Young v. Shoe Palace Corp.

SARAH YOUNG, Plaintiff, v. SHOE PALACE CORPORATION, Defendant.

No. 21CV559-GPC(MSB)

United States District Court, S.D. California

July 2, 2021

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STAY [DKT NO. 3.]

Hon Gonzalo P. Curiel United States District Judge

Before the Court is Defendant's motion to stay this case pending conclusion of Katt v. Shoe Palace Corporation, Case No. 1:19cv3676-RBJ, D. Colo (filed Dec. 26, 2019), a case pending in the District Court for the District of Colorado. (Dkt. No. 3.) Plaintiff filed an opposition and Defendant replied^[1]. (Dkt. Nos. 5, 6.) Based on the reasoning below, the Court GRANTS Defendant's motion to stay proceedings.

Background

On March 30, 2021, Plaintiff Sarah Young (“Plaintiff”) filed a putative class action complaint against Defendant Shoe Palace Corporation (“Defendant” or “Shoe Palace”) for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12181, and violations of California's Unruh Civil Rights Act (“UCRA”). (Dkt. No. 1, Compl.) The Court alleges that Defendant's retail stores provide the public with important goods and services and its website provides consumers access to “the ultimate experience when it comes to shoe and apparel shopping.” (Id. ¶ 5.) Defendant's website provides information about new product arrivals as well as footwear, apparel and accessories for men, women and children, exclusive collections, sale items, store locations and personalized accounts as well as information about shipping, returns exchanges, Defendant's story, social medica webpages contact info and newsletter. (Id.)

Plaintiff is a blind and visually impaired woman and requires screen reader software to access the internet and read website content. (Id. ¶ 1, 25.) While she is proficient in using screen reading software, Defendant's website is not fully or equally accessible to blind and visually impaired customers, and consequently, she has been denied full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services offered to the public on Defendant's website. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 26-28.) Plaintiff seeks to certify a nationwide class of “all legally blind individuals who have attempted to access Defendant's website by the use of a screen reading software during the applicable limitations period up to and including final judgment in this action.” (Id. ¶ 42.) She also seeks to certify a California class of “all legally blind individuals in the State of California who have attempted to access Defendant's website by the use of a screen reading software during the applicable limitations period up to and including final judgment in this action.” (Id. ¶ 43.)

Fifteen months earlier, on December 26, 2019, David Katt filed a putative class action complaint against Defendant for violations of the ADA and sought declaratory relief in the District of Colorado, Katt v. Shoe Palace Corporation, Case No. 1:19cv3676-RBJ, D. Colo. (Dkt. No. 3-2, Hurley Decl., Ex. A, Compl.) In Katt, the plaintiff is blind and visually impaired and uses screen reading software to read website content and claims that when he visited Defendant's website, he encountered multiple access barriers which denied him full and equal access to its facilities. (Id. ¶¶ 28, 29.) He seeks to certify a nationwide class of “all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant's Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services, during the relevant statutory period.” (Id. ¶ 51.)

Discussion

A. Landis Stay

Defendant moves to stay the action pending the conclusion of the Katt matter pursuant to the Court's inherent authority as articulated in Landis v. N. American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). (Dkt. No. 3.) While Plaintiff does not dispute that the same website, same ADA violations and same nationwide class under the ADA are alleged in both cases, she argues a stay will hinder her and the class members' ability to recover monetary relief under California's UCRA. (Dkt. No. 5.)

A federal district court possesses the inherent power to “control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.” Landis, 299 U.S. at 254.

Where it is proposed that a pending proceeding be stayed, the competing interests which will be affected by the granting or refusal to grant a stay must be weighed. Among those competing interests are [1] the possible damage which may result from the granting of a stay, [2] the hardship or inequity which a party may suffer in being required to go forward, and [3] the orderly course of justice measured in terms of the simplifying or complicating of issues, proof, and questions of law which could be expected to result from a stay.

Lockyer v. Mirant, 398 F.3d 1098, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting CMAX, Inc. v. Hall, 300 F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir. 1962)). “A trial court may, with propriety, find it is efficient for its own docket and the fairest course for the parties to enter a stay of an action before it, pending resolution of independent proceedings which bear upon the case. This rule applies whether the separate proceedings are judicial, administrative, or arbitral in character, and does not require that the issues in such proceedings are necessarily controlling of the action before the court.” Leyva v. Certified Grocers of California, Ltd., 593 F.2d 857, 863 (9th Cir. 1979) (citing Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180 (1952); Landis, 299 U.S. at 254-55 (additional citations omitted)).

“In the typical Landis stay case, a federal court postpones resolution of the case pending some related proceeding. However, the related proceeding typically serves only to narrow the factual or legal issues for the federal court . . . . [A] Landis stay is generally of a limited duration.” Stoltz v. Fry Foods, Inc., 60 F.Supp.3d 1132, 1136-37 (D. Idaho 2014) see also Landis, 299 U.S. at 250-51 (recognizing that the related case “may not settle every question of fact and law” in the stayed federal action). A district court has discretion whether to grant or deny a Landis stay. See Dependable Highway Express, Inc. v. Navigators Ins. Co., 498 F.3d 1059, 1066 (9th Cir. 2007).

1. Possible Damage in Granting a Stay

Defendant argues there is no prejudice to Plaintiff if a stay is granted. (Dkt. No. 3-1 at 9.) Instead, Plaintiff will benefit from the Katt matter because she is a member of the Katt class, and if the class is certified, it will provide relief to her on the ADA claim. Moreover, a mere delay of Plaintiff's case is far outweighed by having the issues streamlined by the Colorado district court when it makes its rulings about whether the ADA applies to Defendant's website and whether it is accessible.

Plaintiff disagrees arguing that she and the class will be prejudiced because a stay will jeopardize their UCRA claim which affords them monetary relief. She explains that in the event the ADA claim in this case becomes moot, the Court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction of the remaining UCRA claim, and if so, Plaintiff will be required to file her remaining UCRA claim in state court which will require her prove intentional conduct an element not required if a violation of the ADA is shown. She urges that a stay would contravene the California legislative's purpose to strengthen remedies for California plaintiffs by amending section 51 of the Civil Code to add that “[a] violation of the right of any individual under the [ADA] shall also constitute a violation of this section.” (Id.)

To prevail on a claim under the ADA, a plaintiff must show that (1) he or she has a disability within the meaning of the ADA; (2) the defendant is a private entity that operates, leases, or owns a place of public accommodation; and (3) he or she was denied “public accommodations by the defendant because of his or her disability.” Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182(a)-(b)). “[A] plaintiff need not show intentional discrimination in order to make out a violation of the ADA.” Lentini v. Cal. Ctr. for the Arts, Escondido, 370 F.3d 837, 846 (9th Cir. 2004). Under the ADA, “damages are not recoverable . . . only injunctive relief is available.” Wander v. Kaus, 304 F.3d 856, 858 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1)).

The UCRA provides in part that “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of [California] are free and equal, and no matter what their . . . disability . . . are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.” Cal. Civ. Code § 51(b). The UCRA also provides that a violation of the ADA constitutes a violation of § 51 of the UCRA. Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f). While a claim under the UCRA requires a plaintiff to allege an intentional act by a defendant, a showing of intentional discrimination is not required when a plaintiff brings a UCRA claim based on a violation of the ADA. See Munson v. Del Taco, Inc., 46 Cal.4th 661, 678 (2009) (a plaintiff seeking damages for ADA violations under the Unruh Civil Rights Act is not required to prove intentional discrimination); see also Lentini, 370 F.3d at 847 (“[N]o showing of intentional discrimination is required where the Unruh Act violation is premised on an ADA violation.”). In contrast to the ADA, the UCRA also allows for recovery of monetary damages. See Cal. Civ. Code § 52(a)^[2].

Plaintiff's claim of prejudice due to the inability or difficulty in seeking monetary damages under the UCRA claim is not convincing. First of all, claims of monetary injury due to past harm do not rise to the level of harm or prejudice needed to justify a denial of a stay. See CMAX, ...