Young v. Ferguson, CIVIL NO. 1:18-CV-879

CHRISTOPHER YOUNG, Plaintiff v. TAMMY FERGUSON, et al., Defendants

CIVIL NO. 1:18-CV-879

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

March 30, 2020

(Chief Judge Conner)

MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff Christopher Young ("Young"), an inmate who was housed at all relevant times at the State Correctional Institution, Benner Township, Pennsylvania ("SCI-Benner"), commenced this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1). Named as defendants are Tammy Ferguson, Daniel Myers, Bobbi Jo Salamon, Jennifer Rossman, Stefan Stessney, David Link, Timothy Graham, John Doe/Danison, W. Matthews, Joseph Dupont, and John Wetzel. (Id.) Pending before the court is Young's motion (Doc. 26) for summary judgment, and a cross-motion (Doc. 33) for summary judgment filed by defendants Ferguson, Myers, Salamon, Rossman, Stessney, and Link. For the reasons set forth below, the court will deny Young's motion and grant defendants' motion.

I. Legal Standard

Through summary adjudication, the court may dispose of those claims that do not present a "genuine dispute as to any material fact" and for which a jury trial would be an empty and unnecessary formality. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). The burden of proof tasks the non-moving party to come forth with "affirmative evidence, beyond the allegations of the pleadings," in support of its right to relief. Pappas v. City of Lebanon, 331 F. Supp. 2d 311, 315 (M.D. Pa. 2004); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The court is to view the evidence "in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Thomas v. Cumberland County, 749 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 2014). This evidence must be adequate, as a matter of law, to sustain a judgment in favor of the non-moving party on the claims. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-57 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-89 (1986). Only if this threshold is met may the cause of action proceed. See Pappas, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 315.

"The rule is no different where there are cross-motions for summary judgment." Lawrence v. City of Philadelphia, 527 F.3d 299, 310 (3d Cir. 2008). Cross-motions are no more than a claim by each side that it alone is entitled to summary judgment, and the making of such inherently contradictory claims does not constitute an agreement that if one is rejected the other is necessarily justified or that the losing party waives judicial consideration and determination whether genuine issues of material fact exist. Rains v. Cascade Indus., Inc., 402 F.2d 241, 245 (3d Cir. 1968). Thus, "when presented with cross[-]motions for summary judgment, the Court must consider the motions separately, and view the evidence presented for each motion in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Borrell v. Bloomsburg Univ., 63 F. Supp. 3d 418, 433 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (citations omitted)."[E]ach movant must demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists; if both parties fail to carry their respective burdens, the court must deny [both] motions." Quarles v. Palakovich, 736 F. Supp. 2d 941, 946 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (citing Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1023 (3d Cir. 2008)).

II. Statement of Material Facts

On five separate occasions, Young was temporarily transferred to SCI-Benner for court appearances. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 16, 30, 35-36, 43). While he was temporarily held, he was placed in the Restricted Housing Unit ("RHU") under Administrative Custody ("AC") status and was not released to general population. (Id.; Doc. 29 ¶ 1). Young asserts that his placement in the RHU during his temporary stays violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Doc. 1 ¶ 1).

Young was first transferred to SCI-Benner on March 10, 2016 and was placed on AC status pursuant to DC-ADM 802 § 1(B)(1)(h). (Doc. 29 ¶ 1; Doc. 35 ¶¶ 1, 17; Doc. 47 ¶ 17; Doc. 1, Ex. A). It was noted that Young was placed on AC status because he was being held temporarily for another authority and was not classified for general population of the holding facility. (Id.) Young remained at SCI-Benner until April 14, 2016. (Doc. 35 ¶ 17; Doc. 47 ¶ 17). This first visit totaled thirty-five days. (Id.)

Young's second transfer to SCI-Benner occurred on May 5, 2016. On that date, Young was placed on AC status pursuant to DC-ADM 802 § 1(B)(1)(h), because he was being held temporarily for another authority and was not classified forgeneral population of the holding facility. (Doc. 29 ¶ 2; Doc. 35 ¶ 2; Doc. 1, Ex. R). The reason for Young's placement on AC status at SCI-Benner was updated on May 26, 2016. (Doc. 29 ¶ 1; Doc. 35 ¶ 1; Doc. 1, Ex. V). The facility cited to DC-ADM 802 § 1(B)(1)(k) and stated that Young was being placed on AC status due to lack of bed space in the facility. (Id.) Young remained at SCI-Benner until May 26, 2016. (Doc. 35 ¶ 20; Doc. 47 ¶ 20). This second visit totaled twenty-two days. (Id.)

Young's third transfer to SCI-Benner occurred on July 14, 2016. (Doc. 29 ¶ 1; Doc. 35 ¶ 1; Doc. 1 ¶ 35). On that date, Young was placed on AC status pursuant to DC-ADM 802 § 1(B)(1)(h), because he was being held temporarily for another authority and was not classified for general population of the holding facility. (Id.) Young remained at SCI-Benner until August 25, 2016. (Doc. 35 ¶ 21; Doc. 47 ¶ 21). The third visit totaled forty-three days. (Id.)

On September 20, 2016, Young was transferred to SCI-Benner for a fourth time and was placed on AC status pursuant to DC-ADM 802 § 1(B)(1)(h). (Doc. 29 ¶ 1; Doc. 35 ¶ 1; Doc. 1, Ex. Y). It was again noted that Young was being held temporarily for another authority and was not classified for general population of the holding facility. (Id.) On September 28, 2016, the reason for Young's placement on AC status was updated. (Doc. 29 ¶ 1; Doc. 35 ¶ 1; Doc. 1, Ex. 1). The facility cited to DC-ADM 802 § 1(B)(1)(k) and stated that Young was being placed on AC status due to lack of appropriate bed space. (Id.) Young remained at SCI-Benner until October 11, 2016, for a total of twenty-one days. (Doc. 35 ¶ 22; Doc. 47 ¶ 22).

On November 15, 2016, Young was transferred to SCI-Benner for a fifth time and was placed on AC status pursuant to DC-ADM 802 § 1(B)(1)(k). (Doc. 29 ¶ 1; Doc. 35 ¶ 1; Doc. 1, Ex. 7). The facility noted that Young was temporarily assigned to AC status due to the operational needs of the facility, such as lack of appropriate bed space. (Id.) Young remained at SCI-Benner until November 22, 2016, for a total of seven days. (Doc. 35 ¶ 23; Doc. 47 ¶ 23).

During Young's first visit to SCI-Benner, he complained to the Program Review Committee ("PRC") about his placement in the RHU. (Doc. 29 ¶ 2; Doc. 35 ¶ 2; Doc. 1 ¶¶ 18-27). Young appealed the PRC decision to the Office of the Chief Hearing Examiner in accordance with DC-ADM 802. (Id.) Defendants assert that the only individuals involved with Young during his first visit were the members of the PRC, Salamon, Rossman, and Link, as well as Superintendent Ferguson. (Doc. 35 ¶ 18). Defendant Stessney had no involvement with Young during his first visit. (Id.; Doc. 34-1, at 58, Deposition of Christopher Young ("Young Dep."), at 57:12-58:1). The parties dispute whether defendant Myers had any involvement with Young during this first visit. (Doc. 35 ¶ 18; Doc. 47 ¶ 18).

During Young's second and third transfers to SCI-Benner, he did not appeal or administratively exhaust his placements in the RHU. (Doc. 29 ¶ 2; Doc. 35 ¶ 2; Doc. 34-1, at 60, Young Dep. at 59:23-25).

During his fourth and fifth visits to SCI-Benner, Young complained to the PRC about his placement in the RHU. (Doc. 29 ¶ 2; Doc. 35 ¶ 2; Doc. 1 ¶¶ 36-47).Young appealed the PRC decision to the Office of the Chief Hearing Examiner in accordance with DC-ADM 802. (Id.)

It was the standard practice at SCI-Benner to place all inmates who arrived as temporary transfers for court into the RHU on AC status. (Doc. 29 ¶ 3; Doc. 35 ¶ 3; Doc. 30, Ex. E-2 ¶ 4). The parties agree that Young was eligible for release to general population. (Doc. 29 ¶ 2; Doc. 35 ¶ 2; Doc. 30, Ex. F-9). Defendants deny that they refused to release Young to general population. (Doc. 35 ¶ 3). Every day, unit managers coordinate with the Corrections Classification Program Manager to fill beds that become available in general population. (Doc. 35 ¶¶ 3, 28; Doc. 30, Exs. D-2 and E-3 ¶ 13; Doc. 47 ¶ 28). During Young's transfers to SCI-Benner, no beds became available that could accommodate him based on his status codes. (Doc. 35 ¶¶ 3, 28; Doc. 30, Exs. D-2, E-3 ¶ 13).

A general population inmate may be assigned AC status and placed in the RHU for several reasons, including: (i) the inmate is being held temporarily for another authority and is not classified for the general population of the holding facility; however, a parole violator and temporary transfers from another facility are eligible for release to general population; or, (ii) the inmate has completed a disciplinary custody sanction but other reasons exist, or the facility has an operational need, e.g., appropriate bed space, to temporarily assign the inmate to AC status. (Doc. 35 ¶ 4; Doc. 30, Ex. F, Procedures Manual §§ 1(B)(1)(h), (k)).

Young was "eligible" for placement in general population during his limited stays at SCI-Benner. (Doc. 29 ¶¶ 6, 14; Doc. 35 ¶¶ 6, 14). Defendants deny thatYoung was "classified" for general population. (Doc. 35 ¶ 6; Doc. 30, Ex. F, Procedures Manual § 1(B)(1)(h)). Defendants further deny that Young was "entitled" to be released to general population. (Doc. 29 ¶ 14; Doc. 35 ¶ 14).

Pursuant to DC-ADM 802, the Department of Corrections ("DOC") places an inmate on AC status when their presence in general population would constitute a threat to life, property, himself/herself, staff, other inmates, the public, or the secure or orderly running of the facility. (Doc. 29 ¶ 7; Doc. 35 ¶ 7). The parties agree that Young did not constitute a...