Young v. Hawaii

911 F.Supp.2d 972

George K. YOUNG, Jr., Plaintiff,

v.State of HAWAII and Neil Abercrombie in his capacity as Governor of the State of Hawaii; David M. Louie in his capacity as State Attorney General; County of Hawaii, as a sub-agency of the State of Hawaii and William P. Kenoi in his capacity as Mayor of the County of Hawaii; and the Hilo County Police Department, as a sub-agency of the County of Hawaii and Harry S. Kubojiri in his capacity as Chief of Police; John Does 1–25; Jane Does 1–25; Corporations 1–5, and Doe Entities 1–5, Defendants.

Civ. No. 12–00336 HG BMK.

United States District Court, D. Hawai‘i.

Nov. 29, 2012.

George K. Young, Jr., Hilo, HI, pro se.

John M. Cregor, Jr., Office of the Attorney General, Honolulu, HI, Michael J. Udovic, Kimberly K. Angay, Office of the Corporation Counsel–Big Island, Hilo, HI, for Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING COUNTY OF HAWAII OFFICIAL DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS (DOC. 23) AND STATE OF HAWAII DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS (DOC. 25)

HELEN GILLMOR, Senior District Judge.

Plaintiff George K. Young, Jr. sues County and State Officials alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 and 1986 in the denial of his application for a license to carry a weapon in public, pursuant to Hawaii Revised Statute § 134–9. Plaintiff asserts that the enforcement of Hawaii Revised Statutes §§ 134–6 and 134–9 violate the rights guaranteed him by Article I of the United States Constitution, and by the Second, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. To remedy the alleged violations, Plaintiff seeks damages, an order enjoining the enforcement of Chapter 134 of Hawaii Revised Statutes, and a three-year permit for carrying a weapon in public.

Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint.

Plaintiff's claims against the State and State Officials are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Plaintiff's claims against the County and County Officials fail because Plaintiff has not alleged a Constitutional violation.

The Court GRANTS Defendants' Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 12, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Complaint. (Doc. 1.)

On August 10, 2012, the County Official Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint. (Doc. 23.) The County of Hawaii and Hilo County Police Department were never served.

On August 16, 2012, the State of Hawaii Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint. (Doc. 25.)

On September 6, 2012, Plaintiff filed an Opposition to the Motions to Dismiss. (Doc. 29.)

On October 1, 2012, the County of Hawaii Officials Defendants filed a Reply. (Doc. 33.)

On October 1, 2012, the State of Hawaii Defendants filed a Reply. (Doc. 34.)

The Court elected to decide the matter without a hearing pursuant to Local Rule 7.2(d).

BACKGROUND

A. Factual Allegations Set Forth In The Complaint

The Complaint alleges that Defendants violated Plaintiff George K. Young, Jr.'s rights under the United States Constitution by denying his applications for a license to carry a firearm, pursuant to Hawaii Revised Statute (“HRS”) § 134–9. Plaintiff also alleges that HRS § 134–6, which was repealed in 2006, is unconstitutional.

B. Legal Allegations Set Forth In The Complaint

The Complaint sets out claims asserting that HRS §§ 134–6 and 134–9 (“Hawaii's Firearm Carrying Laws”) violate Plaintiff's rights guaranteed by Article I of the United States Constitution, and by the Second, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.

Plaintiff's primary contention involves HRS § 134–9, Hawaii's License to Carry Law. The law conditions the ability to carry a pistol or revolver and ammunition in public. Haw.Rev.Stat. § 134–9.

The other challenged provision, HRS § 134–6, was repealed in 2006 and replaced by HRS §§ 134–21 through 134–27. See Act 66, § 6, of the 2006 Haw. Sess. Laws; State v. Ancheta, 121 Hawai'i 471, 220 P.3d 1052 (Haw.Ct.App.2009)(noting the similarity between HRS § 134–6 and the replacement statutes). The statutes at issue regulate the transportation of weapons outside of a person's private property. People who hold a License to Carry, pursuant to HRS § 134–9, are exempt from the provisions.

Counts One through Five allege the following claims against all Defendants:

COUNT ONE—“(42 U.S.C. § 1983, 1985, 1986) Violation of U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 10, Cls. 1: ‘No State shall ... pass ... any Bill of Attainder ...’ ”

COUNT TWO—“(42 U.S.C.1983, 1985, 1986) Violation of U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 10: ‘No State shall ... pass any ... law impairing the Obligations of Contract ...’ ”

COUNT THREE—“Violation of U.S. Constitution, Amendment II”

COUNT FOUR—“Violation of U.S. Constitution, Amendment IX”

COUNT FIVE—“Violation of U.S. Constitution, Amendment XIV ‘... No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States ...’ ”

The Complaint also alleges a cause of action under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Complaint at pg. 6.) Plaintiff requests a permanent injunction preventing the enforcement of HRS Chapter 134, damages, and punitive damages. He also requests that he be immediately issued a permit to carry an unconcealed or concealed weapon for three years.

C. Plaintiff's Previous Cases

Plaintiff has previously filed two similar Complaints in the Federal District of Hawaii. In the first case, Young v. Hawaii, 548 F.Supp.2d 1151 (D.Haw.2008)(“Young I ”), Plaintiff sued State and County Officials based on the denial of his application to carry a weapon in public. The factual and legal basis are nearly identical to the case before the Court. On March 12, 2008, the District Court dismissed the Complaint with prejudice. The Court held that sovereign immunity barred suit against the State and State officials. As to the County, the Court held that Plaintiff lacked standing to sue for a Second Amendment violation, reflecting the state of the law at the time of the decision.

In the second case, Young v. Hawaii, No. 08–00540, 2009 WL 1955749, 73 Fed.R. Serv.3d 1635 (D.Haw. Jul. 2, 2009)(“ Young II ”), Plaintiff alleged the same violations as in Young I after he was again denied a permit after reapplying. Three differences existed between Young I and Young II. First, in Young II, Plaintiff brought causes of action against County Officials in their individual capacities, as well as official capacities. Second, after Young I, the Supreme Court of the United States decided District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008), holding that the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution conferred a limited right to individuals to keep and bear arms. Third, at the time of the District Court's Order, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Second Amendment applied to the states, not just to the federal government. Nordyke v. King, 563 F.3d 439 (9th Cir.2009), vacated,611 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir.2010)(remanding back to panel after McDonald v. City of Chicago ), rehearing en banc,681 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir.2012). While Heller and King did confer standing on Plaintiff to challenge an alleged infringement of his Second Amendment right, Plaintiff was estopped from bringing the claims a second time due to the preclusive effect of Young I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Defendants move to dismiss the alleged causes of action in Counts I through V, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The Court may dismiss a complaint as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) where it fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court must presume all allegations of material fact to be true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Pareto v. F.D.I.C., 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir.1998). Conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss. Id. at 699. The Court need not accept as true allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice or allegations contradicting the exhibits attached to the complaint. Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir.2001).

In Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, the United States Supreme Court addressed the pleading standards under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the anti-trust context. 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). The Supreme Court stated that Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” and that “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

Most recently, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Supreme Court clarified that the principles announced in Twombly are applicable in all civil cases. 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). The Court stated that “the pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me-accusation.” Id. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955). A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant...