Young v. Obaisi, 15-cv-2412

BRYAIN J. YOUNG, Plaintiff, v. GHALIAH OBAISI, as Independent Executor for the Estate of Saleh Obaisi,and ANDREW H. TILDEN, M.D., Defendants.

No. 15-cv-2412

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

March 18, 2019

Judge Thomas M. Durkin

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Bryain J. Young brought this Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference action against Dr. Saleh Obaisi (Medical Director, Stateville Correctional Center) and Dr. Andrew H. Tilden (Medical Director, Pontiac Correctional Center), as well as other defendants that have since been dismissed. Before the Court now are Drs. Obaisi and Tilden's motions for summary judgment. For the following reasons, both motions are denied.

Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The Court considers the entire evidentiary record and must view all of the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences from that evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Horton v. Pobjecky, 883 F.3d 941, 948 (7th Cir. 2018). To defeat summary judgment, a nonmovant must produce more than a "mere scintilla of evidence" and come forward with "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Johnson v. Advocate Health and Hosps. Corp., 892 F.3d 887, 894, 896 (7th Cir. 2018). Ultimately, summary judgment is warranted only if a reasonable jury could not return a verdict for the nonmovant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

Background¹

Young has been in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections at all times relevant to this suit. The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.

A. Stateville Correctional Center

On December 4, 2012, Young injured his left knee playing basketball at Stateville Correctional Center. R. 174 ¶ 10. Young saw Dr. Obaisi for treatment that same day, and Dr. Obaisi ordered an x-ray, authorized the use of crutches, and prescribed Naproxen. R. 188 ¶ 2.

On May 9, 2013, five months after his injury, Young saw Dr. Obaisi again for knee pain. Id. ¶ 4. At this visit, Dr. Obaisi noted left knee swelling and administered a steroid injection. Id. ¶¶ 4, 6. On June 20, 2013, Dr. Obaisi again noted left knee pain and swelling and ordered another steroid injection. Id. ¶ 7.

Dr. Obaisi saw Young again on September 19, 2013 for treatment of his knee injury. Id. ¶ 11. Dr. Obaisi noted swelling and Young reported no improvement from the two steroid injections. Id. At that visit, Dr. Obaisi prescribed a knee brace and approved a referral to an outside orthopedist. R. 174 ¶¶ 40, 41. No orthopedist visit was scheduled in 2013. See R. 156 ¶ 28.

On October 19, 2013, ten months after the initial injury, Dr. Obaisi authorized Young for a low bunk/low gallery permit. R. 174 ¶ 53.

B. Pontiac Correctional Center

On January 1, 2014, Young was transferred to Pontiac Correctional Center and to the care of Dr. Tilden. Dr. Tilden first saw Young on February 20, 2014, just two months after Young's transfer. R. 178 ¶ 39. After Young informed him of his injury, Dr. Tilden contacted the referral coordinator to speed up the orthopedic referral. Id. ¶41. Dr. Tilden approved the orthopedic consult and Young was seen by a specialist on May 14, 2014. Id. ¶ 32. The orthopedic specialist recommended an MRI. R. 174 ¶ 56. Based on the specialist's findings, Dr. Tilden authorized a permit for a low bunk/low gallery and a knee brace on May 16, 2014. R. 188 ¶ 15. Young's MRI took place on September 18, 2014. R. 174 ¶ 57. It showed a medial meniscus tear as well as a chronic ACL tear. Id. ¶ 58.

After the MRI, Young saw the orthopedist again on February 18, 2015. Id. ¶ 57. The orthopedist recognized the seriousness of the injury and referred Young to another specialist, Dr. Marcus. Id. On July 1, 2015, Dr. Marcus recommended a formal physical therapy program and stated that he wanted to follow-up with Young in three months. Id. ¶ 58. Young, however, received only one session of physical therapy and did not return to Dr. Marcus for another year, on July 20, 2016. R. 188 ¶ 16.; R. 174 ¶ 59. At that point, Dr. Marcus recommended surgery because Young had failed non-operative management. R. 174 ¶ 59. Young underwent surgery to repair his ACL tear and medial meniscus tear in August of 2016. Id. ¶ 60.

Young brought this case alleging that Drs. Obaisi and Tilden were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs, causing him unnecessary and prolonged left knee pain, discomfort, suffering, and disability.

Discussion

I. Deliberate Indifference

"Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment when they display deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners." Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d 516, 522 (7th Cir. 2008). To establish a deliberate indifference claim based on deficient medical care, a plaintiff must show (1) that he suffered an objectively serious risk of harm, and (2) that the defendant acted with a subjectively culpable state of mind in acting or failing to act in disregard of that risk. Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 843, 857 (7th Cir. 2011).

To satisfy the objective element, a medical condition must be "diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would perceive the need for a doctor's attention." Edwards v. Snyder, 478 F.3d 827, 830-31 (7th Cir. 2007). "A medical condition need not be life-threatening to be serious; rather, it could be a condition that would result in further significant injury or unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain if not treated." Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 620 (7th Cir. 2010). At the same time, however, "[t]he Constitution is not a charter of protection for hypochondriacs." Cooper v. Casey, 97 F.3d 914, 916 (7th Cir. 1996).

To satisfy the subjective state of mind element, an inmate does not have to show that the prison official actually intended or wanted to harm him; it is enough that the official "knew of a substantial risk of harm to the inmate and disregarded the risk." Edwards, 478 F.3d at 831. This standard is higher than mere negligence—medical malpractice or a disagreement with a doctor's medical judgment does not give rise to a constitutional claim for deliberate indifference. Id. at 831; Gayton, 593 F.3d at 622-23. Similarly, an inmate is not entitled to "demand specific care" or the "best care possible." Forbes v. Edgar, 112 F.3d 262, 266-67 (7th Cir. 1997).

A prison doctor may exhibit deliberate indifference to a known condition (i) "through inaction," (ii) "by persisting with inappropriate treatment," or (iii) "by delaying necessary treatment and thus aggravating the injury or needlessly prolonging an inmate's pain." Gatson v. Ghosh, 498 Fed. Appx. 629, 631-32 (7th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). If an inmate alleges that a particular treatment decision was erroneous, "[d]eliberate indifference may be inferred . . . only when the medical professional's decision is such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible did not base the decision on such a judgment." Gayton, 593 F.3d at 622-23.

The parties do not dispute that Young's knee pain was an objectively serious medical condition. The Court will address each defendant's arguments on the subjective element separately.

A. Dr. Saleh Obaisi

Dr. Obaisi argues that Young cannot show that he was deliberately indifferent (1) in his referral to an orthopedic specialist; and (2) in providing sufficient pain management.

1. Referral to Specialist

Although Young was injured in December 2012, Dr. Obaisi did not refer him to an orthopedic specialist until September 19, 2013. Dr. Obaisi argues that he acted reasonably because he attempted conservative methods first. While Young does not dispute Dr. Obaisi properly attempted conservative treatments, the record does indicate that Dr. Obaisi failed to follow the appropriate standard of care in timely referring Young to a specialist and ensuring Young actually saw a specialist, causing Young prolonged pain. R. 188 ¶ 19; R. 156-6 at 183:18-184:13. After all, Young could not make an appointment with a specialist himself. For that, he had to rely on Dr. Obaisi.

There is also evidence that Dr. Obaisi did not follow Wexford policies and procedures in making the referral. Wexford policies and procedures provide that a referral to a specialist should be made where chronic knee pain has been present for six months. R. 188 ¶ 8. Here, Dr. Obaisi did not refer Young until he exhibited chronic knee pain for nine months. Even then, Young did not see an orthopedic specialist before he was moved from Stateville three months later. Dr. Obaisi's failure to follow Wexford polices supports Young's argument that Dr. Obaisi was deliberately indifferent in his delay of referring Young to a specialist for further treatment. See Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 729 (7th Cir. 2016), as amended (Aug. 25, 2016) ("While published requirements for health care do not create constitutional rights, such protocols certainly provide circumstantial evidence that a prison health care gatekeeper knew of a substantial risk of serious harm.").

Dr. Obaisi argues that despite any delay, Young's care management did not change, and thus Young cannot prove causation. "In cases where prison officials delayed rather than denied medical assistance to an inmate," the plaintiff must "offer verifying medical evidence that the delay (rather than the inmate's underlying condition) caused some degree of harm." Jackson v. Pollion, 733 F.3d 786, 790 (7th Cir. 2013). Here, over a year and a half passed between when Young injured his knee in December 2012 and when he first saw a specialist in May 2014 (though Dr. Obaisi was...