Young v. Mitsubishi Motors N. Am. Corp.

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ROBERT YOUNG, et al., Plaintiffs, v. MITSUBISHI MOTORS NORTH AMERICA CORPORATION, INC., et al., Defendants.

No. C19-2070RSL

United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Seattle

January 16, 2024

ORDER DENYING THE UNITED STATES' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ROBERT S. LASNIK, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

This matter comes before the Court on defendant United States' “Motion to Dismiss” (Dkt. # 80). The Court having reviewed the submissions of the parties and the remainder of the record, finds as follows:

I. Background

This lawsuit is based on a tragic car accident that occurred on the afternoon of January 1, 2017. Dkt. # 62 at 2. Plaintiffs were driving a Mitsubishi vehicle through the Olympic National Park when a diseased Douglas fir blew over and fell onto the roof of the vehicle, injuring driver Robert Young killing his wife, Julie Young, and minor grandchild, D.L.H and paralyzing another minor grandchild, I.R.Y. See Dkt. # 62 at 10-11.

Following the accident, plaintiffs hired an attorney and conducted a “thorough investigation” into potential claims. Dkt. # 84 at 2. As part of this investigation, plaintiffs submitted two Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) requests to the National Parks Service (“NPS”). Id. The first request was submitted on March 22, 2017, and asked for “all materials within your possession or under your control relating to the investigation on January 1, 2017.” Dkt. # 83 at 4. On May 16, 2017, NPS responded to the first FOIA request “with documents and correspondence regarding the event, investigation reports, photographs, and several emails.” Dkt. # 84 at 2.

The second request was submitted on June 8, 2017, and asked for, inter alia, “Any Official Tree Hazard Program materials for Olympic National Park and any other official policy on tree maintenance, inspection, or removal.” Dkt. # 83 at 5. On September 7, 2017, NPS responded to plaintiffs' second FOIA request, explaining that it “was able to locate one responsive record and it is attached in its entirety.” Dkt. # 62 at 21. The attached document was titled “Olympic National Park Hazard Tree Management Plan, May 1999.” Id.

In 2018, plaintiffs provided the records they had obtained through their investigation, including the records they had received from NPS, to an expert arborist. Dkt. # 84 at 4. Based on an analysis of the available records, the expert opined that “any claim [against the federal government] would be barred under the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act.” Id. at 3-5.

On December 20, 2019, plaintiffs filed the instant suit, naming Mitsubishi Motor Corporations and Mitsubishi Motors North America Corporations Inc. as defendants in this products liability action. See Dkt. # 1.

More than a year later, defendant Mitsubishi sent its own FOIA request to NPS and received “thousands of pages of documents” in return. Dkt. # 84 at 5. The production included the two key documents at issue in this motion: (1) a May 10, 2017, letter from former forester Richard Cahill and (2) the 2015 Pacific West Region Directive: PW-062 Hazard Tree Management Plan. Plaintiffs allege that PW-062 “direct[s] NPS to identify and remove hazard trees alongside U.S. Highway 101 at Lake Crescent,” a directive that was not imposed by the 1999 Tree Hazard Plan that was previously produced. Dkt. # 83 at 8. Plaintiffs also allege that the Cahill letter demonstrates that “NPS had failed to monitor and manage the hazard tree that resulted in the January 1, 2017, tree fall.” Id.

Mitsubishi provided the documents it received from NPS to plaintiffs in January 2022. Dkt. # 84 at 6. Mitsubishi subsequently filed a motion to implead NPS as a third-party defendant in this action, Dkt. # 49, which the Court granted, Dkt. # 53.

After receiving the additional documents from Mitsubishi, plaintiffs again consulted with an expert arborist who opined “that NPS was responsible for surveying the roadway and . . . that the hazard tree should have been identified and removed before January 1, 2017.” Dkt. # 84 at 7. Plaintiffs filed a Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) administrative claim against NPS on March 18, 2022. Dkt. # 81 at 3. On February 2, 2023, plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint, adding FTCA claims against third-party defendant NPS. See Dkt. # 62. The United States filed this motion to dismiss the claims against NPS. Dkt. # 80. Specifically, the government argues that plaintiffs' claims are untimely and thus “forever barred” under the statute. Id. at 2 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b)). Plaintiffs argue that although their claims were filed after the two-year limitations period provided in the FTCA, their claims should not be dismissed because the limitations period was equitably tolled under a theory of fraudulent concealment or equitable estoppel. Dkt. # 83. The Mitsubishi defendants also oppose the government's motion.^[1] See Dkt. # 86.

II. Legal Standard

While the government's motion was titled “Motion to Dismiss,” the government noted the possibility that its motion could be converted to one for summary judgment. Dkt. # 80 at 5. The government stated that it “does not object to having this motion heard as a motion for summary judgment.” Id. In their response, plaintiffs characterized the government's motion as a “motion to dismiss and for summary judgment” and argued that under “either standard,” plaintiffs have met their burden. Dkt. # 83 at 11, 31. Both parties submitted declarations with attached exhibits in support of their arguments. See Dkts. # 81, 84, 85, 88.

When “matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56. All parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d). The Ninth Circuit has explained that it does not “require strict adherence to formal notice requirements” where a motion to dismiss is converted to one for summary judgment. Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 916, 921-22 (9th Cir. 2004). Rather, the Court must “determine whether the party against whom summary judgment was entered was ‘fairly apprised that the court would look beyond the pleadings and thereby transform the 12(b) motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment.'” Id. (quoting Garaux v. Pulley, 739 F.2d 437, 439 (9th Cir. 1984)). Here, both parties have submitted materials outside the pleadings for the Court's consideration and have referenced the legal standard for summary judgment in their submissions to the Court. See Dkt. # 83 at 10-11; Dkt. # 80 at 4-5. The Court finds that the parties have sufficient notice and will therefore consider the additional materials and treat the motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment. See San Pedro Hotel Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 159 F.3d 470, 477 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[A] represented party who submits matters outside the pleadings to the judge and invites consideration of them has notice that the judge may use them to decide a motion originally noted as a motion to dismiss, requiring its transformation to a motion for summary judgment.” (citation omitted)).

A party is entitled to summary judgment if the “movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Under Rule 56, the party seeking summary dismissal of the case “bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion,” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986), and “citing to particular parts of materials in the record” that establish the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Once the moving party satisfies its burden, it is entitled to summary judgment if the non-moving party fails to designate “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). The Court must “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and draw all reasonable inferences in the nonmovant's favor.” City of Pomona v. SQMN. Am. Corp., 750 F.3d 1036, 1049 (9th Cir. 2014). Although the Court must reserve genuine issues regarding credibility, the weight of the evidence, and legitimate inferences for the trier of fact, the “mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party's position will be insufficient” to avoid judgment. Id. (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Id. (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).

III. Discussion

A. FTCA Statute of Limitations

Plaintiffs bring their claims against NPS under the FTCA, which provides a limited waiver of the government's sovereign immunity for tort claims. Bennett v. United States, 44 F.4th 929, 933 (9th Cir. 2022) (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2671-80). A plaintiff bringing an FTCA claim against the United States must first file an administrative claim with the appropriate agency “within two years after such claim accrues.” 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). The claim must then be brought in federal court “within six months” after the agency acts on the claim. Id. Under the FTCA, a “claim accrue[s] when the plaintiffs kn[o]w both the fact of injury and its immediate physical cause.” Hensley v. United States, 531 F.3d 1052, 1057 (9th Cir. 2008). A plaintiff's “ignorance of the involvement of United States employees is irrelevant.” Dyniewicz v. United States, 742 F.2d 484, 486 (9th Cir. 1984).

Here the parties do not dispute that plaintiffs' claims accrued...