Yuba Cnty. Water Agency v. Sobeck

YUBA COUNTY WATER AGENCY, Plaintiff, v. EILEEN SOBECK, in her official capacity as Executive Director of the CaliforniaState Water Resources Control Board, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 1:20-cv-03297 (TNM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

April 29, 2021

MEMORANDUM ORDER

This case involves a California water agency suing a state-wide board (again in California) over water-quality regulations for a river development in California. The Defendants move to transfer this case to the Eastern District of California. Upon consideration of the parties' filings and the relevant law, the Court will grant the motion.

I.

Plaintiff Yuba County Water Agency ("YCWA") is a local agency tasked with managing water conservation and development projects in Yuba County, California. Compl. ¶ 14, ECF No. 1.¹ It owns and operates the hydroelectric Yuba River Development Project ("the project"), which it built in the late 1960s to supply water and mitigate flooding in Yuba County. Id. ¶¶ 1, 14. For the project, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") issued YCWA a license, which required renewal upon its expiration in 2016. Id. ¶ 26. As part of the renewal process, and in accordance with Section 401 of the Clean Water Act, YCWA had to seek a waterquality certification from the California State Water Resources Control Board ("the State Board"). Id. ¶ 2.

At the heart of this dispute is a purported certification ("the certification") issued by the State Board in July 2020. Id. ¶ 3. It imposes on YCWA certain conditions and obligations, including complying with state water quality standards. Id. ¶ 61. YCWA argues that the State Board waived its certification authority by not acting on YCWA's initial application within one year of its filing. Id. ¶¶ 41, 81. FERC agreed and issued a finding that the State Board had waived the regulatory authority granted to it under Section 401. Id. ¶¶ 48, 50. The State Board filed a Petition for Review of FERC's waiver determination before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Id. ¶ 51. YCWA has intervened in the defense of FERC's decision, and the case is pending before that court. Id. ¶ 51; see Cal. State Water Res. Control Bd. v. FERC, No. 20-72782 (9th Cir. filed Sept. 17, 2020).

YCWA also filed two lawsuits of its own—one in this Court and one in California state court. See Defs. Mot. to Dismiss, Transfer, or Stay and Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. ("Mot.") Ex. 2, ECF No. 11-2. In California, YCWA sought a writ directing the State Board to vacate the certification. Id. at 35.² YCWA similarly asked this Court to enjoin enforcement of the certification, declare that its regulations violate various federal and state laws, and direct the State Board to withdraw it. Compl. at 41-42. The State Board moves to dismiss the complaint, or in the alternative transfer it to the Eastern District of California, or at least stay the case pending the outcome of proceedings before the Ninth Circuit. See Mot. at 55. After the Court ordered YCWA to respond to the question of transfer only, YCWA filed an opposition. Resp. ofPl. Yuba Cnty. Water Agency to Mot. of Defs. Sobeck, Et Al. to Transfer ("Opp'n"), ECF No. 17. This transfer issue is now ripe.

II.

The transfer statute permits a district court to "transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). When considering a motion to transfer, courts undertake a two-step inquiry. A court first determines whether venue is proper in the proposed transferee court—the district where the case "might have been brought." Id. If so, the court then weighs "a number of case-specific factors" to decide whether transfer is warranted. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988); see Aftab v. Gonzalez, 597 F. Supp. 2d 76, 80 (D.D.C. 2009) (explaining that courts use their "broad discretion to balance" these factors). The burden rests with the party seeking transfer. Aftab, 597 F. Supp. 2d at 79.

III.

The Court begins by confirming that this action may have commenced in the Eastern District of California, which YCWA never disputes. The Court then finds that the private- and public-interest factors support transfer.³

A.

For starters, venue was proper in the Eastern District when YCWA filed its Complaint. First, an action may commence in any judicial district in which "a defendant in the action resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located." 28 U.S.C.§ 1391(b)(1). Defendants are sued in their official capacities as members of the State Board, headquartered in Sacramento in the Eastern District. See Cal. Water Code § 181 ("The [State B]oard shall maintain its headquarters in Sacramento . . . ."); see also Nestor v. Hershey, 425 F.2d 504, 521 n.22 (D.C. Cir. 1969) ("Where a public official is a party to an action in his official capacity he resides in the judicial district where . . . he performs his official duties."). Second, venue also properly lies in "a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). Here, the State Board issued the certification in the Eastern District, which is also the location of the project. See Compl. ¶¶ 25-33, 52-56. For either reason, YCWA could have filed this case in the Eastern District, and it has not argued otherwise.

B.

The Court next considers the private- and public-interest factors. Both favor transfer.

1.

Courts generally consider the following private-interest factors: "the parties' choices of forum, where the claim arose, the convenience of the parties and witnesses, and the ease of access to sources of proof." Montgomery v. Barr, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 1:20-CV-03214 (TNM), 2020 WL 6939808, at *6 (D.D.C. Nov. 25, 2020) (cleaned up). On balance, these factors support transfer.

As YCWA notes, see Opp'n at 3, a plaintiff's choice of forum is ordinarily entitled to deference. Trout Unlimited v. USDA, 944 F. Supp. 13, 17 (D.D.C. 1996). But that deference recedes when the district is not the plaintiff's home and the forum has a tenuous connection to the controversy. Islamic Republic of Iran v. Boeing Co., 477 F. Supp. 142, 144 (D.D.C. 1979). More, "when the forum preferred by the plaintiff is not his home forum, and the defendantprefers the plaintiff's home forum, there is little reason to defer to the plaintiff's preference." Ngonga v. Sessions, 318 F. Supp. 3d 270, 275 (D.D.C. 2018) (emphasis in original). That is the case here, where both YCWA and the State Board are in the Eastern District.⁴ So the Court does not give YCWA's choice any deference.

The defendants' choice of forum "is not ordinarily entitled to deference" but is still "a consideration when deciding a § 1404(a) motion." Aishat v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 288 F. Supp. 3d 261, 269 (D.D.C. 2018). Here, the State Board's preferred forum is the Eastern District. Mot. at 38-44. So "[t]o the extent this factor carries any heft," it supports transfer. Aishat, 288 F. Supp. 3d at 269.

The third factor concerns where the claim arose. "Transfer is favored when the material events that form the factual predicate of a plaintiff's claim did not occur in [its] chosen forum." Id. (cleaned up). "Where claims arise from actions in several fora, this factor does not weigh in favor or against transfer." Douglas v. Chariots for Hire, 918 F. Supp. 2d 24, 32 (D.D.C. 2013) (cleaned up). Here, the project exists in the Eastern District. Compl. ¶¶ 14-15. YCWA filed, withdrew, and resubmitted its application for a certification all in the Eastern District. Id. ¶¶ 39, 42-43. And the State Board issued the certification in the Eastern District. Id. ¶ 57.

YCWA does not appear to dispute that this case mainly sprung from the Eastern District; it instead points to the involvement of FERC, which also received YCWA's application and "will enforce the new terms of the certification as part of the new license" if the certification survives judicial scrutiny. Opp'n at 6. FERC's involvement, though, is almost exclusivelyforward-looking; this case may affect FERC's future obligations, but FERC's actions hardly "form[ed] the factual predicate of [YCWA's] claim[s]." Douglas, 918 F. Supp. 2d at 32. The claims here pertain to the State Board's legal authority, as well as the legality of the many obligations within the certification. Compl. at 23-41. Even if looking ahead to the future effects of this case's outcome is appropriate on this factor, the State Board's regulations would play out in Yuba County—not here. At best for YCWA this third factor is neutral, as related events occurred in both districts. But the factual predicate for this dispute really occurred in the Eastern District.⁵

Next, the convenience of the parties also supports transfer. Both parties reside in the Eastern District. See supra at 5 & n.4. Although Plaintiff's counsel practices in this district, see Compl. at 42, defense counsel is in California, see Mot. at 55. Regardless, "the location of counsel carries little, if any, weight" under § 1404(a). State v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 304 F. Supp. 3d 56, 66 (D.D.C. 2018) (collecting cases). Most importantly, there is no suggestion that transfer would materially inconvenience either party.

Similarly, the Court assumes that the parties are correct that the remaining two private factors—convenience of the witnesses and access to sources of proof—are largely neutral given the expected course of the case. See Opp'n at 7; Defs.' Reply in Supp. of Mot. to Transfer ("Reply") at 10. But if they swing in any direction, it is toward transfer. Cf. Bourdon v. United States Dep't of Homeland Sec., 235 F. Supp. 3d 298, 308 (D.D.C. 2017) ("If this case iseventually adjudicated solely based on an administrative record, that record presumably resides in the [Eastern District], where the adjudication of [YCWA's application] occurred, not in the District of Columbia.").

In sum, the...