Yousif v. Ill. Dep't of Juvenile Justice

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SEMELI T. YOUSIF, Plaintiff, v. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CENTRAL MANAGEMENT SERVICES, ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION, ILLINOIS CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION AUTHORITY, and ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Defendants.

No. 21-cv-1302

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division

October 18, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

ROBERT W. GETTLEMAN, JUDGE

Plaintiff Semeli T. Yousif brings this six-count second amended complaint against the State of Illinois, Illinois Department of Juvenile Justice (“IDJJ”), Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”), Illinois Department of Revenue (“IDOR”), Illinois Department of Central Management Services (“IDCMS”), Illinois Commerce Commission (“ICC”), Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority (“ICJIA”), and Illinois Department of Labor (“IDOL”) (collectively “defendants”). Defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff's second amended complaint in its entirety (Doc. 41). On May 18, 2022, the court granted defendants' motion in part and denied it in part (Doc. 51). The court dismissed Counts II, III, IV, V, and VI, in addition to defendants IDOC, IDOR, IDCMS, ICC, ICJIA, and IDOL. Plaintiff moves the court to reconsider and reverse its May 18, 2022 Memorandum Opinion and Order granting in part and denying in part defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's second amended complaint. Plaintiff urges the court to reconsider its dismissal of Counts II and IV, which allege disability discrimination and retaliation respectively, in violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, against defendants IDOC, IDOR, IDCMS, ICC, ICJIA, and IDOL. For the reasons stated below, plaintiff's motion (Doc. 52) is denied.

BACKGROUND

The details of plaintiff's claims and procedural history of this case have been set out in this court's prior decisions and are accordingly discussed herein only to the extent necessary to explain this court's reasoning. See Yousif v. Illinois Department of Juvenile Justice, 21 C 1302, 2022 WL 1567096 (N.D. Ill. May 18, 2022); Yousif v. State of Illinois, 21 C 1302, 2021 WL 3737680 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 24, 2021). Plaintiff's instant argument is that this court's May 18, 2022, ruling on defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's second amended complaint “failed to follow and apply controlling precedent as set forth in Williams v. Milwaukee Health Servs., Inc., 732 F.3d 770, 770-71 (7th Cir. 2013).” Plaintiff cited Williams in her briefs prior to the court's decision to grant defendants' motion to dismiss the second amended complaint in part.

In Williams, the Seventh Circuit determined that “[a] seeker of relief under the Rehabilitation Act against a recipient of federal money is not required to exhaust the administrative remedies that the Act provides.” Plaintiff is concerned that the court “addressed and ruled upon Defendant's argument that Plaintiff was required to exhaust administrative remedies before she can proceed in court on her Section 504 Rehabilitation Act discrimination and retaliation claims (Counts II and IV[ ]).” Specifically, the court stated:

“Defendants next move to dismiss both Rehabilitation Act counts (Count II alleging discrimination and Count IV alleging retaliation), arguing that plaintiff has failed to exhaust administrative remedies against the state agencies and failed to state a claim. Counts II and IV are brought against defendants IDOC, IDOR, CMS, ICC, ICJIA, and IDOL. The court is persuaded by defendants' first argument, that plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies against these defendants. The court accordingly declines to address defendants' arguments regarding failure to state a claim.

Claims under the Rehabilitation Act are subject to the same exhaustion requirements as claims brought under Title VII or the ADA. 29 U.S.C. § 794(d); see also, Malone v. Ill. Dep't of Corr., 2009 WL 2982816, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 14, 2009) (“To maintain a claim under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act, an employee must first file a charge with the EEOC.”) (citing Sitar v. Ind. Dep't of Trans., 344 F.3d 720, 726 (7th Cir. 2003)). As noted above, plaintiff's EEOC charges listed only the “State of Illinois Department of Juvenile Justice,” and the “State of Illinois.” The EEOC charges did not list, identify, or refer to any conduct by IDOC, IDOR, CMS, ICC, ICJIA, or IDOL. Because plaintiff's EEOC charges did not list any of these state agencies, she has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies against them. Plaintiff's claims under the Rehabilitation Act (Counts II and IV) are accordingly dismissed.”

Because plaintiff disagrees with the court's ruling on Counts II and IV and believes that these claims should not be dismissed on the basis of exhaustion, she further argues that the court's reasoning when determining that she stated an actionable disability discrimination claim (Count I) against defendant IDJJ pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, applies equally to her claims pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act (Count II). Plaintiff argues that her Rehabilitation Act claims are based on the same facts against Defendants IDOC, IDOR, IDCMS, ICC, ICJIA, and IDOL, and the ADA and Rehabilitation Act apply the same standards. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(d).

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule 59(e) allows parties to move the court to alter or amend a judgment. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 59(e). Relief under Rule 59(e) is an “extraordinary remed[y] reserved for the exceptional case.” Gonzalez-Koeneke v. West, 791 F.3d 801, 807 (7th Cir. 2015). See also Vesey v. Envoy Air, Inc., 999 F.3d 456, 463 (7th Cir. 2021). A district court may amend a judgment under Rule 59(e) only if the movant clearly establishes either: (1) that the court committed a manifest error of law or fact, or (2) that newly discovered evidence precludes entry of judgment. See Murithi v. Glecker, 829 Fed.Appx. 124 (7th Cir. 2020), citing Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Beyrer, 722 F.3d 939, 954 (7th Cir. 2013). The Seventh Circuit has determined that a “manifest error” is “the wholesale disregard, misapplication, or failure to recognize controlling precedent.” Oto v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 224 F.3d 601, 606 (7th Cir. 2000) (internal quotations omitted). Further, the Seventh Circuit has stated that newly discovered evidence is grounds for relief under Rule 59 only if the party exercised due diligence in discovering it and, nevertheless, only discovered it post-judgment. See Cincinnati Life Ins. Co., 722 F.3d at 955. Importantly, Rule 59(e) does not allow a party to “rehash[ ] old arguments” Oto, 224 F.3d at 606 or gain “[another] bite at [the] apple” to re-litigate previously considered and dismissed arguments. Chico v. Miller, No. 05 C 3101, 2005 WL 2664586, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 19, 2005).

DISCUSSION

While plaintiff urges the court to reconsider and reverse its ruling on defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's second amended complaint based on Williams, defendants argue that plaintiff has not established a case to reconsider under Rule 59(e), and regardless, plaintiff's arguments are futile. According to defendants plaintiff's motion to reconsider merely rehashes previously raised arguments without introducing new evidence or new arguments. In any case, defendants argue that “even if Plaintiff's arguments could fit within the types allowed by Rule 59(e), they are without merit” because Williams is inapplicable. (Internal quotations omitted). Defendants argue that neither Williams nor Cheeny (the case that Williams relies upon, Cheeny v. Highland Community College, 15 F.3d 79 (7th Cir. 1994)) directly address the issue before the court “or otherwise analyze[ ] the applicable provisions of the Code of Federal Regulations.”

It is true, as plaintiff says, that in Williams, the Seventh Circuit determined that “[a] seeker of relief under the Rehabilitation Act against a recipient of federal money is not required to exhaust the administrative remedies that the Act provides.” 732 F.3d 770, 770-71 (7th Cir. 2013). To support its reasoning, the court cited Cheeney, as well as Prescott v. Higgins, 538 F.3d 32, 44 (1st Cir. 2008); McGeshick v. Principi, 357 F.3d 1146, 1149 (10th Cir. 2004); and 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2). On the other hand, when this court dismissed plaintiff's claims because it determined that claims under the Rehabilitation Act are subject to the same exhaustion requirements as claims under Title VII and the ADA, it cited 29 U.S.C. § 794(d) and Malone v. Ill. Dep't of Corr., No. 05 C 4309, 2009 WL 2982816, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 14, 2009). In Malone, the court held that “[t]o maintain a claim under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act, an employee must first file a charge with the [Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)].” 2009 WL 2982816, at *2. In so holding, the Malone court cited Sitar v. Ind. Dep't of Trans., 344 F.3d 720, 726 (7th Cir. 2003). Id.

First, the court agrees with defendants that plaintiff does not seriously contend that she is using Rule 59(e) to introduce new evidence or new arguments. Plaintiff previously argued that she was not obligated to exhaust administrative remedies before stating a valid claim pursuant to § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, in her response to defendants' second motion to dismiss. She argued that exhaustion was not required because the defendants under Counts II and IV “are neither federal government agencies nor federal contractors.”

Next the court agrees with defendants that “the Court was fully apprised of Plaintiff's arguments citing Williams in deciding Defendants' Motion to Dismiss,” and plaintiff cannot relitigate previously considered and dismissed arguments. That said, ...