Yearick v. Kimball Constr. Co.

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JASON YEARICK, Plaintiff, v. KIMBALL CONSTRUCTION CO., INC. Defendant.

Civil Action No. ELH-23-2540

United States District Court, D. Maryland

December 21, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Ellen Lipton Hollander United States District Judge

Jason Yearick, plaintiff, filed suit against his former employer Kimball Construction Company, Incorporated (“Kimball”), alleging a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). ECF 1 (“Complaint”). After Kimball moved to dismiss the Complaint (ECF 4, “First Motion”), Yearick filed a First Amended Complaint. ECF 9 (“Amended Complaint”).^[1]It contains one count. Id. In the Amended Complaint, Yearick alleges that Kimball engaged in retaliation, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3), by firing him after he requested unpaid wages. Id. ¶¶ 39-46.

Kimball moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint (ECF 10), supported by a memorandum. ECF 10-1 (collectively, the “Motion”). Yearick opposes the Motion. ECF 11. Kimball replied. ECF 12.

No hearing is necessary to resolve the Motion. See Local Rule 105.6. For the reasons that follow, I shall deny the Motion.

I. Background^[2]

Kimball is “a general contracting company ....” ECF 9 ¶ 12. Kimball “hired Yearick as a Superintendent” on or about September 22, 2021. Id. ¶ 13. As Superintendent, “Yearick oversaw all day-to-day activities[,] including operations, safety matters, budgeting, and scheduling for all subcontracting projects.” Id. ¶ 14. He “earned an excellent reputation among his colleagues and supervisors[,] who described Yearick as a man with integrity, honesty, and outstanding work ethic and attitude.” Id. ¶ 15.

On August 10, 2022, Yearick was involved in a serious car accident “in a company-issued truck.” Id. ¶ 16. “Soon after the collision,” Yearick “develop[ed] intense physical pain and symptoms of emotional distress,” such as “loss of sleep, anxiety, and emotional instability.” Id. ¶ 17. Despite his physical pain and emotional distress, Yearick completed his shift on August 11, 2022. Id. ¶¶ 18, 19. But, after Yearick completed “his shift” on August 11, 2022, he “obtained a doctor's note” instructing him “to report to work with a temporary restriction on driving.” Id. ¶ 19.

The next day, August 12, 2022, Yearick's supervisors, Robert McFaul and Jerry Higdon, “instructed Yearick to work a portion of his time from home due to Yearick's restrictions.” Id. ¶ 20. “Yearick worked his regularly scheduled hours from home and logged those hours in [Kimball's] payroll system.” Id. ¶ 21.

Then, on August 15, 2022, “Human Resources Director Rebecca Pennington . . . request[ed] a meeting with Yearick.” Id. ¶ 22. Higdon, Yearick's supervisor, “told Yearick to see Pennington.” Id. ¶ 23. “Higdon informed Yearick that Pennington wasn't going to pay Yearick for the hours he worked and logged on” August 11, 2022, and August 12, 2022. Id. ¶ 24.

Yearick then “called Pennington to confront Pennington about her decision to withhold his wages and stated, ‘Jerry [Higdon] let me know that you [Pennington] weren't going to pay me for the time I worked Thursday [August 11, 2022] or Friday [August 12, 2022].'” Id. ¶ 25. In response, Pennington stated: “‘[Y]eah, you weren't working,' or words to that effect.” Id. ¶ 26. Pennington informed Yearick that Kimball would not pay wages to Yearick for the hours he worked on August 11, 2022, and August 12, 2022. Id. Pennington stated that, instead, Kimball “would . . . apply Yearick's accrued vacation and sick time to the hours he worked on August 11, 2022, and August 12, 2022.” Id. ¶ 27.

Yearick “protested” the nonpayment of his wages. Id. ¶ 30. In particular, he stated to Pennington: “‘I was directed by my supervisors to go take care of my doctor's visit and wrap everything up from home,' or words to that effect.” Id. ¶ 31. Yearick “further explained that [he] had even gone to see the damaged company-issued truck in St. Leonard, Maryland to ensure everything was taken care of with respect to the post-collision processing of the vehicle.” Id. In addition, Yearick told Pennington: “‘[S]houldn't I be talking to someone in payroll because who the fuck are you to make the determination to apply my vacation and sick time,' or words to that effect.” Id. ¶ 32. Yearick also “pointed out the fact [that] Pennington should have spoken with his supervisors to corroborate the fact [that] Yearick worked on” August 11, 2022, and August 12, 2022. Id. ¶ 33.

Kimball, “through Pennington, terminated Yearick's employment the same day[,] after Yearick protested the non-payment of his wages on August 15, 2022.” Id. ¶ 34. However, “Pennington did not consult with Yearick's supervisors about Yearick's termination.” Id. ¶ 35. In fact, “[a]fter Yearick's termination, McFaul stated [that] he did not agree with Yearick's termination, and felt that Yearick's termination was unwarranted.” Id. ¶ 36.

According to plaintiff, since his car accident on August 10, 2022, he “has developed a worsening unspecified lumbago with sciatica, which is characterized by pain radiating from his upper neck, spine, and lower back down to the leg and foot allowing for constant headaches as a result of injuries sustained from the accident.” Id. ¶ 37. Moreover, “Yearick's retaliatory termination caused him to sustain damages in the form of lost wages, emotional distress, expenses, and attorney's fees and costs connected with this action.” Id. ¶ 38.

II. Standard of Review

A defendant may test the legal sufficiency of a plaintiff's complaint by way of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Nadendla v. WakeMed, 24 F.4th 299, 304-05 (4th Cir. 2022); Fessler v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 959 F.3d 146, 152 (4th Cir. 2020); Paradise Wire & Cable Defined Benefit Pension Plan v. Weil, 918 F.3d 312, 317 (4th Cir. 2019); In re Birmingham, 846 F.3d 88, 92 (4th Cir. 2017); Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d 159, 165-66 (4th Cir. 2016); McBurney v. Cuccinelli, 616 F.3d 393, 408 (4th Cir. 2010), aff'd sub nom. McBurney v. Young, 569 U.S. 221 (2013). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion constitutes an assertion by a defendant that, even if the facts alleged by a plaintiff are true, the complaint fails as a matter of law “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).

Whether a complaint states a claim for relief is assessed by reference to the pleading requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). See Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming Int'l Inc., 248 F.3d 321, 325-26 (4th Cir. 2001); see also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002). That rule provides that a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). The purpose of the rule is to provide the defendant with “fair notice” of the claims and the “grounds” for entitlement to relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007).

To survive a motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain facts sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (citation omitted) (“Our decision in Twombly expounded the pleading standard for ‘all civil actions' ....”); see also Fauconier v. Clarke, 966 F.3d 265, 276 (4th Cir. 2020); Paradise Wire & Cable Defined Benefit Pension Plan, 918 F.3d at 317-18; Willner v. Dimon, 849 F.3d 93, 112 (4th Cir. 2017). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.'” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)).

A plaintiff need not include “detailed factual allegations” to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2). Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Moreover, federal pleading rules “do not countenance dismissal of a complaint for imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted.” Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S. 10, 11 (2014) (per curiam). However, mere “‘naked assertions' of wrongdoing” are generally insufficient to state a claim for relief. Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).

In other words, the rule demands more than bald accusations or mere speculation. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see Painter's Mill Grille, LLC v. Brown, 716 F.3d 342, 350 (4th Cir. 2013). If a complaint provides no more than “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” it is insufficient. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “[A]n unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation” does not state a plausible claim of relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Instead, to satisfy the minimal requirements of Rule 8(a)(2), the complaint must set forth “enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest” a cognizable cause of action, “even if . . . [the] actual proof of those facts is improbable and . . . recovery is very remote and unlikely.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (internal quotation marks omitted).

In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a court ‘must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint,' and must ‘draw all reasonable inferences [from those facts] in favor of the plaintiff.'” Retfalvi v. United States 930 F.3d 600, 605 (4th Cir. 2019) (alteration in Retfalvi) (quoting E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 2011)); see Semenova v. Md. Transit Admin., 845 F.3d 564, 567 (4th Cir. 2017); Houck v. Substitute Tr. Servs., Inc., 791 F.3d 473, 484 (4th Cir. 2015). However, “a court is not required to accept...