Youngblood v. Bd. of Comm'rs

HELEN YOUNGBLOOD, PLAINTIFF, v. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF MAHONING COUNTY, et al., DEFENDANTS.

CASE NO. 4:19CV231

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION

September 9, 2019

JUDGE SARA LIOI

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

On January 30, 2019, plaintiff filed the present action in federal court alleging that certain promotions within Mahoning County have been awarded based on "cronyism, patronage, and racially discriminatory customs and practices." (Doc. No. 1 (Complaint ["Compl."]) ¶¶ 2, 17.) She seeks to certify this matter as a class action and defines the proposed class as: "All persons eligible for employment or advancement employed at the Mahoning County Department of Jobs & Family Service on January 1, 2014 and thereafter."¹ (Id. ¶ 10.)

Now before the Court is defendants' motion to dismiss, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) (Doc. No. 8 ["Mot."]). Plaintiff opposes the motion (Doc. No. 11 ["Opp'n"]), and defendants have filed a reply (Doc. No. 12 ["Reply"]). For the reasons that follow, the motion is granted and the case is dismissed with prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Helen Youngblood ("Youngblood") "is an African American employee of the Mahoning County Department of Job & Family Services ['MCDJFS']."² (Compl. ¶ 3.) Youngblood "is also an official representative of the relevant collective bargaining unit[.]" (Id.) While "purported lawful hiring policies exist," Youngblood asserts that she and other similarly situated MCDJFS employees have been denied promotional opportunities due to the "long-standing and persistent custom" of the MCDJFS to "award promotions without appropriate posting of vacancies, but instead to rely on cronyism, patronage and racial identity." (Id. ¶ 2.)

The factual allegations supporting these conclusory accusations are scant, the essence of which is confined to one paragraph. Specifically, paragraph 17 of the complaint provides:

On information and belief, the Director of the Department of Job and Family Services has within the past sixty months made a series of promotional appointments without prior posting, and hired individuals who lacked the requisite qualifications. The aforementioned hirings are typical of the endemic reliance on cronyism, patronage and racial discrimination in connection with the filing of positions in Mahoning County and [MCDJFS].

(Id. ¶ 17.)

Youngblood raises five claims: (1) due process violations under the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment; (3) disparate impact based racial discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.; (4) respondeat superior; and (5) violations of the Ohio Whistleblower Act, Ohio Rev. Code § 4113.52. (Compl. at 5-8.³) The first four claims are brought on behalf of the class as a whole,while the whistleblower claim is asserted by Youngblood individually.⁴

There is no dispute that Youngblood and other MCDJFS employees are members of the American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees ("AFSCME"), Ohio Council 8, AFL-CIO, Local 2001, and are subject to the collective bargaining agreement between the union and MCDJFS and the Mahoning Board of County Commissioners ("Board"). (See Compl. ¶ 3; Doc. No. 8-1 (Collective Bargaining Agreement ["CBA"]).) The CBA specifically dictates the procedure for filling vacancies and issuing promotions, and requires that such opportunities be posted prior to being awarded. (CBA, Art. 5, § 5.02 (C)(3).)

In their motion to dismiss, defendants—the Board, David Ditzler ("Ditzler"), Carol Rimedio-Righetti ("Rimedio-Righetti"), Anthony Traficanti ("Traficanti"), and MCDJFS (collectively "defendants")—posit that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the case as Youngblood's claims "represent employment disputes that are governed by" the CBA. (Mot. at 82.) Alternatively, defendants argue that this case must be dismissed with prejudice because each asserted claim fails to state a cause of action. (Id.)

II. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION (FED. R. CIV. P. 12(B)(1))

A. Standard of Review

Because defendants' Rule 12(b)(1) challenge attacks this Court's authority to entertain this litigation, the Court addresses it first. The Sixth Circuit recognizes two kinds of motion to dismiss for lack of standing pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1): a facial attack and a factual attack. United States v. Ritchie, 15 F.3d 592, 598 (6th Cir. 1994). A facial attack merely questions thesufficiency of the pleading. Id. In deciding a facial motion to dismiss, "the court must take the material allegations of the petition as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Id. A factual attack, on the other hand, is an attack on the factual existence of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. In deciding a factual motion to dismiss, "no presumptive truthfulness applies to the factual allegations, and the court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case." Id. (internal citation omitted). On this type of challenge, the Court has broad discretion to consider extrinsic evidence, including affidavits and documents, and can conduct a limited evidentiary hearing if necessary. See DLX, Inc. v. Kentucky, 381 F.3d 511, 516 (6th Cir. 2004); Ohio Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 922 F.2d 320, 325 (6th Cir. 1990). Youngblood presents a factual attack in this case, and it is therefore appropriate to consider documents, including the CBA, in order for the Court to satisfy itself of its jurisdiction. In either case, however, "the plaintiff has the burden of proving jurisdiction in order to survive the motion." Rogers v. Stratton Indus., Inc., 798 F.2d 913, 915 (6th Cir. 1986) (emphasis omitted).

B. Discussion

Under the terms of the CBA, the union is "the sole and exclusive representative for all employees covered by [the CBA.]" (CBA Art. 3, § 3.04.) For all individuals subject to the CBA, the agreement governs all employment related matters, including wages, benefits, and promotions, and provides a detailed grievance procedure that culminates in binding arbitration. (Id., Art. 10, § 10.02(A)(5).) Defendants argue that, to the extent "Youngblood claims her rights were violated by defects in the posting and awarding of job vacancies, she is bound by the terms of her own contract and must follow those procedures in order to seek redress." (Mot. at 87.)Youngblood retorts by noting that defendants did not raise "the alleged duty to resolve these issues through the collective bargaining grievance process" during the administrative proceedings before the Ohio Civil Rights Commission ("OCRC") and have "waived the CBA as a defense" in this case. (Opp'n at 168.)

Youngblood is mistaken, as it is well settled that subject matter jurisdiction may never be waived. See Curry v. U.S. Bulk Transp., Inc., 462 F.3d 536, 539 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Owens v. Brock, 860 F.2d 1363, 1367 (6th Cir. 1988) ("[D]efects in subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties and may be addressed by a court on its own motion at any stage of the proceedings.")). Furthermore, the OCRC is not a judicial body, and its determinations are not binding upon this Court. See Smith v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 685 F.2d 164, 168 (6th Cir. 1982).

Returning then to the issue of jurisdiction, defendants correctly note that Ohio law favors arbitration provisions in collective bargaining agreements as the exclusive means of resolving employment disputes. (Mot. at 86, citing cases.) But, Youngblood brings federal statutory discrimination claims in her complaint, and for such claims to be subject to arbitration, the intent must be "explicitly stated" in the CBA and otherwise not prohibited by statute. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 258-59, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 173 L. Ed. 2d 398 (2009) (citing Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 80, 119 S. Ct. 391, 142 L. Ed. 2d 361 (1998)). The CBA must "clearly and unmistakably" require the parties to arbitrate the specific claims at issue. Id. at 274. The Sixth Circuit has emphasized that "a statute must specifically be mentioned in a CBA for it to even approach [this] 'clear and unmistakable' standard." Bratten v. SSI Servs., Inc., 185 F.3d 625, 631 (6th Cir. 1999).

Although the CBA contains a general anti-discrimination policy, the inclusion of such a policy "is not the same as requiring union members to arbitrate such statutory claims." Id. at 631-32 (quotation marks and citation omitted). The CBA's general arbitration clause does not expressly provide for arbitration of claims brought pursuant to Title VII, § 1983, or any Ohio anti-discrimination statutes (or even mention these statutes), and thus, Youngblood's right to bring such claims in a federal judicial forum is not waived by the CBA. See, e.g., Kenney v. Superior Printing Co., 215 F.3d 650, 653-54 (6th Cir. 2000); O'Donnell v. City of Cleveland, 148 F. Supp. 3d 621, 629-30 (N.D. Ohio 2015). This Court has subject matter over Youngblood's claims and, to the extent defendants seek dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1), the motion is DENIED.

III. FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM (RULE 12(B)(6))

A. Standard of Review

Defendants also seek dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). A claim survives a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) if it "contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 29 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007)). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. A complaint's "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the...