Youngers v. ATF Transp., Inc.

JOLEEN YOUNGERS, as Personal Representative

of the Estate of Susana Rojo,TODD LOPEZ, as Personal Representativeof the Estate of Arnoldo Rojo, and EDUARDO ROJO,as Next Friend of D.R., a minor, Plaintiffs, v. ATF TRANSPORT, INC., J.B. HUNT TRANSPORT,INC., and BENGAL BUILDING CORP., Defendants,andKRISTINA MARTINEZ, as Personal Representativeof Jose Apodaca, Deceased, and JUANA APODACA, GUSTAVO APODACA,and EVANGELINA APODACA, individually, Intervenor-Plaintiffs, v. ATF TRANSPORT, INC.,and J.B. HUNT TRANSPORT, INC., Defendants.

No. 1:19-cv-01203-JCH-SCY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

September 9, 2020

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF REMAND

This matter is before the Court on motions to remand filed by Plaintiffs Joleen Youngers, as personal representative of the estate of Susana Rojo, Todd Lopez, as personal representative of the estate of Arnoldo Rojo, and Eduardo Rojo, as next friend of D.R. (Plaintiffs); and Intervenor-Plaintiffs Kristina Martinez, personal representative of the estate of Jose Apodaca, and Juana Apodaca, Gustavo Apodaca and Evangelina Apodaca (Intervenors). See ECF Nos. 8 and 9. In their remand motions, Plaintiffs and Intervenors also moved for attorneys' fees to recover costs for time spent litigating against removal. After carefully considering the motions, briefs, and relevant law, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs' and Intervenors' motions to remand will be granted, but their motions for attorneys' fees and costs will be denied.

I. BACKGROUND

The relevant facts of this case arise from a multi-vehicle accident that tragically killed four people. On March 24, 2019, Defendant ATF Transportation Inc.'s (ATF) driver, Sean White, drove a tractor-trailer across the center of an interstate in New Mexico, striking an oncoming vehicle occupied by Susana and Arnoldo Rojo and their minor daughter D.R. This collision created another collision with a vehicle occupied by Jose Apodaca, a professional driver who was operating the vehicle on behalf of his employer, Defendant Bengal Building Corporation (Bengal). All three vehicles became engulfed in flames. White, Apodaca, Susana and Arnoldo lost their lives, while D.R. was seriously injured. At the time of the collision, ATF and White were transporting property for Sigma Corporation (Sigma), who is not a party to this case.

On March 28, 2019, Plaintiffs filed suit in the First Judicial District Court of New Mexico. They contended that Defendant J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., (J.B. Hunt), "and/or" ATF "operat[ed] as a motor carrier and were transporting a load" driven by White, and that White was J.B. Hunt's and ATF's employee. ECF No. 1-1, 9. Plaintiffs asserted numerous state law causes of action against J.B. Hunt and ATF, including negligence, negligence per se, negligent entrustment, hiring, supervision, training, and retention, and gross negligence. Plaintiffs also sued Bengal, alleging that its driver, Jose Apodaca, contributed to their injuries by not properly maintaining control of the Bengal vehicle.

On May 29, 2019, Intervenors intervened as plaintiffs. Like the Plaintiffs, the Intervenors' complaint-in-intervention against ATF and J.B. Hunt asserted state law causes of action for various theories of negligence.

As pre-trial litigation progressed, ownership and operation of the truck driven by White became a disputed issue. ATF admitted that it operated the truck and that White was its employee.¹ J.B. Hunt, however, denied owning the truck or employing White. J.B. Hunt instead maintained that it acted as a broker between Sigma and ATF. Pre-trial discovery documents led Plaintiffs to believe that J.B. Hunt could be liable for negligently brokering the shipment. On November 20, 2019, Plaintiffs sought permission to amend their complaints to sue J.B. Hunt as a freight broker. The Intervenors likewise sought to amend their complaint after determining that J.B. Hunt "may be liable under a broker liability theory or similar theory." ECF No. 1-1, ¶ 3 at 272. On November 25, 2019, the state court granted the Plaintiffs' and Intervenors' request. Their amended complaints alleged that "in the alternative, to the extent that J B Hunt was acted in any capacity as a broker," J.B. Hunt negligently failed to exercise due care in, inter alia, selecting, hiring, and screening AFT and/or Sean White to transport the shipment. Id. ¶ 32, at 240; id. ¶ 17, at 280 (same).

In response to the amended complaints, J.B. Hunt removed the case to this Court on December 23, 2019. Even though the amended complaints assert no federal causes of action, J.B. Hunt's removal notice claims that two statutory provisions confer federal jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1441. Section 1441(a) permits the removal of "any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction."Section 1331, the "general federal-question statute," Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 787 n. 2 (2014), gives district courts original jurisdiction over "all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. According to J.B. Hunt, the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (FAAAA), which forbids States to "enact or enforce a law ... related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier ... or any ... broker," 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1), preempts state law causes of action for broker negligence. ECF No. 1 at 5. J.B. Hunt therefore contends that the Plaintiffs' and Intervenors' negligent brokering claims are truly based on federal law even though they are styled as state law causes of action.

On January 22, 2020, the Plaintiffs and Intervenors filed motions to remand, which the Court proceeds to analyze.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

"Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, possessing only that power authorized by Constitution and statute." Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256 (2013). "Congress has granted the federal courts removal jurisdiction to hear claims initially brought in state court if the federal district court could have exercised original jurisdiction." Garley v. Sandia Corp., 236 F.3d 1200, 1207 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)). "The party invoking federal jurisdiction has the burden to establish that it is proper, and there is a presumption against its existence." Salzer v. SSM Health Care of Oklahoma Inc., 762 F.3d 1130, 1134 (10th Cir. 2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "Removal statutes are to be strictly construed, [ ] and all doubts are to be resolved against removal." Fajen v. Found. Reserve Ins. Co., 683 F.2d 331, 333 (10th Cir. 1982) (citing Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 107-09 (1941)). When assessing a remand motion, the court "must assume all of the facts set forth by plaintiff tobe true and resolve all uncertainties as to state substantive law in favor of the plaintiff." Colon v. Ashby, 314 F. Supp. 3d 116, 120 (D.D.C. 2018) (citations omitted). A district court must remand a case to state court whenever the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the case. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) ("[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.")

III. DISCUSSION

A. Preemption

1. Legal Framework

The Court must determine whether this case was properly removed to federal court because the FAAAA completely preempts Plaintiffs' and Intervenors' negligent broker claims against J.B. Hunt. Sometimes J.B. Hunt says the claims are "expressly" preempted. Other times it refers to them as "completely" preempted. Compare Notice of Removal at 5 with, Def.'s Resp., ECF No. 15, 14-17. However, the doctrines are not the same. Before analyzing the parties' arguments, it makes sense to first describe some of the preemption doctrines given that the distinctions between them are important in the context of removal.

Without diversity jurisdiction, a district court has jurisdiction over cases in which "a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint." Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, if the federal question does not appear on the face of the plaintiff's complaint, there is no federal question jurisdiction. In determining whether a claim "arises under" federal law, courts examine the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint and ignore potential defenses. Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 6 (2003).

One exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule is the doctrine of "complete preemption." Schmeling v. NORDAM, 97 F.3d 1336, 1339 (10th Cir. 1996). If the state claim is completely preempted by federal law, that claim is considered a federal claim arising under federal law. Nicodemus v. Union Pacific Corp., 440 F.3d 1227, 1232 n.4 (10th Cir. 2006). "When the federal statute completely preempts the state-law cause of action, a claim which comes within the scope of that action, even if pleaded in terms of state law, is in reality based on federal law. The claim is then removable under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) Anderson, 539 U.S. at 8; see also Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63-64 (1987) ("Congress may so completely pre-empt a particular area that any civil complaint raising this select group of claims is necessarily federal in character.")

"There are three forms of preemption that are frequently discussed in judicial decisions—express preemption, conflict preemption, and field preemption." Devon Energy Prod. Co., L.P. v. Mosaic Potash Carlsbad, Inc., 693 F.3d 1195, 1203 n.4 (10th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). "[F]ederal statutes can preempt state statutes either by an express statement of preemption or by implication." Id. (citation omitted). "Express preemption arises from explicit preemption language in the statute. Implied preemption includes field preemption or conflict preemption." Id.

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