Zavala v. Tex. Lehigh Cement Co.

635 F.Supp.3d 524

John ZAVALA, Plaintiff, v. TEXAS LEHIGH CEMENT COMPANY, LP, Lehigh Hanson, Inc.,and Eagle Materials, Inc., Defendants.

No. 1:21-CV-00082-DAE

United States District Court, W.D. Texas, Austin Division

Signed October 12, 2022

Austin Harris Kaplan, Matthew Barton Caponi, Ryan Odell Estes, Kaplan Law Firm, PLLC, Austin, TX, for Plaintiff.

John Runde, Sherrard Lee Hayes, Weisbart Springer Hayes LLP, Austin, TX, for Defendants Texas Lehigh Cement Company, LP, Eagle Materials, Inc.

Eric G. Carlson, James H. Birch, Mark S. Scudder, Quilling Selander Lownds Winslett and Moser PC, Dallas, TX, for Defendant Lehigh Hanson, Inc.

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT LEHIGH HANSON'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF JOHN ZAVALA'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND DENYING DEFENDANTS LEHIGH CEMENT AND EAGLE MATERIALS'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

David Alan Ezra, Senior United States District Judge

Before the Court are three Motions for Summary Judgment. The first is Defendant Lehigh Hanson, Inc.'s ("Lehigh Hanson")¹ Motion for Summary Judgment filed on March 31, 2022. (Dkt. # 18.) Plaintiff John Zavala ("Zavala") responded in opposition on April 14, 2022. (Dkt. # 27.) Lehigh Hanson replied on April 21, 2022. (Dkt. # 28.)

Next is Zavala's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment against Defendant Lehigh Cement Company, LP ("Lehigh Cement") filed on March 31, 2022. (Dkt. # 20). Lehigh Cement and Defendant Eagle Materials, Inc. ("Eagle Materials") responded in opposition on April 14, 2022. (Dkt. # 24.) Lehigh Hanson filed a Notice of Joinder in Lehigh Cement and Eagle Material's Response to Zavala's Partial Motion for Summary Judgment on April 14, 2022. (Dkt. # 25.) Zavala replied on April 21, 2022. (Dkt. #29.)

Finally, Lehigh Cement and Eagle Materials filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on March 31, 2022. (Dkt. # 21.) Zavala responded in opposition on April 14, 2022. (Dkt. # 26.) Lehigh Cement and Eagle Materials replied on April 22, 2022. (Dkt. #31.)

After careful consideration of the memoranda filed in support of and against the motion, the Court DENIES Lehigh Hanson's Motion for Summary Judgment, GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Zavala's Partial Motion for Summary Judgment, and DENIES Lehigh Cement and Eagle Materials's Motion for Summary Judgment for the following reasons.

BACKGROUND

Zavala began working for Lehigh Cement, a cement manufacturing facility, at its Buda, Texas plant in June 2012. (Dkt. # 20-2 at 4.) He started as a Utility Man, then was promoted to Utility Leadman in 2013. (Id. at 5.) As a Lead, Zavala alleges he was occasionally asked by his Utility Supervisor to crawl into a confined space to aid with annual outages. (Dkt. # 1-1 at 4:16-18.) According to Zavala, this is an "inherently dangerous" activity, particularly for individuals with disabilities, because the difference between life and death can be measured in the number of seconds it takes to crawl out of the space if something goes wrong. (Id. at 4:18, 5:20.)

Zavala was promoted to Utility Supervisor in 2016. (Dkt. # 20-2 at 6.) Approximately one year later, on December 4, 2017, Zavala was in a serious motorcycle accident, which resulted in the loss of his leg. (Id. at 7.) While he recovered, Zavala went on short-term disability. (Dkt. # 1-1 at 5:25-26.) Zavala alleges that in May 2018, Lehigh Cement informed him that his short-term disability would expire if he did not return to work before six months elapsed. (Id. at 5:30, 6:32.) Though he still had a broken femur, Zavala obtained a work release from his doctor permitting his return so long as he wore a knee brace and took breaks. (Id. at 6:33.)

On June 12, 2018, Zavala underwent femur surgery and remained out of work for six months. (Id. at 7.) He was cleared to return to work on or around December 10, 2018, and was able to perform all his core supervisor duties. (Id.) Zavala worked without problem until May 2019, when he had an unexpected gallbladder surgery. He returned to work on June 7, 2019, with a 15-pound lifting restriction. (Id. at 7-8.) Zavala then left on June 27, 2019, for a preplanned ACL surgery resulting from his motorcycle accident. (Dkt. # 1-1 at 8.) He was again out of work for roughly six months, but was cleared to return in December 2019 with some restrictions, including use of a cane as needed. (Id.)

Zavala alleges that in December 2019, Lehigh Cement informed him that he needed a full release, without any restrictions, in order to return to work. (Id.) He also contends Lehigh Cement told him that, as a Supervisor, he needed to personally crawl into a confined space. (Id. at 8.) Zavala claims he felt unsafe performing this task with his prosthetic leg and pointed to the fact that Leads historically took on this task for Supervisors, not the other way around. (Id. at 9.) Zavala and Lehigh Cement continued to dispute the issue throughout December 2019. (Id.)

Finally, on December 23, 2019, Zavala attended a meeting with his managers and the president of Lehigh Cement. (Id.) Zavala alleges Lehigh Cement informed him that he was being terminated because of his "refusal to accept [his] job duties," meaning the task of climbing into the confined space. (Id. at 10:74.) Zavala also asserts that Lehigh Cement acknowledged that the company's refusal to accommodate his injury and injury-based limitations were the reason for his termination. (Id.)

Zavala filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC on June 19, 2020. (Dkt. # 20-4.) He then brought suit against Lehigh Cement, Lehigh Hanson, and Eagle Materials in Hays County, Texas state court on December 23, 2020. (Dkt. # 1-A.) His complaint alleged disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act, as amended (the "ADAAA") and the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act, Texas Labor Code § 21.001 et seq. (the "TCHRA"). (Id.) Lehigh Cement and Eagle Materials removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas on January 27, 2021. (Dkt. # 1.)

LEGAL STANDARD

"Summary judgment is appropriate only if 'there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.' " Vann v. City of Southaven, 884 F.3d 307, 309 (5th Cir. 2018) (citations omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "A genuine dispute of material fact exists when the 'evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.' " Bennett v. Hartford Ins. Co. of Midwest, 890 F.3d 597, 604 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). "The moving party 'bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.' " Nola Spice Designs, LLC v. Haydel Enter., Inc., 783 F.3d 527, 536 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)).

"Where the non-movant bears the burden of proof at trial, 'the movant may merely point to the absence of evidence and thereby shift to the non-movant the burden of demonstrating . . . that there is an issue of material fact warranting trial.' " Kim v. Hospira, Inc., 709 F. App'x 287, 288 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Nola Spice Designs, 783 F.3d at 536). While the movant must demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, it does not need to negate the elements of the nonmovant's case. Austin v. Kroger Tex., L.P., 864 F.3d 326, 335 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1076 n.16 (5th Cir. 1994)). A fact is material if it "might affect the outcome of the suit." Thomas v. Tregre, 913 F. 3d 458, 462 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505).

"When the moving party has met its Rule 56(c) burden, the nonmoving party cannot survive a summary judgment motion by resting on the mere allegations of its pleadings." Jones v. Anderson, 721 F. App'x 333, 335 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Duffie v. United States, 600 F.3d 362, 371 (5th Cir. 2010)). The nonmovant must identify specific evidence in the record and articulate how that evidence supports that party's claim. Infante v. Law Office of Joseph Onwuteaka, P.C., 735 F. App'x 839, 843 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Willis v. Cleco Corp., 749 F.3d 314, 317 (5th Cir. 2014)). "This burden will not be satisfied by 'some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, by conclusory allegations, by unsubstantiated assertions, or by only a scintilla of evidence.' " McCarty v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., Inc., 864 F.3d 354, 357 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co., 402 F.3d 536, 540 (5th Cir. 2005)). In deciding a summary judgment motion, the court draws all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Wease v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 915 F.3d 987, 992 (5th Cir. 2019).

Additionally, at the summary judgment stage, evidence need not be authenticated or otherwise presented in an admissible form. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Lee v. Offshore Logistical & Transp., LLC, 859 F.3d 353, 355 (5th Cir. 2017). However, "[u]nsubstantiated assertions, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation are not sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment." United States v. Renda Marine, Inc., 667 F.3d 651, 665 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Brown v. City of Hous., 337 F.3d 539, 541 (5th Cir. 2003)).

DISCUSSION

Because each Motion for Summary Judgment was brought under a different ground, the Court will discuss the Motions separately.²

I. Lehigh Hanson's Motion for Summary Judgment

Lehigh Hanson argues that it is neither a general nor a limited partner of The Texas Lehigh Cement Company ("TLCC"), and that there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to this allegation. (Dkt. # 18; Dkt. # 28.) Lehigh Hanson also contends that, because it is not a partner to TLCC, there is no...