Young Conservatives of Tex. Found. v. Univ. of N. Tex.

609 F.Supp.3d 504

YOUNG CONSERVATIVES OF TEXAS FOUNDATION

v.The UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS, et al.

CIVIL NO. 4:20-CV-973-SDJ

United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Sherman Division.

Signed June 28, 2022

Robert Earl Henneke, Chance Dean Weldon, Christian Gerald Townsend, Texas Public Policy Foundation, Austin, TX, Chad Phillip Ennis, Texas Secretary of State, Austin, TX, for Young Conservatives of Texas Foundation.

Amy Warr, Melanie D. Plowman, Wallace B. Jefferson, Alexander DuBose & Jefferson LLP, Austin, TX, Paige Carlysa Duggins-Clay, Husch Blackwell LLP, Austin, TX, Sandy Dian Hellums, Husch Blackwell LLP, Houston, TX, William Andrew Taylor, Andy Taylor & Associates, PC, Houston, TX, for The University of North Texas.

Paige Carlysa Duggins-Clay, Husch Blackwell LLP, Austin, TX, Sandy Dian Hellums, Husch Blackwell LLP, Houston, TX, William Andrew Taylor, Andy Taylor & Associates, PC, Houston, TX, for The University of North Texas System.

Paige Carlysa Duggins-Clay, Husch Blackwell LLP, Austin, TX, Wallace B. Jefferson, Alexander DuBose & Jefferson LLP, Austin, TX, Sandy Dian Hellums, Husch Blackwell LLP, Houston, TX, William Andrew Taylor, Andy Taylor & Associates, PC, Houston, TX, for Neal Smatresk, Shannon Goodman.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

SEAN D. JORDAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Defendants Neal Smatresk and Shannon Goodman (collectively, "UNT Officials") are appealing this Court's decision to grant summary judgment and a permanent injunction in favor of Plaintiff Young Conservatives of Texas Foundation ("Young Conservatives"). They now seek a stay of the injunction pending appeal. (Dkt. #69). For the following reasons, the UNT Officials’ motion to stay is DENIED .

I. BACKGROUND

This Court previously concluded that Section 54.051(d) of the Texas Education Code, as applied to United States citizens at the University of North Texas, is preempted by Section 1623(a) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRIRA") and is therefore unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause. Young Conservatives of Tex. Found.v. Univ. of N. Tex. , 597 F.Supp.3d 1062, 1086-87, No. 4:20-CV-973-SDJ, (E.D. Tex. Apr. 8, 2022). In reaching its decision, the Court first explained why Young Conservatives had standing to sue on behalf of its members. Next, the Court considered whether Young Conservatives had sued a proper defendant under Ex parte Young , 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908). The Court answered this question in the affirmative as to the UNT Officials. But due to the limited nature of an equitable Ex parte Young action, Young Conservatives’ preemption claim against the University of North Texas and the University of North Texas System failed as a matter of law.

With the threshold issues resolved, the Court turned to preemption. Considering the federal and state statutes in tandem, the Court determined that Texas's tuition scheme directly conflicts with Congress's express prohibition on making unlawfully present aliens eligible for postsecondary education benefits based on residency when United States citizens are not eligible for such benefits based on residency. Accordingly, the Court concluded that Texas's nonresident tuition scheme is unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause and granted summary judgment to Young Conservatives on its official-capacity equitable claim against the UNT Officials. To prevent ongoing violations of federal law, the Court permanently enjoined the UNT Officials from allowing unlawfully present aliens to pay resident tuition while denying that benefit to United States citizens based on residency. (Dkt. #65).

More than a month later, the UNT Officials moved the Court to stay the permanent injunction against them until the Fifth Circuit decides their appeal.¹ (Dkt. #69). They argue that each of the requirements for a stay is satisfied and that the balance of equities tilts in their favor. Young Conservatives disagrees, contending that the UNT Officials’ arguments are meritless and that staying the injunction pending appeal would substantially harm their members.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

"A stay is not a matter of right, even if irreparable injury might otherwise result." Ind. State Police Pension Tr. v. Chrysler LLC , 556 U.S. 960, 961, 129 S.Ct. 2275, 173 L.Ed.2d 1285 (2009) (per curiam) (quoting Nken v. Holder , 556 U.S. 418, 433, 129 S.Ct. 1749, 173 L.Ed.2d 550 (2009) ). It is instead an "intrusion into the ordinary processes of administration and judicial review," and the propriety of issuing a stay depends on the circumstances of the particular case. Nken , 556 U.S. at 427, 433, 129 S.Ct. 1749 (quotation omitted). The decision to grant or deny a stay pending appeal is committed to the sound discretion of the district court. Id. at 433, 129 S.Ct. 1749.

When considering whether to grant a stay pending appeal, a court must consider four factors: (1) "whether the stay applicants have made a strong showing that they are likely to succeed on the merits"; (2) "whether the applicants will be irreparably harmed absent a stay"; (3) "whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties"; and (4) "where the public interest lies." U.S. Navy Seals 1-26 v. Biden , 27 F.4th 336, 349–50 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing Nken , 556 U.S. at 426, 129 S.Ct. 1749 ). Under this standard, the first two factors "are the most critical." Nken , 556 U.S. at 434, 129 S.Ct. 1749. The applicant for a stay "bears the burden of showing its need." Tex. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Hughs , 978 F.3d 136, 143 (5th Cir. 2020).

III. DISCUSSION

Considering the applicable factors, the UNT Officials have not met their burden to show that a stay of the permanent injunction pending appeal is warranted.

A. Success on the Merits

The Court first considers whether the UNT Officials have made a strong showing that they are likely to succeed on the merits. As to this factor, the thrust of the UNT Officials’ argument is that "Section 1623 does not extend [Young Conservatives’] members a right to resident tuition." (Dkt. #73 at 2). "Without an affirmative right to resident tuition," the UNT Officials say, Young Conservatives does not have standing, "its preemption claim fails, and the injunction is impermissibly broad." (Dkt. #73 at 2).

The requirements for Article III standing are familiar. To establish standing, a litigant must show "(1) an injury in fact, (2) a sufficient causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of, and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision." Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus , 573 U.S. 149, 157–58, 134 S.Ct. 2334, 189 L.Ed.2d 246 (2014) (cleaned up). An association, like Young Conservatives, may establish standing by showing, among other things, that at least one of its members would have standing to sue in their own right. Tex. Ent. Ass'n v. Hegar , 10 F.4th 495, 504 (5th Cir. 2021).

The UNT Officials present several arguments challenging Young Conservatives’ standing, none of which has merit. First, the UNT Officials contend that Young Conservatives’ members fail to meet the injury-in-fact requirement because they have no affirmative right to any particular tuition rate under Section 1623 and thus no "legally protected interest" in resident tuition. (Dkt. #73 at 2 (quoting Ne. Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors v. City of Jacksonville , 508 U.S. 656, 663, 113 S.Ct. 2297, 124 L.Ed.2d 586 (1993) )). This argument misunderstands the injury-in-fact inquiry and conflates standing with the distinct question of whether Young Conservatives has a cause of action for its preemption challenge.

The UNT Officials’ argument might have had some merit during the first half of the twentieth century. At that time, a plaintiff could sue only for the violation of a legal right—"one of property, one arising out of contract, one protected against tortious invasion, or one founded on a statute which confers a privilege." Tenn. Elec. Power Co. v. Tenn. Valley Auth. , 306 U.S. 118, 137, 59 S.Ct. 366, 83 L.Ed. 543 (1939). But all this changed with the Supreme Court's 1970 decision in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp , 397 U.S. 150, 90 S.Ct. 827, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970). After Data Processing , a plaintiff need not have suffered an invasion of a legal right —one protected by statute or some other positive law—only an "injury in fact , economic or otherwise." Id. at 152, 90 S.Ct. 827 (emphasis added); see also id. at 153, 90 S.Ct. 827 (criticizing the lower court's search for a "legal interest" to establish standing as improper because "[t]he ‘legal interest’ test goes to the merits" and "[t]he question of standing is different"); Jud. Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Senate , 432 F.3d 359, 363 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Williams, J., concurring) (explaining that, in Data Processing , the Supreme Court "rejected the ‘legal interest’ standard, proclaiming the separation of standing from merits issues").

True, in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992), the Supreme Court introduced the phrase "legally protected interest" as part of the injury-in-fact test. Id. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (explaining that, to show an "injury in fact," a plaintiff must show "an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical" (cleaned up)). But the Supreme Court did not define the phrase or indicate that it does any independent work in the standing analysis. See Cottrell v. Alcon Lab'ys , 874 F.3d 154, 163–64 (3d Cir. 2017) ; Jud. Watch , 432 F.3d at 363 (Williams, J., concurring).² To the contrary, the Court in Lujan summarily concluded that the plaintiffs had a "cognizable interest" in using or observing an animal species without asking whether they had a legally protected right to do so. 504 U.S. at 562–63, 112 S.Ct. 2130. And nowhere did the Lujan Court suggest that it was turning...