Young v. Scott Twp.

469 F.Supp.3d 298

James M. YOUNG, Sr., et al., Plaintiffs,

v.SCOTT TOWNSHIP, et al., Defendants.

No. 4:18-CV-0403

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania.

Signed June 26, 2020

Matthew Thomas Comerford, Curt M. Parkins, Comerford Law, Scranton, PA, for Plaintiffs.

David J. MacMain, The MacMain Law Group LLC, Malvern, PA, for Defendants Scott Township, Raymond Klingler, Joe Grassley, Vincent Figuerido, Paul Kelly.

John A. Lucy, Sarah W. Arosell, Thomas, Thomas & Hafer, LLP, Harrisburg, PA, for Defendants Columbia Montour Snyder Union Counties of Central Pennsylvania Service System, Megan Fetterman.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Matthew W. Brann, United States District Judge

I. BACKGROUND

Two motions for summary judgment are ripe for the Court's disposition.

Plaintiffs have concurred with the motion for summary judgment made by Defendants Megan Fetterman and Columbia Montour Snyder Union Counties of Central Pennsylvania Service System.¹ Therefore, the Court grants this motion. And the Court dismisses with prejudice all claims against Fetterman and Columbia Montour Snyder Union.

Plaintiffs do contest, however, the second motion. This one comes from Defendants Scott Township, Chief Raymond Klingler, Sergeant Joseph Grassley, Officer Vincent Figueiredo, and Officer Paul Kelly (the "Scott Township Defendants"). The Court also grants these Defendants’ motion.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

I begin my analysis with the standard of review which undergirds summary judgment. "One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses, and we think it should be interpreted in a way that allows it to accomplish this purpose."² Summary judgment is appropriate where "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."³ "Facts that could alter the outcome are ‘material facts,’ and disputes are ‘genuine’ if evidence exists from which a rational person could conclude that the position of the person with the burden of proof on the disputed issue is correct."⁴ "A defendant meets this standard when there is an absence of evidence that rationally supports the plaintiff's case."⁵ "A plaintiff, on the other hand, must point to admissible evidence that would be sufficient to show all elements of a prima facie case under applicable substantive law."⁶

"The inquiry involved in a ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict necessarily implicates the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at the trial on the merits."⁷ Thus, "if the defendant in a run-of-the-mill civil case moves for summary judgment or for a directed verdict based on the lack of proof of a material fact, the judge must ask himself not whether he thinks the evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other but whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented."⁸ "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff."⁹ "The judge's inquiry, therefore, unavoidably asks ... ‘whether there is [evidence] upon which a jury can properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it, upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.’ "¹⁰ The evidentiary record at trial, by rule, will typically never surpass that which was compiled during the course of discovery.

"A party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact."¹¹ "Regardless of whether the moving party accompanies its summary judgment motion with affidavits, the motion may, and should, be granted so long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for the entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied."¹²

Where the movant properly supports his motion, the nonmoving party, to avoid summary judgment, must answer by setting forth "genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party."¹³ For movants and nonmovants alike, the assertion "that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed" must be supported by: (i) "citing to particular parts of materials in the record" that go beyond "mere allegations"; (ii) "showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute"; or (iii) "showing ... that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact."¹⁴

"When opposing summary judgment, the non-movant may not rest upon mere allegations, but rather must ‘identify those facts of record which would contradict the facts identified by the movant.’ "¹⁵ Moreover, "if a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may ... consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion."¹⁶ On a motion for summary judgment, "the court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record."¹⁷

Finally, "at the summary judgment stage the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial."¹⁸ "There is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party."¹⁹ "If the evidence is merely colorable ... or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted."²⁰

B. Undisputed Facts

With that standard outlining the Court's framework for review, I now turn to the undisputed facts of this matter.

1. Jonathan Young

Jonathan Young resided at 2700 Lackawanna Avenue, Lot 5, Bloomsburg, Columbia County, Pennsylvania 17815.²¹

Young suffered from schizophrenia and had been involuntarily committed numerous times in the past.²² Scott Township (Columbia County) officers assisted in serving Section 302 involuntary commitment warrants on Young in the past. Young was not violent during the previous interactions with Scott Township officers.²³

Young drank alcohol and had a history of drug use. Young was a frequent user of the drug called "bath salts." Young had been arrested before for drug use.²⁴

2. Events Prior to the Police's Entry

Young was hallucinating on the day of this incident – November 13, 2016. That day, Young was not taking his mental health medication. Young's parents believed he needed immediate medical help and should have been admitted to the hospital. November 13, 2016 was the worst that James Young ("James"; Young's father) had seen his son's behavior.²⁵

In keeping, a Section 302 involuntary commitment warrant ("the warrant") was issued for Young on November 13, 2016.²⁶ Meghan Fetterman was an intervention specialist for Columbia Montour Snyder Union ("CMSU") and mainly dealt with mental health crises.²⁷ Young's parents provided information regarding Young's mental health to Fetterman; she approved the warrant and requested that Scott Township officers assist in serving it.²⁸

Officers believed Young was a danger to himself and to others on the incident date.²⁹ James told the officers that his son had physically grabbed his mother. James told the officers that his son had tools such as a hammer and screwdrivers in the residence. James told the officers that Young had a baseball bat inside his residence (a trailer), and that Young had chased him and his wife out of the residence using the baseball bat.³⁰

Sandra Young ("Sandra"; Young's mother) wanted the officers to do what was necessary to get her son to the hospital. James suggested that the officers break a window to get into the trailer. Officers as well as Fetterman spoke to Young in an effort to convince Young to exit his residence. Officers had Judy Snyder, Young's aunt to whom he was close, speak to Young on the phone and in-person to convince him to come out of his residence. Officers had Snyder try to convince Young to open the door to let his dog out in an effort to have him exit the residence. And officers had Young's parents speak to Young in an effort to get him to come out of his residence.³¹

While his family, Fetterman, and officers were trying to convince Young to come out, they could hear Young barricading the door and nailing it shut.³² James drew a diagram of the residence for officers.³³ Officers made the decision to enter Young's residence after mental health workers, officers, and family members had tried to convince Young to come out because Young posed a danger to himself and to others.³⁴ And officers made the decision to enter Young's residence pursuant to the Section 302 warrant.³⁵

Officers and Meghan Fetterman did not anticipate a violent response from Young when officers entered the residence.³⁶ Officers made the decision to enter Young's residence while on the scene, based on the totality of the circumstances.³⁷ They made this decision after an hour had passed with no success in convincing Young to exit the residence.³⁸ While his family, Fetterman, and officers were trying to convince him to come out of his residence, Young readied himself for entry and made things more dangerous for the officers.³⁹

3. Events Inside the Residence

Young greased the floor just inside the door, making the floor slippery.⁴⁰ Young retreated to his bedroom.⁴¹ He had a hatchet and a baseball bat in his possession.⁴² Young was given orders throughout his interactions with officers in the house to drop the hatchet and baseball bat.⁴³

Young was screaming and yelling while officers were inside the residence.⁴⁴ Young emerged out of the...