross-motion for summary judgment. Yarbrough moved for reconsideration, but the trial court denied his motion. Thereafter, on August 27, 2019, the trial court severed "all claims" between Yarbrough and Brooks, thus making the summary judgment order appealable. Yarbrough timely filed an appeal.

Meanwhile, Yarbrough filed an amended petition in the estate proceedings, repeating most of his original claims and defenses as to Brooks and adding additional claims against Woods for breach of the warranties contained in the Yarbrough Deed. Yarbrough served Woods with the amended petition on October 24, 2019. According to Woods, these events caused him to discover for the first time on November 12 that a court had voided the two deeds to which he was a party. Woods filed pleadings on November 12 in the severed action, including an answer and counter- and cross-claims, and sought to set aside the summary judgment. The trial court took no action on Woods's pleadings but determined that Woods first learned of the summary judgment order on November 12. Woods filed a notice of appeal in the severed action and has filed a brief in our court.

Issues Presented

Yarbrough challenges the summary judgment order. In his appellate brief, Yarbrough complains the trial court erred by: (1) declaring the Woods Deed and the Yarbrough Deed void; (2) denying his cross-motion for summary judgment on limitations; and (3) "ignoring" his adverse possession claim. Alternatively, Yarbrough says fact issues exist on his bona fide purchaser status, limitations, and adverse possession.

Woods has also filed an appellant's brief. In sum, he contends the summary judgment order declaring his lack of interest in the Property and voiding the deeds violated his due process rights, or alternatively does not bind him, because Brooks never served him with any pleading or citation. Woods also contests the merits of summary judgment relief.

For his part, Brooks has filed multiple briefs, signed by more than one attorney.^[4] On the points we find dispositive, we conclude Brooks's various briefs may be construed consistently, and we consider all of them.

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