York Cnty. Prison v. Teamsters Local Union No. 776

245 A.3d 399

YORK COUNTY PRISON, Appellant

v.TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 776

No. 265 C.D. 2020

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued December 8, 2020

Decided January 8, 2021

Reargument Denied March 2, 2021

Cory A. Iannacone, Harrisburg, for Appellant.

Jason M. Weinstock, Harrisburg, for Appellee.

BEFORE: HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

OPINION BY JUDGE COVEY

York County Prison (County/Prison) appeals from the York County Common Pleas Court's (trial court) February 10, 2020 order denying the County's Petition to Modify or Vacate Arbitration Award. The County presents two issues for this Court's review: (1) whether the trial court erred or abused its discretion by affirming the Arbitrator's Award, which conflicted with the parties' collective bargaining agreement (CBA);¹ and (2) whether the trial court erred or abused its discretion by finding that the Arbitrator's Award did not violate the public policy of protecting inmates from abuse. After review, this Court affirms.

On May 1, 2018, County Correctional Officers (Correctional Officers) Marcial Baez (Baez) and Graig Phillips (Phillips) (collectively, Grievants) were responsible for the custody and care of an inmate with mental health issues who had been placed on suicide prevention watch (SP2). Grievants verbally engaged in bantering with the inmate, which included taunting and antagonizing the inmate, and using profanity and slurs, causing the inmate to become agitated to the point that he placed a mattress against his cell door. Grievants notified a Prison Lieutenant, who directed them and several other Correctional Officers to open the cell door and remove the obstructing mattress. While the Correctional Officers were attempting to remove the mattress, the inmate punched a Correctional Officer and bit his arm. This precipitated an incident that involved subduing the inmate, placing him in a restraint chair and, thereafter, moving him to the Prison Medical Unit. This incident became the subject of a Use of Force report.

Prison administration officials questioned Grievants about the Use of Force incident during fact-finding meetings. Grievants were specifically asked if they or any other staff had taunted or antagonized the inmate, to which they both responded: "No." Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 282a.² A surveillance video/audiotape (Audiotape) verified that Grievants did, in fact, use obscene and/or demeaning language towards the inmate, which they ultimately acknowledged after their initial interviews.³ At the conclusion of the investigation, the County issued employment termination letters to Grievants (Termination Letters), which stated, in part, that they were found to have "taunted and antagonized an inmate" and "were dishonest during the investigation." R.R. at 332a (Baez Termination Letter), 334a (Phillips Termination Letter). The Termination Letters further stated that Grievants' actions violated the CBA, the Prison Procedures Manual and the Code of Ethics, and were "contrary to the orderly operations and reputation interests of the ... Prison." Id . Teamsters Local Union No. 776 (Union) filed grievances on behalf of Grievants, alleging therein that their employment termination was without just cause. The County denied the grievances and the matters eventually proceeded to arbitration for final resolution.

On June 9, 2019, the Arbitrator determined:

On the basis of the record as a whole and for the reasons discussed, just cause for discharge is not found. However, just cause for discipline is found. [ ] Grievants are to be returned to work with full seniority but without back pay. Their time out of service is to be carried as a disciplinary suspension.^{[4 ]}

R.R. at 296a (Arbitrator's Dec. at 20). The County appealed to the trial court.

On February 10, 2020, the trial court affirmed the Arbitrator's Award. On February 11, 2020, the trial court filed an opinion in support of its order. The County appealed to this Court. On March 4, 2020, the trial court ordered the County to file a Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure (Rule) 1925(b) (Rule 1925(b) Statement). The County filed its Rule 1925(b) Statement on April 21, 2020.⁵ On May 7, 2020, the trial court filed a Statement in Lieu of Additional Opinion Pursuant to Rule 1925(a), stating that the basis for the trial court's order can be found in the trial court's February 11, 2020 opinion.

The County first argues that the Arbitrator's Award fails the essence test by exceeding the four corners of the CBA. Particularly, the County contends that the CBA defined just cause by supplying a discipline table which specifically, clearly and unambiguously provided for immediate employment termination in cases of proven dishonesty. The County asserts that, once the Arbitrator found the Grievants were dishonest, the essence test required the Arbitrator to uphold Grievants' employment termination as outlined in the CBA's discipline table. The County further claims that the Arbitrator's Award violated the essence test by the Arbitrator rewriting the CBA's terms and instituting a new level of discipline for cases of proven dishonesty.

The Union rejoins that the parties stipulated to the issue of just cause to discharge, and the County is asking this Court to re-determine the facts and interpret the CBA in a manner contrary to the Arbitrator. The Union further retorts that fact finding is not a proper function of the court where a matter has been arbitrated pursuant to a CBA. In addition, the Union asserts that, where it is determined that the subject matter of the dispute is encompassed within the CBA's terms, the validity of the Arbitrator's interpretation of the agreement is not a matter of concern to this Court. The Union cites Chambersburg Area School District v. Chambersburg Education Ass'n (Professional) , 120 A.3d 407 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015), to support its position.

Initially, Article 18, Section 1 of the CBA provides:

[The County ] shall not demote, suspend, discharge, or take any disciplinary action against an employee without just cause . An employee may appeal a demotion, suspension, or discharge beginning at the third step of the grievance procedure, subject of [sic] any conditions set forth in the Grievance Procedure. The Union shall be notified in writing within four (4) calendar days by [the County] of any demotion, suspension or discharge.

R.R. at 230a-231a, 280a (emphasis added). Article 18, Section 4 of the CBA directs, in relevant part:⁶

OFFENSE	1[st]	2nd	3rd	4th
....
4.	Involvement in unprovoked altercation.	S	T
5.	Proven theft or dishonesty.	T
....
13.	Failure to follow instruction or perform assigned work.	W	3-D	T
....
Note:	T means ‘Termination’
1D means ‘1[-]day Suspension’
3D means ‘3[-]day Suspension’
W means ‘Written Warning’

The parties agree and understand that those offenses indicated[, supra ,] do not necessarily constitute or incorporate all the rules and regulations of [the County], and that [the County] may take disciplinary action pursuant to Article 3 for offenses other than those listed above, which in the opinion of [the County] are contrary to its orderly operation or reputation interests.

R.R. at 231a-233a, 281a.

This Court explained in Chambersburg :

When reviewing an arbitrator's interpretation of a [collective bargaining agreement], the essence test is the proper standard of review. ‘The essence test is a two[-]prong test under which an award should be upheld if[:] (1) the issue as properly defined is within the terms of the collective bargaining agreement[;] and (2) the arbitrator's award can be rationally derived from the collective bargaining agreement.’ Coatesville Area Sch. Dist. v. Coatesville Area Teachers' Ass'n/Pa. State Educ. Ass'n , 978 A.2d 413, 415 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) .... We are not required to agree with the arbitrator's interpretation of the [collective bargaining agreement], but we must ‘look at whether that interpretation and application of the agreement can be reconciled with the language of the agreement. We may vacate an award only if it indisputably and genuinely is without foundation in, or fails to logically flow from, the collective bargaining agreement .’

Northumberland Cnty. Comm'rs v. Am. Fed'n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., AFL-CIO Local 2016, Council 86 , 71 A.3d 367, 375 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013) (en banc) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Chambersburg , 120 A.3d at 412 (emphasis added; citation omitted). The Chambersburg Court continued:

Under the first prong,

[t]he essence test requires a determination as to whether the terms of the agreement encompass the subject matter of the dispute. Where it is determined that the subject matter of the dispute is encompassed within the terms of the agreement, the validity of the arbitrator's interpretation is not a matter of concern to the court.

Cranberry Area Sch. Dist. v. Cranberry Educ. Ass'n , 713 A.2d 726, 729 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998) (quoting Leechburg Area Sch. Dist. v. Dale , 492 Pa. 515, 424 A.2d 1309, 1312-13 (1981) ) ....

Chambersburg , 120 A.3d at 412.

Here, the Arbitrator defined the issue as "whether the County had just cause to discharge [ ] Grievants and, if not, what shall be the remedy?" R.R. at 281a (Arbitrator's Dec. at 5). Because Article 18 of the CBA encompasses just cause, the first prong of the essence test is met.

The County asserts that the Arbitrator's Award cannot satisfy the second prong of the essence test because the Arbitrator disregarded the CBA's plain language. The County cites County of Berks v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local Union No. 429 (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 1230 C.D. 2007, filed May 5, 2008),⁷ and Department of Corrections, State Correctional Institution at Pittsburgh v. Pennsylvania State Corrections Officers Ass'n (SCI-Pittsburgh ), 56 A.3d 60 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012), to support its position.

In County of Berks , the collective bargaining agreement contained a...