Y.Z. v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist.

54 F.Supp.3d 1171

Y.Z., a minor, by and through Guardian ad Litem and individual, Graciela ARVIZU, Plaintiff,

v.CLARK COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant.

Case No. 2:13–cv–01545–APG–PAL.

United States District Court, D. Nevada.

Signed Oct. 20, 2014.

Michelle M. Jones, Michelle M. Jones, Attorney at Law, Las Vegas, NV, for Plaintiff.

Donna Mendoza–Mitchell, Las Vegas, NV, for Defendant.

Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney's Fees

(Dkt. No. 13)

ANDREW P. GORDON, District Judge.

In 2013, Plaintiff “Y.Z.” ¹ filed an administrative claim with the Nevada Department of Education (“NDE”) against the Clark County School District (“District”). Y.Z. alleged that the District denied him certain rights in violation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). During the administrative claim process Y.Z. and the District settled, and the NDE administrative hearing officer incorporated the parties' settlement into an NDE final order. Y.Z. now seeks to recover the attorney's fees he incurred in litigating his claim.

The District argues that only a party who has prevailed in a court action may recover attorney's fees under the IDEA—not, as was the case here, a party who has prevailed in an administrative action. The District also argues that if Y.Z. is permitted to recover fees, his calculation is unreasonable and should be reduced.

I agree with Y.Z. that a plaintiff who prevails in an administrative action may recovery attorney's fees under the IDEA. But I also agree with the District that aspects of Y.Z.'s fee calculation are unreasonable, and I reduce Y.Z.'s award accordingly.

I. BACKGROUND

Y.Z. is a disabled child from a low income, Spanish-speaking family, who attended one of the District's schools. In April of 2013, Y.Z. filed an NDE Due Process Request alleging the District had violated the IDEA by (1) failing to provide Y.Z. a bilingual program of instruction; (2) failing to provide Y.Z. with a certified special education teacher; (3) failing to provide Y.Z.'s parents with notice in the parents' primary language; and (4) failing to implement certain provisions of Y.Z.'s Individualized Education Plan.² Y.Z. sought, among other things, compensatory education, translation of Y.Z.'s records, and accommodations related to toilet use.³

During the NDA administrative process, the parties settled.⁴ The parties' settlement agreement provided Y.Z. with 120 hours of compensatory education, translation of Y.Z.'s records, and accommodations related to toilet use.⁵ Y.Z. requested attorneys' fees during the administrative process, but the District refused to include any fee reimbursement in the settlement agreement.⁶ After the settlement, the NDE administrative hearing officer issued a final order expressly incorporating the parties' agreement.⁷

After the administrative action concluded, Y.Z.'s counsel again contacted the District to request attorney's fees. The District refused to pay.⁸ Y.Z. alleges that during the course of the underlying administrative proceeding, he incurred $6,600.00 in attorney's fee and $805.50 in costs; ⁹ and during the instant litigation he incurred 6,025.50 in attorney's fees, and $620.00 in costs.¹⁰ On August 27, 2013, Y.Z. filed a complaint in this Court seeking reimbursement of attorney's fees and costs related to both the underlying administrative action and the instant court action.

II. DISCUSSION

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) permits a court to “award reasonable attorneys' fees” to the “prevailing party” “[i]n any action or proceeding brought under” the statute.¹¹ The prevailing party should ordinarily recover attorney's fees unless the court finds that “special circumstances would render such an award unjust.” ¹²

The District raises two arguments against Y.Z.'s request for fees: (1) Y.Z. is not a “prevailing party” entitled to fees under the IDEA because he received relief in an administrative process, not in court, and (2) Y.Z.'s fee calculation is not reasonable. I find that Y.Z. is a prevailing party entitled to fees under the IDEA, but that Y.Z.'s fee calculation should be reduced.

A. Prevailing party status

A plaintiff is a “prevailing party” entitled to fees under the IDEA if he (1) brings an action and is provided judicially-sanctioned relief, also referred to as relief with sufficient “judicial imprimatur,¹³ and (2) the relief changes the legal relationship between plaintiff and defendant. ¹⁴ Here, apparently the parties do not dispute that the second prong of the test is met: the settlement required the District to provide Y.Z. with compensatory education and other binding relief, thus changing the legal relationship between the parties. The issue in dispute is whether relief provided in an administrative action qualifies as “judicially-sanctioned” relief permitting recovery of attorney's fees under the IDEA; or whether instead, “court-ordered” relief is required.”

The IDEA's statutory language indicates a plaintiff may recover attorney's fees after receiving relief in an administrative action. The IDEA provides that a court may award attorney's fees to a party that prevails “[i]n any action or proceeding brought under” the statute.¹⁵ As noted by the Second Circuit, “the statute implies that administrative hearings are proceedings ” in several places.¹⁶ The Department of Education has similarly interpreted the statutory language.¹⁷

Additionally, the policies behind the IDEA's administrative process—namely efficiency and fairness—militate towards this interpretation.¹⁸ “Congress created a detailed administrative scheme for aggrieved parents to pursue in order to exhaust their remedies under IDEA.” ¹⁹ Congress crafted this scheme to increase “efficiency by giving [ ] agencies the [ ] opportunity to correct shortcomings in their educational programs for disabled students.” ²⁰ The efficiency achieved by the administrative process would be lost under the District's interpretation because students wishing to collect under the IDEA's fee-shifting provision would need to carry out two litigations: one at the administrative level, then another at the District Court level to affirm whatever relief the hearing officer approved.

The District apparently suggests that both the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have held that a party may recover attorney's fees under the IDEA only where a court sanctions the plaintiff's relief.²¹ But neither of those courts has reached this issue.

The Supreme Court case cited by the District, Buckhannon, addressed whether a party who brings suit and receives relief in a private settlement—without any involvement by a third-party decision maker—may seek statutory attorney's fees as a prevailing party.²² The Supreme Court rejected this practice, also referred to as the “catalyst theory,” explaining that a plaintiff may seek statutory attorney's fees only if a judge sanctions the relief.²³ While language in Buckhannon mentions that relief should be “court-ordered” to confer prevailing party status,²⁴ the Second Circuit has noted that “ Buckhannon [does not] explicitly instruct ... how to apply the rule ... to fees awarded with respect to [ ] state administrative proceedings.” ²⁵ The Buckhannon Court was not faced with the question raised in this case, namely, whether agency-sanctioned relief confers prevailing party status.

The Ninth Circuit has held that Buckhannon's definition of “prevailing party” applies to the IDEA's attorney fee provision.²⁶ But the Ninth Circuit has declined to answer the question left open after Buckhannon: whether prevailing in an administrative action confers prevailing party status for purposes of statutory attorney's fees provisions.²⁷ The District implies the Ninth Circuit has held that administrative orders do not confer prevailing party status, citing to P.N. v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1.²⁸ But in P.N., the Ninth Circuit explicitly stated that it was not ruling whether an administrative order may confer prevailing party status, because in that case, no administrative officer signed or approved the settlement in question.²⁹ In fact, in an unpublished opinion, the Ninth Circuit specifically reversed a District Court for failing to award attorney's fees following a plaintiff's success in an administrative proceeding.³⁰

Other courts, including at least the Fifth, Third and Second Circuits, have held that agency orders confer “prevailing party” status.³¹ The Second Circuit has repeatedly held that plaintiffs are “entitled to ‘prevailing party’ status if they obtain the administrative analog of a consent decree from an IHO, even where the terms of such orders arise out of an agreement between the parties, rather than out of the wisdom of the IHO.” ³² The Third Circuit has similarly held “a settlement of administrative proceedings that is judicially enforceable meets the Buckhannon requirements.”³³ I have found no cases holding that an agency order does not confer prevailing party status under the IDEA.³⁴

The District also cites E.W. ex rel. C.W. v. Rocklin Unified Sch. Dist. to suggest that some District Courts have refused to confer prevailing party status following an administrative proceeding; but that case does not support the District's position. The court in E.W. impliedly recognized an agency determination could confer prevailing party status, but ruled that the agency hearing officer's order did not establish that the plaintiff had prevailed in his claim.³⁵

Given the IDEA's statutory language, the purpose of the administrative process scheme, and the case law, I find that prevailing in an administrative action is prevailing under the IDEA. Y.Z. is therefore permitted to recover attorney's fees.

B. Fee calculation

As a preliminary matter, Y.Z. argues I may not reduce its fee calculation because the District unreasonably protracted the litigation. Y.Z. argues the District unreasonably delayed by failing to pay Y.Z.'s attorney's fees when the administrative action was...