Young v. U.S.

305 A.3d 402

James D. YOUNG & Tyrone Height, Appellants,

v.UNITED STATES, Appellee.

Nos. 18-CF-0694 & 18-CF-1078

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued April 28, 2022

Decided November 30, 2023

Appeals from the Superior Court of the District of Columbia (2014-CF1-015616 & 2014-CF1-015617), (Hon. Milton Lee, Trial Judge)

Sam H. Zwingli, with whom Jeffrey T. Green and Kathleen Mueller, Washington, were on the brief, for appellant James D. Young.

Cecily E. Baskir for appellant Tyrpne Height.

David P. Saybolt, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Channing P. Phillips, Acting United States Attorney (at the time of argument), and Chrisellen R. Kolb, John P. Mannarino, and Laura Crane, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief, for appellee.

Before Blackburne-Rigsby, Chief Judge, Alikhan, Associate Judge, and Fisher, Senior Judge.

Blackburne-Rigsby, Chief Judge:

In these appeals, appellants Jam.es D. Young and Tyrone Height challenge their convictions for felony murder and second- degree murder while armed and related offenses resulting from, and following, the shooting death of Willard Shelton. They contend that the government’s evidence against them was insufficient and they also challenge various evidentiary and motions rulings by the trial court.

We affirm appellants’ convictions¹ and, in doing so, reject a majority of their challenges. First, we reject appellants’ challenge to the sufficiency of the government’s evidence, and conclude that the evidence before the trial court was sufficient for a rational jury to convict. Second, we reject appellants’ challenge to the trial court’s denial of their motion for a mistrial based on allegedly prejudicial testimony introduced at trial. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that appellants were not unduly prejudiced. Third, we reject appellants’ argument that their Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial by an impartial jury was violated by a juror’s exposure to extrajudicial communications. Fourth, we reject appellants’ argument that there was government misconduct during closing and rebuttal argument. Fifth, we reject Mr. Height’s argument that his conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, and conclude that all elements of the offense were satisfied. Sixth, we reject appellants’ other challenges to the trial court’s rulings concerning the redirect examination of witness Tiera Liverpool and the trial court’s response to a jury note received during deliberations. Finally, we reject Mr. Height’s independent challenges to the trial court’s denial of various motions to suppress evidence as well as the denial of a pre-trial motion to sever, and affirm the trial court’s rulings on those motions.

We agree with appellants that certain of them convictions merge; in particular (1) their conviction for second-degree murder while armed merges with their conviction for felony murder while armed; (2) their conviction for felony murder merges with the underlying felony (armed robbery); and (3) three of their four convictions for possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence merge. However, we agree with the government that appellants’ fourth conviction for possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence does not merge. Further, we agree with appellants that the trial court retains discretion over how to effectuate the merger and resentence appellants on remand. Accordingly, we grant a limited remand to address the merger question consistent with this opinion.

I. Procedural and Factual Background

The following facts are undisputed. During the early morning hours of August 31, 2014, appellant James D. Young, along with another individual, shot and killed Willard Carlos Shelton in the parking lot of the Wellington Park apartment complex in the southeast quadrant of Washington, D.C.² Mr. Young and the other man subse- quently removed property from Mr. Shelton’s person and entered a nearby apartment unit without permission.

The government indicted Mr. Young for various murder, robbery, burglary and weapons-related offenses resulting from this series of events as well as for obstruction of justice based on a recorded jail call that the government alleges was Mr. Young’s effort to suppress witness testimony by ordering a hit on a key government witness. The government also indicted appellant Tyrone Michael Height³ for identical offenses related to the shooting of Mr. Shelton on the theory that Mr. Height was present with, and an accomplice to, Mr. Young at Wellington Park. Mr. Height was additionally indicted for obstruction of justice for allegedly conspiring with a fellow incarcerated individual to provide a false statement to the government exculpating him for the events at Wellington Park.

Appellants Mr. Young and Mr. Height were tried jointly before a jury. The government’s theory at trial was that appellants robbed, assaulted, and killed Mr. Shelton when he came to buy PCP from Mr. Young. Mr. Young, testifying in his own defense, presented a self-defense case, arguing that Mr. Shelton was an aggressor, high on PCP, and that he only sought to recover his own property that Mr. Shelton possessed. Mr. Young did not directly implicate his co-defendant as a part of his defense. Mr. Height did not put on evidence, but he argued that he was not present for these events. The jury convicted appellants of all counts, although they were acquitted of premeditated-first-degree murder while armed and convicted instead of second-degree murder while armed, a lesser-included offense.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence for Felony Murder While Armed and Second-Degree Murder While Armed

Appellants argue that the government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that they were guilty of felony murder while armed as well as second-degree murder while armed. The felony murder charge was premised on the theory that appellants shot and killed Mr. Shelton while committing or attempting to commit robbery. Mr. Young separately argues that the government failed to disprove self-defense for the charge of second-degree murder while armed. The government argues that the evidence was sufficient to support appellants’ convictions and disprove self-defense. We agree with the government that the evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to convict appellants of felony murder while armed and second-degree murder while armed and that the government disproved self-defense as to Mr. Young.

[1–4] We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence by viewing "the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, giving full play to the right of the fact-finder to determine credibility, weigh the evidence, and draw justifiable inferences of fact, and making no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence." Lucas v. United States, 240 A.3d 328, 343 (D.C. 2020) (quoting Cherry v. District of Columbia, 164 A.3d 922, 929 (D.C. 2017)). We will affirm if, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, "any rational fact-finder could have found the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. (quoting Hernandez v. United States, 129 A.3d 914, 918 (D.C. 2016)). "[T]he evidence in a criminal prosecution must be strong enough that a jury behaving rationally really could find it persuasive beyond a reasonable doubt." Rivas v. United States, 783 A.2d 125, 134 (D.C. 2001) (en banc). "The evidence is insufficient if, in order to convict, the jury is required to cross the bounds of permissible inference and enter the forbidden territory of conjecture and speculation." Id. (quoting Curry v. United States, 520 A.2d 255, 263 (D.C. 1987)).

[5] A rational jury could have convicted appellants of felony murder while armed and second-degree, murder while armed. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, as we must, the record supporting these convictions was as follows. On the morning of August 31, 2014, Mr. Shelton placed three unanswered calls to Mr. Young. At 6:50 a.m., as recorded by a crime camera maintained by the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department, Mr. Shelton, in his blue Chevrolet Trailblazer, entered the Wellington Park property.

At around 7:00 a.m., Victoria McRae, who lived at 2512, awoke to the sound of gunshots. She went to the window and saw two men shooting at Mr. Shelton. She saw each of the shooters with a "handgun," but she did not see Mr. Shelton holding a firearm or anything else. Although she did not personally know Mr. Shelton, she recognized the two shooters from the community and identified them as "Dink" and "Mike," nicknames for Mr. Young and Mr. Height, respectively. Ms. McRae identified appellants twice: first, in a written statement to the Wellington Park property manager; and second, in an interview with the Metropolitan Police Department ("MPD"). She also testified, that she witnessed Mr. Young "tak[ing] [Mr. Shelton]’s belongings out his pockets" including "[a] wallet" and "some keys."

Tiera Liverpool, a resident of 2514, was also a witness to the events. She was standing in her window smoking marijuana when she saw Mr. Young, whom she identified as Dink, and a second man interacting with a "larger man." She knew Mr. Young through family connections at Wellington Park. Although she did not know the larger man by name, she had previously seen him in the Wellington Park parking lot smoking PCP. The government contended that the second man was Mr. Height and the larger man was Mr. Shelton.⁴ Ms. Liverpool testified that she heard the second man, Mr. Height, "arguing at Dink about telling him to check the dude’s pockets" as if it were an attempted robbery. However, Mr. Young "didn’t want to check his pockets, but he kept asking him where the money was at." She then heard the shooting and saw Mr. Young and Mr. Height approaching her building. At that time, she saw Mr. Young with a gun....