Yeaw v. Worcester County Sheriff's Office

2008-MBAR-100

Dennis Yeaw^[1] v. Worcester County Sheriff's Office et al.^[2]

No. 043061

Superior Court of Massachusetts

January 14, 2008

Opinion No.: 101131

As-is Docket Number: 04-3061

Venue Middlesex

Judge (with first initial, no space for Sullivan, Dorsey, and Walsh): Gershengorn, Wendie I., J.

Opinion Title: MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff is the administrator of the estate of Alexis Santana (Santana) who, at all relevant times, was an inmate at the Worcester County House of Correction (WCHC). Santana seeks money damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging in Count I cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution against John M. Flynn, the former sheriff of Worcester County (Flynn),^[3] and in Count II failure to train against Flynn and the Worcester County Sheriff's Office (sheriff's office). He also asserts a claim for negligence against the sheriff's office pursuant to G.L.c. 258, §1 et seq. (Count III).^[4] The matter is before the court on defendants' motion for summary judgment. For the following reasons, defendants' motion is ALLOWED.

BACKGROUND

On March 5, 2001, Santana was held at the WCHC as a pre-trial detainee. He began serving his sentence on April 4, 2001, and was expected to be released from custody on August 31, 2001. At that time, the sheriff's office had in place written policies and procedures for suicide prevention, including contracts with outside agencies to provide relevant assessment, crisis intervention, suicide screening, suicide prevention and treatment for inmates. At the time of Santana's initial incarceration, these services were provided by clinicians employed at Boston Road Clinic, Inc.

In addition, the policy outlined procedures by which inmates could be placed in either of two categories designed for suicide prevention and intervention: category A suicide watch, a restrictive program with more frequent staff checks and mandated mental health evaluations, or category B suicide watch, with less restrictions and less frequent checks and evaluations. According to the procedures set forth, only a mental health professional could place an inmate in category B or downgrade an inmate to a less restrictive setting either category B or back into the general population. In contrast, any WCHC staff member could place an inmate in category A; they could not, however, place an inmate in a less restrictive program. Additionally, the WCHC provided its staff with forty hours of training at orientation, eight hours of which addressed suicide prevention, and forty hours of training annually, four hours of which addressed suicide prevention.

Upon Santana's admission to the WCHC, staff administered an initial suicide screening and placed him in category A, based on his admission of prior suicide attempts and current suicidal ideation. On March 7, 2001, McNeil, a licensed independent clinical social worker employed by Boston Road agreed that Santana should be in category A. Upon re-evaluation on March 9, 2001, McNeil reduced Santana's level of care to category B; on March 12, McNeil removed Santana from any suicide watch program.

On June 12, 2001, staff at the WCHC again placed Santana in category A after he cut his penis with a razor and inserted a piece of plastic in the wound.^[5] McNeil evaluated Santana on June 13, 2001, and again on June 15, 2001, and referred him to a psychiatrist. Dr. Serge Botsaris examined Santana on June 18, 2001, noted that Santana was experiencing auditory hallucinations, and prescribed anti-psychotic medication. On June 20, 2001, McNeil removed Santana from suicide watch. On June 24, 2001, WCHC staff placed Santana back in category A after Santana responded in the affirmative when a correctional officer asked if he was suicidal; McNeil removed him from suicide watch on June 25, 2001.

After kicking his cell door and appearing disoriented and unable to confirm that he was not suicidal, WCHC staff placed Santana on suicide watch A on July 4, 2001; he was removed by McNeil on July 9, 2001. Another social worker, Marjorie Pierce (Pierce) evaluated Santana on July 18, 2001, and found him to be at imminent risk of suicide if his symptoms remained untreated. Pierce evaluated Santana on July 20, 2001, and again on July 25, 2001. She recommended that he be removed from suicide watch, but be placed in administrative segregation in J block where he could be closely monitored. On July 30, 2001, the sheriff's classification board, of which Finneran and Paladino were members, determined that Santana should remain in J block. That same day he was visited by Pierce, who provided information on outpatient services, and examined by Dr. Botsaris who increased his anti-psychotic and added an anti-depressant.

After telling an officer that he was confused and suffocating, that officer again placed Santana in category A on July 31, 2001; the next day McNeil reduced Santana's level of care to category B and, on August 3, 2001, removed him from suicide watch altogether. On August 5, 2001, Santana hung himself by the neck while housed in the J segregation unit.

DISCUSSION

Santana's claims rest largely on his assertion that the policies and procedures for suicide assessment did not mandate sufficient communication between the mental health professionals and the WCHC staff to ensure that the staff were aware of the seriousness of his psychiatric presentation and attendant risk for suicide. The correctional staff's lack of access to critical information known to the mental health clinicians, Santana argues, constituted a violation of his constitutional right guaranteed under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.^[6]

1. Summary judgment standard

A court reviews the summary judgment materials in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, here the plaintiff, Bray v. Community Newspaper Co., Inc., 67 Mass.App.Ct. 42, 43 (2006), and inquire[s] whether upon any reasonable view of the evidence, there is a combination of facts from which a rational inference may be drawn in the plaintiff's favor. Sullivan v. Brookline, 416 Mass. 825, 826 (1994). Summary judgment will be granted where there are no genuine issues of material fact and where the summary judgment record entitles the moving party to judgment as a matter of law. Cassesso v Commissioner of Corr., 390 Mass. 429, 422 (1983); Community Nat'l Bank v. Dawes, 369 Mass. 550, 553 (1976); Mass.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating affirmatively the absence of a triable issue. Pederson v. Time, Inc., 404 Mass. 14, 16-17 (1989). When the moving party does not bear the burden of proof at trial, as is the case here, it is entitled to summary judgment either by submitting affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of the opposing party's case, or by demonstrating that the opposing party has no reasonable expectation of proving an essential element of its case at trial. Kourouvacilis v. General Motors Corp., 410 Mass. 706, 716 (1991).

2. Violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments - cruel and unusual punishment

Santana argues that Flynn acted with deliberate indifference in failing to provide him with medical care and exposing him to a substantial risk of damage to his future health, thus violating the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. See Ahearn v. Vose, 64 Mass.App.Ct. 403, 413 (2005). Flynn counters that he cannot be held liable where (1) he had no notice of Santana's condition; (2) even if he had been on notice, he did not act with deliberate indifference; and (3) he is entitled to qualified immunity.

"The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials, in the course of performing discretionary tasks, from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Clancy v. McCabe, 441 Mass. 311, 317 (2004) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (internal quotations omitted). It is well established that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment protects prisoners from deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). See also Watson v. Caton, 984 F.2d 537, 540 (1st Cir. 1993) ("prison officials and doctors may violate the Eighth Amendment if they exhibit deliberate indifference to serious medical needs"). The issue before the court is, therefore, whether Flynn acted with deliberate indifference regarding Santana's psychiatric needs in violation of his constitutional right.

Deliberate indifference is a "stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a [State] actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action." White v. Gurnon, 67 Mass.App.Ct. 622, 629 (2006). When prison officials intentionally ignore serious medical needs, they violate the Constitution. Cortes-Quinones v. Jimenez-Nettleship, 842 F.2d 556, 558 (1st Cir. 1988). In order to establish deliberate indifference, the plaintiff must show (1) an unusually serious risk of harm; (2) the defendant's actual knowledge (or willful blindness) to that risk; and (3) defendant's failure to take obvious measures to address that risk. Ahearn, 64 Mass.App.Ct. at 14. In the instant case, even taking all the facts presented in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, Longval v. Commission of Corr., 48 Mass. 412, 419 (2007), Santana has failed to present evidence sufficient to prove deliberate indifference.

As to Santana's claim regarding the lack of communication between prison officials and the contracted clinicians, there is nothing in the record to show that Flynn had actual...