Yohe v. Mooney

TODD YOHE, Petitioner v. VINCENT MOONEY, JR., et al., Respondents

CIVIL NO. 3:CV-13-1599

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

April 28, 2016

(Judge Kosik)

MEMORANDUM

I. Introduction

This matter is before the court on an Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed by Todd Yohe ("Petitioner"). (Doc. 12.) Petitioner proceeds pro se in this action. In his amended petition, he raises six (6) challenges to his Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas conviction for Murder of the Second Degree, Robbery and Conspiracy. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for Second Degree Murder, a concurrent 48-96 month incarceration sentence for Robbery, a consecutive 36 to 72 month sentence for Conspiracy, and a fine. Following careful consideration of the parties' submissions, the amended petition for habeas relief will be denied. Additionally, a certificate of appealability will not be issued.

II. Background

A. Factual Background

In addressing Petitioner's appeal from the Post Conviction Relief Act¹ petition which Petitioner filed, the Pennsylvania Superior Court provided the following background:

The record reflects that on July 1, 2007, [Petitioner], along with coconspirators Michael Lyter, Stephen Alfera, and Nathan Bell, were present at [Petitioner]'s apartment. At some point during the evening, [Petitioner], who allegedly did not have a license to drive, asked Alfera to drive Lyter, in [Petitioner]'s vehicle, to Harrisburg to buy marijuana from the victim, a known drug dealer. Alfera testified at trial that he drove Lyter to Harrisburg, parked and watched as Lyter went into an apartment for 15-20 minutes, exited the apartment, and disappeared from view for approximately one hour before he returned to the car all "jumpy and antsy." Trial Court Opinion, 5/24/10, at 3. The men then returned to [Petitioner]'s apartment, and Lyter gave Alfera the half-pound of marijuana, or about $800 to $900 worth, he had obtained from the victim. Id.

The victim was found dead in the entryway to his apartment in the early morning hours of August 1, 2007, shot between the eyes execution style. Through phone records and interviews with people that knew the victim planned to sell drugs to Lyter on the night of July 31, 2007, the police were led to [Petitioner] and his [co-conspirators], all of whom were ultimately arrested and charged in connection with [the victim's] murder.

On August 4, 2007, [Petitioner] gave a statement to police wherein he claimed that Lyter had told him he had gotten into a confrontation with a drug dealer in Harrisburg who had tried to rob him, and that [Lyter] had shot the dealer in the head. During the two-day trial ending onNovember 17, 2009, co-conspirator Bell testified that he had seen the .25 caliber gun used in the crime, that he had heard [Petitioner] and Lyter talking about a $1,000.00 debt the victim owed Lyter, and that on the day of the murder, Lyter had paid [Petitioner] money and/or marijuana for allowing Lyter to use his car. These statements were corroborated by the trial testimony of Gerald Smith, an inmate who had been incarcerated with [Petitioner] in July 2008. At trial, Smith testified that [Petitioner] had told him that he had "set up a robbery of a marijuana dealer that went bad and someone got killed in the robbery." Id. at 6. "[Petitioner] told Smith that guys named Steve (Alfera), Nate (Bell) and Mike (Lyter) were trying to pin the murder on him and that he was particularly worried about (Lyter) since he had given [Lyter] a .25 caliber pistol to commit the robbery." Id.

Following the jury trial, [Petitioner] was convicted of second[-]degree murder, robbery and conspiracy. [Petitioner] was sentenced on November 18, 2009 [to life imprisonment for second-degree murder, a concurrent term of four to eight years' imprisonment for robbery, and a consecutive term of three to six years' imprisonment for conspiracy.] [N]o post-sentence motions were filed.

(Doc. 21-3 at 2-3, Commonwealth v. Yohe, 6 A.3d 559 (Pa. Super. 2010)).

III. Procedural History

A. Direct appeal proceedings

Following the trial, Petitioner filed a direct appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court and raised the following grounds:

1. Sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions;

2. Trial court error in denying Petitioner's motion in limine to declare co-defendant Nathan Bell incompetent to testify at trial; and

3. Trial court error in denying Petitioner's motion in limine to exclude statements of Lyter, a non-testifying co-conspirator.

(Doc. 21-2 at 8, Pl.'s Br.) On July 13, 2010, the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed Petitioner's judgment of sentence (Doc. 21-3, Super. Op.), and he did not pursue a petition for allowance of appeal at that time with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.²

B. PCRA proceedings

Following his direct appeal, Petitioner filed a pro se PCRA petition with the trial court on August 5, 2011. Following the appointment of counsel, he thereafter submitted an amended petition. In the amended petition, ineffective assistance of counsel grounds were raised, which included the following:

1. Ineffective assistance of trial counsel in failing to call Michael Lyter as a defense witness;

2. Ineffective assistance of trial counsel in developing insufficiency of evidence claim on appeal; and

3. Ineffective assistance of trial counsel in failing to consult with him and exercise discretionary review to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on direct review.

(Doc. 21-4 at 5-7.) An evidentiary hearing was conducted on January 12, 2012. (Doc. 21-5, Hearing Trans.) On July 11, 2012, the amended PCRA petition was denied, however Petitioner was granted 30 days to consult with his current PCRA counsel and,if appropriate, to file a petition for allowance of appeal nunc pro tunc from the July 13, 2010 opinion of the Superior Court on direct appeal. (Doc. 21-6 at 10, Dauphin Cty. Ct. Op.) Petitioner thereafter pursued an appeal of the PCRA decision to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, and raised only the following issue on appeal:

Did the PCRA court err in denying Appellant's petition for post-conviction relief due to ineffective assistance of counsel where trial counsel failed to speak with Appellant's co-defendant, Michael Lyter, about testifying at trial, when trial counsel was aware of the exculpatory nature of his potential testimony?

(Doc. 21-7 at 9, Pet.'s Br.; Doc. 21-9 at 3-4, 3/15/13 Pa. Super. Op.) On March 15, 2013, the Superior Court affirmed the PCRA court's order dismissing the PCRA petition. (Doc. 21-9 at 10.) A petition for allowance of appeal filed with the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was denied on December 2, 2013.

C. Present Habeas Proceedings

The pending amended federal habeas petition raises the following grounds:

1. Ineffective assistance of trial counsel in violation of Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments in failing to investigate and call Michael Lyter as a defense witness to present exculpatory evidence;

2. Insufficient evidence to support convictions in violation of Due Process guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment;

3. Ineffective assistance on direct appeal for failing to properly pursue the insufficient evidence claim³;4. Trial Court error in denying motion in limine declaring Nathan Bell incompetent to testify;

5. Trial Court error in denying motion to exclude statements of non-testifying co-defendant (Michael Lyter); and

6. Violation of Due Process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment when Commonwealth witness Gerald Smith committed perjury.

(Doc. 12, Am. Pet. at 2-3.)⁴ For the reasons that follow, the pending petition will be denied.

IV. Governing Legal Principles

A. Standard of Review

Since the instant petition was filed after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), review of Petitioner's claims is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-27, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997). Under the AEDPA, a federal court may not grant habeas relief on a claim adjudicated on its merits in state court unless that adjudication "resulted in adecision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 97-98, 131 S.Ct. 770, 783-84, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-05, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1519, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). The first prong applies both to questions of law and to mixed questions of law and fact, Williams, 529 U.S. at 384-86, 120 S.Ct. at 1508-09, while the second prong applies to decisions based on factual determinations, Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 1041, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003).

"Under the 'contrary to' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13, 120 S.Ct. at 1523. A state court decision is an "unreasonable application of Supreme Court authority, falling under the second clause of § 2254(d)(1), if the state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle from the Supreme Court's decisions but "unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Williams, 529 U.S. at 413, 120 S.Ct. at 1523. The federal court on habeas review may not issue the writ "simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that therelevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly." Id., 529 U.S. at 411, 120 S.Ct. at 1522.

"Under the 'unreasonable application' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the...