Youth 71Five Ministries v. Williams

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YOUTH 71FIVE MINISTRIES, Plaintiff, v. CHARLENE WILLIAMS, Director of the Oregon Department of Education, in her individual and official capacities, et al, . Defendants.

No. 1:24-cv-00399-CL

United States District Court, D. Oregon, Medford Division

June 26, 2024

OPINION AND ORDER

CLARKE, MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

Plaintiff Youth 71 Five Ministries brings this cause of action alleging claims of religious discrimination against officials of the Oregon Department of Education and the Youth Development Division of Oregon. Plaintiff moves the Court for a preliminary injunction, and the Defendants move to dismiss the case based on qualified immunity. Full consent to magistrate jurisdiction was entered on March 22, 2024 (#20). For the reasons below, the motion for a preliminary injunction (#20) is DENIED, and the motion to dismiss for qualified immunity (#34) is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

The Oregon Department of Education (ODE) through the Youth Development Division (YDD) provides funding for community-based youth development programs and services through the Youth Community Investment Grants. Complt. at ¶ 22 (#1). To be eligible for a grant, an applicant must meet several requirements and must submit a new application for each cycle of grants, which take place every two years or so. See id. at ¶ 71, 75; Detman Deci, at ¶ 13. A variety of different types of organizations are eligible, including “faith-based organizations.” Complt. Ex. 9 at p. 5. For the first time, in the March 1 2023 grant cycle, required applicants to certify that they do not discriminate in certain employment or service delivery practices. Complt. at ¶ 89; Complt. at ¶ 23. The 2023 Request for Grant Applications (“RFA”) form,“Certification” states in relevant part:

By checking boxes below applicant understands and agrees to following statements:

...

Applicant does not discriminate in its employment practices vendor selection, subcontracting, or service delivery with regard to race, ethnicity, religion, age, political affiliation, gender, disability, sexual orientation, national origin, or citizenship status.

Complt. Ex. 9 at 23.

Plaintiff admits that it discriminates in its hiring practices by requiring that all employees and volunteers “subscribe and adhere without mental reservation” to a statement of Christian faith. Complt. at ¶ 45. Despite this practice, Plaintiff certified on the 2023 RFA form that it met the nondiscrimination eligibility condition for the RFA. Id. at ¶ 93. Based in part on this misrepresentation, YDD conditionally awarded grant funding to Plaintiff for multiple proposed programs. Detman Deci, at ¶ 17.

Months later, while finalizing the agreements for the grant funding, YDD discovered that Plaintiffs employment practices did not meet the RFA's new nondiscrimination requirement. Id. at ¶ 18; Hofmann Deci, at ¶ 10. YDD terminated further progress on the grant agreements and withdrew its offer to provide funding to Plaintiffs programs. Id. at ¶ 12; Detman Deci, at ¶ 19.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff seeks preliminary injunctive relief exempting it from the nondiscrimination eligibility requirement and requiring YDD to reinstate and fund the withdrawn grants. Defendants seek to dismiss Plaintiffs case on the basis of qualified immunity. For the reasons below, Plaintiffs motion is denied and Defendants' motion is granted.

I. Plaintiff s motion for a preliminary injunction is denied.

“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008). All four elements must be satisfied. See, e.g., Am. Trucking Ass'n v. City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1057 (9th Cir. 2009). Here, Plaintiff cannot satisfy any of the four elements to be entitled to a preliminary injunction., A. Plaintiff has not established that it is likely to succeed on the merits.

Plaintiffs lawsuit claims that the YDD's nondiscrimination requirement violates the Free Exercise and Free Speech clauses of the First Amendment, as well as the ministerial exception and church autonomy doctrine under the religion clauses of the First Amendment. Complt. at ¶¶ 145-183 (#1). Plaintiff is not likely to succeed on these claims.

1. Plaintiff cannot show a likelihood of success on the merits of its Free Exercise claims.

The Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment provide that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof[.]” U.S. Const, amend. I. The Free Exercise Clause prohibits government action that is “hostile to the religious beliefs of affected citizens ... and that passes judgment upon or presupposes the illegitimacy of religious beliefs or practices.” Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm'n, 138 S.Ct. 1719, 1731 (2018). Indeed, “[t]he free exercise of religion means, first and foremost, the right to believe and profess whatever religious doctrine one desires.” Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (“Smith").^[1] “A State violates the Free Exercise Clause when it excludes religious observers from otherwise available public benefits” because of their “religious character” or “religious exercise.” Carson v. Makin, 596 U.S. 767,778-81 (2022).

However, while the constitution protects sincerely held religious beliefs, it does not guarantee an unlimited right to religious practice. See Malik v. Brown, 16 F.3d 330, 333 (9th Cir. 1994) (weighing sincerely held religious beliefs against penological interests). “[T]he right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability[.]” Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (quotation marks omitted).

The Court finds that Plaintiff is unlikely to succeed on the merits of its Free Exercise claims because the nondiscrimination requirement is neutral and generally applicable and because YDD did not excluded Plaintiff from grant funding “solely because of religious character or exercise.”

a. Defendants' nondiscrimination requirement is a valid and neutral law of general applicability.

As stated above, Smith held that laws incidentally burdening religion are ordinarily not subject to strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause, so long as they are neutral and generally applicable. 494 U.S. at 879. Plaintiff concedes that the nondiscrimination requirement is facially neutral, but it argues that it is not generally applicable.

“Broadly speaking, there are two ways a law is not generally applicable.” Tingley v. Ferguson, 47 F.4th 1055, 1087-88 (9th Cir. 2022) (citing Fulton, 593 U.S. at 533). “The first is if there is a ‘formal mechanism for granting exceptions' that ‘invite[s] the government to consider the particular reasons for a person's conduct.'” Id. (citing Fulton, 593 U.S. at 537). “The second is if the law ‘prohibits religious conduct while permitting secular conduct' that also works against the government's interest in enacting the law.” Id. at 1088 (citing Fulton, 593 U.S. at 534). If neither applies, the law is generally applicable. See id. 8 882.

First, here, there is no formal or informal mechanism for granting exceptions to the nondiscrimination requirement at all, let alone one that invites the government to consider particular reasons for a person's conduct. Each applicant “must complete and submit all Applicant Information and Certification information,” including the certification that the “Applicant does not discriminate in its employment practices, vendor selection, subcontracting,. or service delivery with regard to race, ethnicity, religion, age, political affiliation, gender, disability, sexual orientation, national origin or citizenship status.” Complt. Ex. 9 at 13 (RFA, “Application Requirements,” including the “Applicant Information and Certification Sheet”); Complt. Ex. 7 at 23 (Plaintiffs application, “Certification” section). If the application does not comply with all Application Requirements, including submission of the nondiscrimination certification, it is deemed “non-responsive,” and it does not proceed to the “evaluation” stage. See Complt. Ex. 9 at 17 (“Responsive Applications meeting the requirements outlined in the Application Requirements section will be evaluated by an Evaluation Committee.”). No waiver of this certification exists. Plaintiffs own allegations state that “a failure to check the box on the electronic-only application would have caused 71Five's application to be ‘considered non-responsive,' meaning it would ‘not be considered further.'” Complt. ¶ 95. Thus, even on the face of the Complaint, the RFA does not permit applicants to opt out of the nondiscrimination requirement for any reason.

Second, Plaintiff argues in its Reply Brief that YDD permits secular conduct as an exception to the nondiscrimination requirement by “allow[ing] many successful applicants to openly discriminate in the provision of services based on race, ethnicity, gender, and national origin.” Plf. Reply pg. 8. Plaintiff gives the following examples, among others:

Defendants awarded $220,000 to Ophelia's Place even though its mission is limited to helping girls.

Defendants awarded $220,000 to the Black Parent Initiative even though its youth programs “serve African and African American families with children.”

Defendants awarded $560,000 to the CAPECES Leadership Institute even though its website lists “[w]ho we serve & work with” as “Latin/e/o/a/x, immigrant Indigena, Affodescendiente, and farmworker children, youth,

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