Youngs v. Rewerts

JASON YOUNGS, #229558, Petitioner, v. RANDEE REWERTS, Respondent.

CASE NO. 2:18-CV-11629

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

April 22, 2021

HONORABLE PAUL D. BORMAN

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, DENYING A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY, AND DENYING LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS ON APPEAL

I. Introduction

This is a pro se habeas case brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Michigan prisoner Jason Youngs ("Petitioner") was convicted of first-degree home invasion, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.110a(2), and unarmed robbery, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.530, following a jury trial in the Shiawassee County Circuit Court. He was sentenced, as a fourth habitual offender, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 769.12, to consecutive terms of 16 years 8 months to 41 years 8 months and 11 years 8 months to 41 years 8 months imprisonment on those convictions in 2015. In his pleadings, Petitioner raises claims concerning the right to counsel, the conduct of the prosecutor, and the effectiveness of counsel. For the reasons set forth herein, the Court denies the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Court also denies a certificate of appealability and denies Petitioner leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.

II. Facts and Procedural History

Petitioner's convictions arise from a home invasion and attempted robbery at the home of Robert Lacina in Ovid, Shiawassee County, Michigan on October 27, 2014. The Michigan Court of Appeals described the underlying facts, which are presumed correct on habeas review, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Wagner v. Smith, 581 F.3d 410, 413 (6th Cir. 2009), as follows:

The jury convicted Youngs of breaking into the home of Robert Lacina in Ovid, Michigan, on October 27, 2014, and then assaulting Lacina when Lacina returned to the home while Youngs was still there. The prosecutor's theory at trial was that Youngs planned the offense with Jamie Rummell, who was Youngs's ex-wife or girlfriend and Lacina's employee.

Rummell testified at trial pursuant to a plea agreement. She stated that she and Youngs planned for Youngs to break into Lacina's house and steal his property while she accompanied Lacina on a trip to AuGres, Michigan to winterize a trailer there. While Rummell and Lacina were gone, Rummell sent text messages to Youngs informing him of their location and expected return. Evidence suggested that Youngs may not have received Rummell's text messages because he had turned off his cell phone to prevent it from being linked to the vicinity of Lacina's home at the time of the offense. When Lacina and Rummell arrived at Lacina's house, Rummell saw Youngs's truck still in the driveway. Lacina began to enter his house, but was assaulted by a person who was inside. According to Lacina, the assailant repeatedly hit him, knocked him down, and then kicked him in the face and head. Lacina's teeth were broken during the assault. The assailant then entered the red truck in the driveway and drove away.

After the intruder left, Lacina discovered that a door to his home had been ripped off its frame and his bedroom had been ransacked. In addition, a safe that had been hidden was on the floor and had been opened. Lacina did not notice anything missing, but at Rummell's suggestion he initially told the police that $5,000 had been taken from his house. Lacina later admitted to the police that nothing had been stolen.

After the offense, the police attempted to locate Youngs through his parole officer, Brian Stevens. When Youngs subsequently met with Stevens, Youngs uncharacteristically was not carrying his cell phone and said that he had left it at a job site. Additionally, Youngs was not driving his red truck and said it had broken down. Stevens provided Youngs with the contact information for the detective who wanted to speak to him. Youngs said he would call the detective, but never did. Youngs was later arrested and incarcerated for absconding from his parole. While in jail, he was incarcerated with Lakendrik Willis. At trial, Willis testified that Youngs admitted his involvement in the break-in and assault at Lacina's house. Willis provided detailed information about the offense and Youngs's efforts to avoid detection, which he claimed he learned from Youngs.

At trial, Youngs's lawyer suggested that Lacina collaborated with Rummell to plan the home invasion and commit insurance fraud and that, with Willis's help, the two were now attempting to place the blame on Youngs to get themselves out of trouble. As noted above, the jury found Youngs guilty of first-degree home invasion and armed robbery.

People v. Youngs, No. 328969, 2017 WL 430234, *1-2 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2017) (unpublished).

Following his convictions and sentencing, Petitioner filed an appeal of right with the Michigan Court of Appeals raising several claims of error, including the claims presented on habeas review. The court denied relief and affirmed Petitioner'sconvictions and sentences. Id. at pp. 2-9. Petitioner filed an application for leave to appeal with the Michigan Supreme Court, which was denied in a standard order. People v. Youngs, 501 Mich. 862, 901 N.W.2d 100 (2017).

Petitioner thereafter filed his federal habeas petition raising the following claims:

I. The trial court violated his right to the effective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment when it precluded any further plea negotiations prior to the appointment of substitute counsel.

II. The prosecutor engaged in substantial misconduct that denied him a fair trial in violation of the United States Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause where he utilized the perjured testimony of Lakendric Willis, and knowingly and materially misled the jury in closing argument concerning the source of Mr. Willis's information.

III. He was denied the effective assistance of counsel and a fair trial in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution where appointed counsel:

a. made an indefensible mid-trial strategy change that included his opening statement promise to the jury of defendant's testimony;

b. endorsed the testimony of Lakendric Willis in opening statement and failed to destroy his credibility with documentary evidence;

c. acquiesced with the prosecution striking witnesses critical to the defense;

d. failed to investigate and produce testimony andevidence vital to the defense;

e. knowingly permitted the State's use of perjured testimony that violated evidentiary rules and defendant's right to due process and failed to respond to material misrepresentations;

f. failed to request "disputed accomplice" and "mistake of fact" jury instructions.

Respondent has filed an answer to the habeas petition contending that it should be denied because the first two claims are procedurally defaulted and all of the claims lack merit.

III. Standard of Review

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241 et seq., sets forth the standard of review that federal courts must use when considering habeas petitions brought by prisoners challenging their state court convictions. The AEDPA provides in relevant part:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim--

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. §2254(d) (1996).

"A state court's decision is 'contrary to' ... clearly established law if it 'applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court cases]' or if it 'confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [that] precedent.'" Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15-16 (2003) (per curiam) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)); see also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). "[T]he 'unreasonable application' prong of § 2254(d)(1) permits a federal habeas court to 'grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of petitioner's case." Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413); see also Bell, 535 U.S. at 694. However, "[i]n order for a federal court find a state court's application of [Supreme Court] precedent 'unreasonable,' the state court's decision must have been more than incorrect or erroneous. The state court's application must have been 'objectively unreasonable.'" Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 520-21 (citations omitted); see also Williams, 529 U.S. at 409. The "AEDPA thus imposes a 'highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,' and 'demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.'" Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (quoting Lindh, 521 U.S. at 333, n. 7);Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam)).

A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit "precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). The Supreme Court has emphasized "that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable." Id. (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003)). Pursuant to § 2254(d), "a habeas court must determine what arguments or theories supported or ... could have...