Yarrington v. Candor Cent. Sch. Dist.

AMANDA YARRINGTON, Plaintiff, v. CANDOR CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT;JEFFREY J. KISLOSKI,individually and in his Official Capacity as Superintendent of Schools for the Candor Central School District;BERN SMITH, individually and in his Official Capacity as Directorof Operations for the Candor Central School District;DAREN JENSEN,individually and in his Official Capacity as Transportation Supervisor for the Candor Central School District;and GREG NICHOLS, individually andin his Official Capacity as Mechanic for the Candor Central School District, Defendants.

3:18-CV-1250 (FJS/ML)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

March 27, 2020

APPEARANCES

LAW OFFICES OF RONALD R. BENJAMIN

126 Riverside Drive

P.O. Box 607

Binghamton, New York 13902

Attorneys for Plaintiff

THE LAW FIRM OF FRANK W. MILLER

499 S. Warren St. Suite 3050

Syracuse, New York 13057

Attorneys for Defendants

OF COUNSEL

RONALD R. BENJAMIN, ESQ.

CHARLES C. SPAGNOLI, ESQ.

FRANK W. MILLER, ESQ.

GIANCARLO FACCIPONTE, ESQ.

SCULLIN, Senior Judge

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Amanda Yarrington ("Plaintiff"), a bus driver for the Candor Central School District ("Defendant District"), brought this action based on gender discrimination against Defendant District, its Superintendent ("Defendant Kisloski"), its Director of Operations ("Defendant Smith"), its Transportation Supervisor ("Defendant Jensen"), and its former Chief Mechanic ("Defendant Nichols") seeking compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorney's fees. See generally Dkt. No. 1, Compl. Pending before the Court are Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, see Dkt. No. 13, and their motion for summary judgment, see Dkt. No. 58, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.¹

II. BACKGROUND

The majority of Plaintiff's gender-discrimination claims stem from issues with Defendant Nichols.² Plaintiff worked for Defendant District for four or five years before she began having issues with Defendant Nichols in 2005. See Dkt. No. 58-2, Defs' Stmt. of Facts, at ¶¶ 1, 8, 15.³Generally, those issues included Defendant Nichols being silent to her, leaving notes on her bus to clean it, giving her the finger once while they were driving past each other, swearing at her, raising his voice, slamming doors, and once throwing a ladder (though Plaintiff admits she was not at work when the ladder was supposedly thrown). See id. at ¶¶ 16-18, 20. Plaintiff complained of these issues to her first-level supervisor, Defendant Jensen, her second level supervisor, Defendant Smith, and later to Defendant Kisloski. See id. at ¶¶ 13, 16, 35-38. Plaintiff admits, however, that she never made any accusations against Defendant Nichols of gender-based discrimination. See id. at ¶ 34. Plaintiff met with all three of her supervisors in February of 2016 about her issues with Defendant Nichols, in which Defendant Kisloski informed her that the two would learn to get along or one or both of them would be fired. See id. at ¶ 44. After this meeting, Plaintiff tried to "avoid" Defendant Nichols, but there was no substantial change in their relationship, and they continued to have problems. See id. at ¶¶ 52, 58-59, 64-65.

Two events in particular ultimately led to Plaintiff's termination. First, sometime in October of 2016, Plaintiff deviated approximately four miles in total from her bus route while transporting children from TST BOCES in Ithaca back to Defendant District so that she could look for recycled glass bottles to use for crafts. See id. at ¶¶ 73, 83; Dkt. No. 60-1 at ¶ 73. Plaintiff did not have permission to deviate from her route in that manner. See Dkt. No. 58-2 at ¶ 80.

Second, on December 6, 2016, Plaintiff parked her bus in front of a garage bay door, thus blocking the entrance and exit; and Defendant Nichols told her she could not leave her bus there. See id. at ¶ 86; Dkt. No. 60-1 at ¶ 86. The parties argued, and Plaintiff testified thatDefendant Nichols was "loud" and used profanity during the dispute. See Dkt. No. 60-1 at ¶ 86. Plaintiff admits that she was aware that she was not supposed to leave her bus in front of the garage bay door in that manner and that Defendant Jensen eventually moved the bus for her during the incident in an attempt to diffuse the situation. See Dkt. No. 58-2 at ¶¶ 87-88. After Defendant Smith arrived at the bus garage, he directed Plaintiff to sit in her car; and she refused before ultimately complying with his direction. See id. at ¶ 96.

Plaintiff met with Defendants Kisloski and Smith on December 8, 2016, to discuss her detour from her bus route in October and the incident on December 6th. See id. at ¶ 105. At the meeting, Plaintiff admitted to the facts surrounding the October 2016 detour; and, as a result of her admission, she was placed on administrative leave. See id. at ¶¶ 105, 110. In late December of 2016, Defendant District notified Plaintiff that she was subject to disciplinary charges and would be provided a Civil Service Law Section 75 hearing. See id. at ¶ 114.

Defendant District filed four disciplinary charges against Plaintiff on December 20, 2016, all stemming from her bus route deviation in October 2016 and her altercation with Defendants Nichols and Smith on December 6, 2016. See id. at ¶ 115. The section 75 disciplinary hearing took place on January 20, 2017, before a hearing officer. See id. at ¶ 123. During the hearing, Plaintiff was represented by counsel, had the ability to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and testified on her own behalf. See id. at ¶¶ 123-124, 126. On March 3, 2017, the hearing officer found that Plaintiff was guilty of misconduct because she (1) took an unauthorized detour in October of 2016, (2) acted "unprofessionally" with Defendant Nichols on December 6, 2016, and (3) was insubordinate when she did not comply with Defendant Smith's first directive to leave the building on December 6, 2016. See generally Dkt. No. 58-20, Ex. N, Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact and Recommendation. On March 7, 2017,Defendant District's Board of Education adopted the hearing officer's findings of fact and terminated Plaintiff's employment. See Dkt. No. 58-2 at ¶ 193.

During the course of these events, Plaintiff filed two complaints with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), which were also filed with the New York State Division of Human Rights ("NYSDHR"), alleging discrimination and retaliation.⁴ Plaintiff's retaliation claim stemmed from a report Defendant Kisloski received on January 25, 2017, that Plaintiff had carried a pistol in her purse while driving her bus in 2014 or 2015. See Dkt. No. 13-5, Ex. F. The NYSDHR found no probable cause for either claim. See Dkt. Nos. 13-6, Ex. F and 13-7, Ex. H. Plaintiff then filed her complaint in the instant action on October 23, 2018. See generally Dkt. No. 1.⁵

III. DISCUSSION

A. Legal standards

"The standard for granting a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings is identical to that of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim." Patel v. Contemporary Classics of Beverly Hills, 259 F.3d 123, 126 (2d Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). Thus, when considering such a motion, a court must "'construe plaintiff['s] complaint liberally, accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in plaintiff['s] favor.'" Selevan v. N.Y. Thruway Auth., 584 F.3d 82, 88 (2d Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted).Although a plaintiff is not required to plead "detailed factual allegations," a plaintiff is required to plead "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action..." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007) (citation omitted). Finally, in deciding a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a court may consider the pleadings, documents attached thereto as exhibits, documents incorporated by reference, documents that are integral to the complaint, and matters upon which the court may take judicial notice. See Holland v. City of New York, No. 10 Civ. 2525 (PKC) (RLE), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144941, *9 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2011) (quotations and other citations omitted).

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs motions for summary judgment. Under this Rule, the entry of summary judgment is warranted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). When deciding a summary judgment motion, a court must resolve any ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (citation omitted).

B. Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings

1. Exhaustion of administrative remedies

The only issue Defendants raised in their motion for judgment on the pleadings that they did not reargue in their motion for summary judgment was whether the Court should dismiss some of Plaintiff's claims for failure to exhaust her administrative remedies. Specifically, Defendants argue that Plaintiff did not include claims for disparate impact or pattern or practice discrimination in her EEOC complaint and that these claims are not reasonably related to the instances of discrimination that she alleged in her complaint. See Dkt. No. 25, Defs' Reply inSupport of Mot. on Pleadings, at 8-9. Defendants also assert that Plaintiff is limited to the factual allegations of acts of discrimination included in her EEOC complaint. See id. at 9.

"A plaintiff may bring an employment discrimination action under Title VII ... only after filing a timely charge with the EEOC or with 'a State or local agency with authority to grant or seek relief from such practice.'" Holtz v. Rockefeller & Co., Inc., 258 F.3d 62, 82-83 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)) (other citation omitted). "Exhaustion of remedies is a precondition to suit ... and a...