Yattaw v. City of E. Providence

203 A.3d 1167

Austin YATTAW

v.The CITY OF EAST PROVIDENCE et al.

No. 2017-274-Appeal. (PC 13-820)

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

April 2, 2019

For Plaintiff: Adam J. Resmini, Esq., Ronald J. Resmini, Esq., Providence.

For Defendants: Caroline V. Murphy, Esq., Marc DeSisto, Esq., Providence.

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ.

Justice Goldberg, for the Court.

Once again, the Supreme Court is confronted with a case involving an innocent adolescent who suffered serious injuries, alleged to be caused by defects in a public park, and who is denied a judicial remedy because the municipality is immune from liability for any negligence. Although we affirm the entry of summary judgment in this case, we hasten to add that, no matter the age of the child nor the severity of the injury, in light of the protections afforded by the Recreational Use Statute, G.L. 1956 chapter 6 of title 32 (the RUS), there is no recourse in our courts, because users of most public parks are treated as trespassers under the law.¹

This case came before the Supreme Court on December 6, 2018, on appeal by the plaintiff, Austin Yattaw (Yattaw or plaintiff), from the entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendants (collectively the city or defendants).² The plaintiff brought suit to recover damages for injuries he suffered while riding his bicycle in Glenlyon Park,³ located in East Providence (the park). For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

Facts and Travel

On June 8, 2010, plaintiff, who was seventeen years old, was injured while riding his bicycle through the park. Presuming that he was riding down a grassy slope on the side of a stairway, plaintiff was unaware of a series of concrete retaining walls located on the slope. The plaintiff alleged he was thrown from his bicycle after his tire became wedged in a crack in one of the concrete retaining walls. As a result, plaintiff sustained a double compound fracture to his left arm.

On February 18, 2013, plaintiff filed suit, asserting that defendants were negligent in maintaining the park. Pretrial discovery proceeded; in its interrogatory answers, the city stated that there had been no previously reported injuries in that area of the park. During his deposition, John Arrighi (Arrighi), a city employee who performed routine maintenance work in the park, testified that at the end of each shift, city employees are required to prepare paper logs, which they call "trip tickets," identifying the location and type of work performed during the shift. When shown a photograph of the area where plaintiff alleged that he had been injured, Arrighi confirmed that he did not observe the condition that was depicted in the photograph, and stated: "If I saw this, I would have documented it on my trip ticket. * * * [S]o it would have [gone] to the correct channel so it would have been repaired." Arrighi testified that the trip tickets he personally filled out were "a lot more extensive" than a document, identified as an expenditure log, that he was shown during his deposition.

Also during discovery, the city produced "Work Order Detail Reports" (work orders) and "Detailed Location Expenditures" (expenditure reports), documenting the maintenance work performed at the park. The plaintiff subsequently made a discovery request for "any and all daily work logs and trip tickets regarding any work to be done, or that was done" at the park, to which the city responded: "Upon information and belief, none known." According to the city, it was not in possession of these logs, which are routinely destroyed.

On May 27, 2015, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, on the ground that the city was immune from liability under the RUS⁴ because the park was open to the public for recreational purposes and the city did not act in a willful or malicious manner in failing to guard or warn against a known danger. The plaintiff filed an objection in which he contended that, under the doctrine of spoliation of evidence,⁵ the city's destruction of the trip tickets gave rise to an adverse inference—namely, that the city knew about the defective condition of the retaining wall. According to plaintiff, this negative inference was sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether an exception to the RUS applied in this case.

On August 4, 2015, the motion for summary judgment was argued; and, in a bench ruling, a justice of the Superior Court determined that the only evidence before the court was "speculation that there may have been trip-tickets that would have documented the hazard." Specifically, the hearing justice found that there was "no evidence that these tickets were destroyed in an attempt to conceal something from the plaintiff" and that there was "no other evidence that anyone had any knowledge of this defect[.]" Accordingly, the hearing justice concluded that "the plaintiff has not put forward sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact that would defeat the recreational use's strong standard and show that the town was aware there was a strong likelihood of injury in that park." The city's motion for summary judgment was therefore granted, and final judgment subsequently entered in favor of defendants. The plaintiff appealed.

Standard of Review

"This Court reviews de novo a trial justice's decision granting summary judgment." Rohena v. City of Providence , 154 A.3d 935, 937 (R.I. 2017) (quoting Sola v. Leighton , 45 A.3d 502, 506 (R.I. 2012) ). "[S]ummary judgment is appropriate only when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Coscina v. DiPetrillo , 186 A.3d 590, 595 (R.I. 2018) (brackets omitted) (quoting Sola , 45 A.3d at 506 ). "Only when a review of the admissible evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party reveals no genuine issues of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, will this Court uphold the trial justice's grant of summary judgment."

Ahearn v. City of Providence ex rel. Mancini , 181 A.3d 495, 497 (R.I. 2018) (quoting National Refrigeration, Inc. v. Standen Contracting Company, Inc. , 942 A.2d 968, 971 (R.I. 2008) ).

Analysis

The declared purpose of the RUS is "[t]o encourage landowners to open their property to the public for recreational use[.]" Smiler v. Napolitano , 911 A.2d 1035, 1038 (R.I. 2006). To accomplish this purpose, the RUS as originally enacted provided that those who come upon the private land of another for recreational purposes are considered to be trespassers, "thus greatly reducing the duty of care that owners owe to recreational users." Symonds ex rel. Symonds v. City of Pawtucket , 126 A.3d 421, 424 (R.I. 2015). Although the RUS initially applied to private landowners, not governmental entities, in 1996, the RUS was amended by the Legislature to include within the umbrella of immunity publicly-owned recreational facilities. See § 32-6-2(3), as amended by P.L. 1996, ch. 234, § 1. So now, in the courts of this state, members of the public who frequent most public parks, beaches, and other recreational sites are viewed as trespassers to whom there is no duty to maintain these facilities in a reasonably safe condition.

However, the RUS's immunity is "not absolute." See Roy v. State , 139 A.3d 480, 488 (R.I. 2016). An exception to the RUS, § 32-6-5(a)(1), provides that the statute does not limit liability "[f]or the willful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity after discovering the user's peril[.]" As such, given that users of recreational properties are classified as trespassers, "landowners who open their land to the public for recreational use owe no duty to users of the property other than to refrain from willful or wanton conduct after a user of the property is discovered in peril." Symonds ex rel. Symonds , 126 A.3d at 424 (citing Berman v. Sitrin , 991 A.2d 1038, 1043-44 (R.I. 2010) ).

In the case at bar, it is undisputed that the city owns the park, which is open to the public without charge, and that plaintiff was engaged in an ordinary recreational activity, riding his bicycle. Thus, the city is immune from liability under the RUS. Before this Court, plaintiff contends that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether the exception set forth in § 32-6-5(a)(1) applies in this case. The fragile premise upon which this appeal rests is the alleged spoliation of the trip tickets. The plaintiff asserts that, because the trip tickets may have contained detailed notes regarding the condition of the area where plaintiff had sustained injury, the city's alleged destruction of the trip tickets raised the adverse inference that the city knew about the defective condition of the wall and failed to guard or warn against it. We reject this contention.

Spoliation of Evidence

Under the doctrine of spoliation of evidence, "the deliberate or negligent destruction of relevant evidence by a party to litigation may give rise to an inference that the destroyed evidence was unfavorable to that party." Tancrelle v. Friendly Ice Cream Corporation , 756 A.2d 744, 748 (R.I. 2000) ; see also McGarry v. Pielech , 47 A.3d 271, 282 (R.I. 2012) ; Mead v. Papa Razzi Restaurant , 840 A.2d 1103, 1108 (R.I. 2004) ( Mead I ). "Although a spoliation instruction is improper when ‘the destruction was a matter of routine with no fraudulent intent,’ it is appropriate when ‘the act was intentional or intended to suppress the truth.’ " State v. Roberts , 841 A.2d 175, 180 (R.I. 2003) (quoting State v. Barnes , 777 A.2d 140, 145 (R.I. 2001) ); see Mead v. Papa Razzi , 899 A.2d 437, 442-43 (R.I. 2006) (recognizing that this Court has held that a spoliation instruction was appropriate "where...