Zamichieli v. Andrews

WHEELER ZAMICHIELI, Plaintiff, v. WILLIAM ANDREWS, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 12-cv-03200

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania

July 26, 2021

MEMORANDUM

EDUARDO C. ROBRENO, J.

I. INTRODUCTION

This civil rights action arises from Plaintiff Wheeler Zamichieli's 2011 arrest by Philadelphia police officers and his subsequent prosecution. Zamichieli brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Pennsylvania law against seven police officers and the City of Philadelphia. Defendants now move for summary judgment on all counts. Because the record cannot support Zamichieli's claims Defendants' motions for summary judgment will be granted.

II. BACKGROUND^[1]

The facts and procedural history of this matter are set forth fully in prior opinions from the instant action and the underlying criminal case. See United States v. Zamichieli (“Zamichieli I”), No. CRIM.A. 11-393, 2011 WL 6133352, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 9, 2011) (Schiller, J.); Zamichieli v. Andrews (“Zamichieli II”), No. 12-CV-3200, 2016 WL 8732421, at *1-3 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 15, 2016) (Sleet, J.). The Court assumes familiarity with the history of the action and sets forth only those facts relevant to the instant motions.

Following a lawful traffic stop, Philadelphia Police Department Officers Andrews and Victor discovered a weapon in Zamichieli's vehicle. They arrested him for carrying a firearm without a license. The United States Attorney's Office adopted the case for federal prosecution and charged Zamichieli as a felon in possession of a firearm.

In the federal action, Zamichieli filed a motion to suppress the weapon. At the suppression hearing, Andrews testified that he saw the gun in plain view on the front passenger seat of Zamichieli's vehicle. Victor testified that Zamichieli turned on the interior dome light as the officers approached. Zamichieli disputed the officers' version of events and testified that he did not turn on the dome light, the gun was not in plain view, and the officers pulled him out of the car with guns drawn before searching the vehicle.

After finding the officers' version of events implausible and crediting Zamichieli's testimony, Judge Schiller granted the motion to suppress. See Zamichieli I, 2011 WL 6133352, at *3. Upon the Government's motion, he dismissed the indictment. Zamichieli was held in federal custody for several months in connection with the charge.

In 2012, Zamichieli filed the instant action, asserting civil rights claims arising from his arrest and prosecution. In 2013, the matter was assigned to Judge Sleet.^[2] In 2016, Zamichieli moved for summary judgment on the Third Amended Complaint, arguing “Judge Schiller's suppression hearing ruling precludes the defendants from relitigating issues or claims that have already been adjudicated.” Zamichieli II, 2016 WL 8732421, at *4. Judge Sleet disagreed, concluding that suppression of the gun in the criminal case before Judge Schiller did not prevent this Court from considering the weapon in connection with Zamichieli's civil claims. Id. Judge Sleet also concluded that “collateral estoppel is inapplicable because privity does not exist between the defendants in the § 1983 action and the prosecution in the federal criminal matter.” Id.

Following Judge Sleet's retirement, the matter was reassigned to the undersigned. In 2020, Zamichieli filed a Fourth Amended Complaint (“Complaint”), the operative pleading in the matter. He brings claims against Officers William Andrews, Melvin Victor, Ronald Dove, James Pitts, John Verrecchio, George Fetters, William Gallagher, and the City of Philadelphia. The claims are:

Count I: § 1983 claim for violations of the Fourth Amendment (Victor and Andrews)^[3]

Count II: § 1983 claim for Monell liability (City)

Count III: Malicious prosecution (Andrews, Victor, Verrecchio, Dove, and Pitts)

Count IV: False imprisonment (Andrews, Victor, Dove, and Pitts)^[4]

Count V: Conspiracy (Andrews, Victor, Verrecchio, Dove, Pitts, Fetters, and Gallagher)

Count VI: Negligence (Andrews, Victor, Verrecchio, Dove, Pitts, Fetters, and Gallagher)^[5]

Because the Complaint does not specify otherwise, the Court assumes that Zamichieli brings Counts III (malicious prosecution), IV (false imprisonment), and V (conspiracy) under both § 1983 and Pennsylvania law.

In 2020, Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint. The Court denied the motions to dismiss without prejudice and ordered Defendants to answer the Complaint and take Zamichieli's deposition. The Court also ordered that no further discovery would be required absent court order. Defendants took Zamichieli's deposition and now move for summary judgment on all counts.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “A fact is material if it ‘might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.'” Physicians Healthsource, Inc. v. Cephalon, Inc., 954 F.3d 615, 618 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). “A factual dispute is genuine if the ‘evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'” Id. (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).

The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. If the movant meets this obligation, the nonmoving party must “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. At the summary judgment stage, the Court must view the facts “in the light most favorable to” the nonmoving party and “draw all reasonable inferences in favor” of that party. Young v. Martin, 801 F.3d 172, 174 n.2 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Tri-M Grp., LLC v. Sharp, 638 F.3d 406, 415 (3d Cir. 2011)). IV. DISCUSSION

Defendants' three motions for summary judgment are presently before the Court. The first was filed by the City and Andrews, Victor, Verrecchio, Fetters, and Gallagher (collectively, the “Andrews Defendants”), who are represented by the City Law Department. Pitts and Dove, who are represented by private counsel, filed separate motions. The Court will address the motions in turn.

A. Andrews Defendants

1. Count I: Fourth Amendment (Victor and Andrews) Zamichieli alleges Andrews and Victor violated his Fourth Amendment rights by unreasonably searching his vehicle.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects against “unreasonable searches and seizures, ” U.S. 6 Const. amend. IV, and is applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. Zamichieli brings his Fourth Amendment claim pursuant to § 1983, which provides “a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979).

The party opposing a motion for summary judgment “must point to specific factual evidence showing that there is a genuine dispute on a material issue requiring resolution at trial.” Chavarriaga v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 218 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986)). Zamichieli has failed to do so.

Zamichieli has pointed to no admissible evidence supporting his claim that the officers' search of his vehicle was unreasonable. During his deposition, Zamichieli repeatedly invoked the Fifth Amendment to decline to respond to questions concerning the location of the gun in the vehicle.^[6] He did not timely submit an errata sheet seeking to supplement his deposition testimony or request that the deposition be reopened. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 30(e).^[7] Nor has he “show[n] by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, [he] cannot present facts essential to justify [his] opposition” to the motion for summary judgment on this count. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(d).^[8]

Because the record cannot support a finding that the officers' search of the vehicle was unreasonable, the Court will grant Andrews and Victor's motion for summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment claim.

2. Count II: Municipal Liability (City)

Next, Zamichieli avers the City police had a pattern and practice of violating individuals' Fourth Amendment rights to be free from illegal search and seizure. He seeks to hold the City liable via § 1983 under a theory of Monell liability.

“[A] municipality is not liable for the unconstitutional acts of its employees just because of their employment, under a respondeat superior theory.” Johnson v. City of Philadelphia, 975 F.3d 394, 403 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)). However, the municipality may be liable under a theory of Monell liability “if a plaintiff ‘demonstrated] that the violation of rights was caused by the municipality's policy or custom.'” Johnson, 975 F.3d at 403 (alteration in original) (quoting Thomas v. Cumberland Cnty., 749 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 2014)).

Zamichieli's attempt to establish municipal liability fails because he cannot demonstrate any underlying violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. See supra Section IV.A.1. Accordingly, the City is entitled to summary judgment on Count II.

3. Count III: Malicious Prosecution (Andrews, Victor, and Verrecchio)

Next, Zamichieli brings a claim for malicious prosecution, alleging Defendants brought criminal charges against him despite knowing that the search of his car was illegal.

To prevail on a claim for malicious prosecution under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish:

(1) the defendants initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in [the] plaintiff's favor; (3) the proceeding was initiated without probable cause; (4) the defendants acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the

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