Yiyu Lin v. CGIT Sys.

YIYU LIN, Plaintiff, v. CGIT SYSTEMS, INC., Defendant.

Civil Action No. 20-11051-MBB

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts

September 21, 2021

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS (DOCKET ENTRY # 6)

MARIANNE B. BOWLER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Pending before this court is a motion to dismiss filed by defendant CGIT Systems, Inc. (“defendant”). (Docket Entry # 6). Plaintiff Yiyu Lin (“plaintiff”) opposes dismissal. (Docket Entry # 9). Defendant filed a reply to plaintiff's opposition. (Docket Entry # 15). After conducting a hearing, this court took the motion under advisement.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed this action on June 3, 2020, after obtaining permission to sue from both the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination and the Office of the Massachusetts Attorney General's Fair Labor Division. (Docket Entry # 1, pp 6-7, ¶¶ 39-42). The complaint sets out four claims discrimination because of his disability as well as his mother's disability (Count I), age discrimination (Count II), race or national origin discrimination (Count III), and retaliation (Count IV). (Docket Entry # 1, pp. 8-9 ¶¶ 55-63). Counts I through III arise under Massachusetts General Laws, chapter 151B (“chapter 151B”), and Count IV arises under Massachusetts General Laws, chapter 149, section 148C. Defendant presently seeks to dismiss Counts I, II, and III for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) (“Rule 12(b)(6)”).^[1] (Docket Entry # 6).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is well established. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” even if actual proof of the facts is improbable. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Miller v. Town of Wenham, 833 F.3d 46, 51 (1st Cir. 2016). The “standard is ‘not akin to a “probability requirement, ” but it'” requires “‘more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.'” Saldivar v. Racine, 818 F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). For a party to “survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must include ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” In re ARIAD Pharms. Sec. Litig., 842 F.3d 744, 756 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “[W]here a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).

“[A]ll reasonable inferences” are drawn “in the pleader's favor.” Sanders v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 843 F.3d 37, 42 (1st Cir. 2016). Legal conclusions, however, are not considered. See Dixon v. Shamrock Fin. Corp., 522 F.3d 76, 79 (1st Cir. 2008) (accepting “well-pleaded facts as true, but reject[ing] ‘unsupported conclusions or interpretations of law'” in reviewing Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal).

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Defendant is a publicly-traded company that provides “galvanizing, welding solutions, specialty electrical equipment, and highly engineered services.” (Docket Entry # 1, p. 2, ¶ 7). Plaintiff is a 55-year-old Chinese-American with a history of high blood pressure and was an employee of defendant from April 1, 2005, until his termination on March 31, 2020. (Docket Entry # 1, pp. 1-22, 6, ¶¶ 6, 8, 35). At the time of his termination, plaintiff was a “Senior Project Engineer/Team Lead.” (Docket Entry # 1, p. 2, ¶ 9). Throughout his employment, he received consistently positive performance reviews and was “recognized as one of the best engineers in his department.” (Docket Entry # 1, p. 2, ¶ 11).

Because of Massachusetts Governor Charlie Baker's order closing non-essential businesses due to the COVID-19 pandemic, ^[2]and with “verbal consent from his Manager, ” plaintiff began working from home on March 16, 2020. (Docket Entry # 1, p. 3, ¶ 15). Defendant knew that plaintiff had a history of high blood pressure and that he lived with his 81-year-old mother, who suffers from heart disease, high blood pressure, and diabetes. (Docket Entry # 1, p. 3, ¶¶ 12-13).

While working at home from March 16 through the date of his termination, plaintiff “participated in daily morning engineering status meetings[, ] . . . internal project status meetings[, ]” and “weekly project status meetings.” (Docket Entry # 1, p. 3, ¶ 16). He also “executed and completed all tasks through [defendant's] VPN.” (Docket Entry # 1, p. 3, ¶ 16). Accordingly, the complaint sets out facts that show plaintiff was adequately performing his job.

“On March 25, 2020, [p]laintiff's General Manager instructed” all employees working from home to report to defendant's office for work on March 27, 2020. (Docket Entry # 1, p. 4, ¶ 20). Defendant required that any employee who wished to continue working from home submit a form and obtain approval from his “manager, general manager[, ] and human resources.” (Docket Entry # 1, p. 4, ¶ 21). “Plaintiff communicated to his Manager that he wanted to” continue working from home and, on March 26, 2020, submitted the required form. (Docket Entry # 1, p. 4, ¶¶ 22-23). While awaiting approval, plaintiff requested a “floating holiday” on March 27 to avoid reporting to the office, to which plaintiff's Manager responded, “‘Are you kidding me?'” (Docket Entry # 1, p. 4, ¶ 24). Defendant later approved the floating holiday, “[a]fter [p]laintiff reminded his Manager of the federal guidance concerning COVID-19 with respect to vulnerable persons.” (Docket Entry # 1, p. 4, ¶ 24).

On March 28, 2020, defendant informed plaintiff about the denial of his request to work from home and that he was required to return to work in defendant's office on March 30. (Docket Entry # 1, p. 5, ¶ 27). On the same date, an employee reported that the employee's “significant other and two roommates tested positive for COVID-19.” (Docket Entry # 1, pp. 4-5, ¶ 26). During this same time period, defendant approved requests to work from home for two other engineers in plaintiff's department.^[3] (Docket Entry # 1, p. 5, ¶ 28). Also on March 28, 2020, plaintiff requested to take vacation until April 3, 2020, but the request was never approved. (Docket Entry # 1, p. 5, ¶ 29). On the same day, plaintiff asked if he could use sick time, to which defendant replied that he “could use his last paid sick day on March 30, 2020, but must report to [d]efendant's office location the following day.” (Docket Entry # 1, p. 5, ¶ 31). Meanwhile, “[p]laintiff's General Manager emailed [d]efendant's Director of Human Resources to inform him that he had denied [p]laintiff's request to work from home” and “that [p]laintiff was ‘pushing back.'” (Docket Entry # 1, p. 5, ¶ 30). The Director “responded, ‘I think by Tuesday [March 31st] you will be down at least one person. [Plaintiff] is helping us document his termination.'” (Docket Entry # 1, p. 5, ¶ 30).

“On March 30, 2020, [d]efendant's President” emailed plaintiff “that he needed to report to [d]efendant's office location on March 31, 2020 to continue his employment.” (Docket Entry # 1, p. 5, ¶ 32). Plaintiff, in response, “reiterated the reasons for his request to work from home, namely that he was 55-years-old with a long-time high blood pressure medical problem, and that he lived with his mother, who was subjected to high risk of COVID-19.” (Docket Entry # 1, p. 6, ¶ 33). Plaintiff also pointed out “that he had been working from home for” weeks and that he could perform “all of his work . . . remotely without any problem.” (Docket Entry # 1, p. 6, ¶ 34).

Nevertheless, defendant terminated plaintiff's employment on March 31, 2020, citing “job abandonment.” (Docket Entry # 1, p. 6, ¶ 35). Plaintiff's Manager told other employees “that he ‘needed to make an example' of [p]laintiff and that [d]efendant wouldn't permit people to take sick or vacation time because they were concerned about coming in to work in [d]efendant's office location due to COVID-19.” (Docket Entry # 1, p. 6, ¶ 36). Within days, both an employee and an employee's wife tested positive for COVID-19. (Docket Entry # 1, p. 6, ¶ 37). Five of defendant's employees were also out sick. (Docket Entry # 1, p. 6, ¶ 37). On April 3, 2020, defendant instructed all of its employees to work from home until at least April 7, but it did not contact plaintiff about rescinding his termination. (Docket Entry # 1, p. 6, ¶ 38).

DISCUSSION

Defendant seeks dismissal on multiple grounds. As to Count I, defendant asserts that plaintiff fails to establish the first element in a prime facie case that plaintiff is “handicapped” under section 1 of chapter 151B and that the associational discrimination claim based on his mother's disability does not exist as a matter of law. (Docket Entry # 7, pp. 5-11). Plaintiff contends that the issue of whether he has a qualifying handicap is a factual determination that cannot be made at the motion to dismiss stage. (Docket Entry # 9, pp. 5-6). He also argues that, because the question of associational discrimination vis-a-vis his mother is unresolved under Massachusetts law, Count I is not appropriate for dismissal. (Docket Entry # 9, pp. 12-13). Additionally, plaintiff cites defendant's failure to address his claims that defendant failed to provide him a reasonable accommodation and failed to engage in the interactive process with him. (Docket Entry # 9, pp. 9 11).

As to Counts II and III, defendant argues that the complaint fails to plead a prima facie case of age discrimination and discrimination on the basis of race or national origin respectively. (Docket Entry # 7, pp. 11-13). In a reply brief, defendant asserts that the...