Zeigler v. Naidu

1

MIKAYLA ZEIGLER AND DANIELLE KING Appellants v. RAMARAO NAIDU AND GLOBAL DOCTORS US, LLC

No. 1125 EDA 2023

No. J-A24014-23

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

January 23, 2024

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

Appeal from the Order Entered April 20, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Civil Division at No: 2021-07894-TT

BEFORE: STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM

STABILE, J.

Mikayla Zeigler ("Zeigler") and Danielle King ("King") (collectively "Appellants") appeal from the April 20, 2023 order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County, denying their Motion to Stay Proceedings in their civil action against Ramarao Naidu ("Naidu") and Global Doctors US, LLC (collectively "Appellees"). Appellants contend that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied their motion effectively requiring that they provide testimony in their civil action despite an ongoing investigation and indictment in criminal proceedings "based upon the same operative alleged facts that form the basis of Appellees' civil counterclaims." Appellants' Brief at 8. Following review, we vacate the order and remand.

Details of the facts underlying this action are not necessary for our disposition of the legal issue before us. Suffice it to say Appellants brought a civil action against Appellees by writ of summons filed on October 8, 2021. In their complaint filed on August 5, 2022, Appellants asserted claims of assault and battery against Naidu related to events that occurred during Appellants' employment with Appellees.

On September 9, 2021, Appellees filed their answer and new matter. In addition, Appellees asserted counterclaims in which they alleged, inter alia, conversion, unjust enrichment, fraud, and civil conspiracy against Appellants. Appellants filed a reply to matter and an answer to the counterclaims on December 2, 2022 and December 13, 2022, respectively.

On March 16, 2023, Appellants filed their Motion to Stay Proceedings. They asserted that the criminal complaint initiated against them, as well as the subsequent pending criminal investigation, is based on the same facts alleged against Appellants in Appellees' counterclaim. Motion to Stay, 3/16/23, at ¶ 8. Appellants claimed that the criminal investigation has made the instant litigation more challenging and that, "at this time, [Appellants] do not have the opportunity to set forth a full defense to [Appellees'] counterclaims, as setting forth such a defense is incompatible with the Fifth Amendment privilege." Id. at ¶¶ 9-10. Appellants claimed that "mental health related conditions," from which both Appellants are suffering, have rendered them unable to participate meaningfully in discovery. Id. at ¶ 11.

They contended that Appellees failed to accommodate their health issues and instead insisted that Appellants respond to discovery requests and schedule depositions. Id. at ¶ 12. Appellants requested the trial court to stay the proceedings until the criminal proceedings were concluded and/or Appellants were medically able to participate meaningfully in discovery. Id. at ¶ 13.

In response, Appellees denied that they initiated a criminal complaint after Appellants filed their writ of summons on October 10, 2021. They point to a September 15, 2021 letter from their then-counsel, Attorney Samuel C. Stretton, to the District Attorney reporting "significant theft and fraud" committed against Appellees by Appellants. Answer to Motion to Stay, 4/5/23, at ¶ 8. They further suggested that the existence of a criminal investigation was not a basis for staying the civil action and that it was Appellants' behavior "involving criminal activity, to wit, theft and fraud of assets and monies of [Appellees], which has created the alleged challenge for [Appellant's] counsel." Id. at ¶ 9. Appellees concluded by indicating that Appellants were aware as early as September 2021 that Appellees were investigating Appellants' activities; that no criminal charges had been filed (as of the date Appellees filed their Answer to the Motion to Stay); and that delay "only gives [Appellants] more opportunity to hide or dissipate the assets and monies they misappropriated by [Appellants]." Id. at ¶ 13.

The trial court did not conduct a hearing on the motion. Instead, by order entered April 20, 2023, the court denied the motion based on the motion and the response thereto. Order, 4/20/23.^[1]This timely appeal followed. Appellants and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.^[2]

In their docketing statement filed with this Court on May 24, 2023, Appellants contended that April 20, 2023 order was appealable pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 313. By order entered on July 10, 2023, we issued a rule upon Appellants to show cause why the April 20, 2023 order satisfies the collateral order doctrine. Order, 7/10/23, at 1. By letter filed on July 24, 2023, Appellants' counsel suggested that Keesee v. Dougherty, 230 A.3d 1128 (Pa. Super. 2020), was instructive to the analysis. In Keesee, this Court explained:

An order denying a motion to stay generally is considered interlocutory and not appealable unless it satisfies the collateral order doctrine. Spanier v. Freeh, 95 A.3d 342, 345 (Pa. Super. 2014). Our Supreme Court held,

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 313(b) permits a party to take an immediate appeal as of right from an otherwise unappealable interlocutory order if the order meets three requirements: (1) the order must be separable from, and collateral to, the main cause of action; (2) the right involved must be too important to be denied review; and (3) the question presented must be such that if review is postponed until after final judgment, the claim will be irreparably lost. All three prongs of Rule 313(b) must be met before an order may be subject to a collateral appeal; otherwise, the appellate court lacks jurisdiction over the appeal.

Commonwealth v. Harris, 612 Pa. 576, 32 A.3d 243, 248 (2011); see also Pa.R.A.P. 313(b) (defining a collateral order as "an order separable from and collateral to the main cause of action where the right involved is too important to be denied review and the question presented is such that if review is postponed until final judgment in the case, the claim will be irreparably lost").

With regard to the first prong of the collateral order doctrine, an order is separable from the main cause of action if it is entirely distinct from the underlying issue in the case and if it can be resolved without an analysis of the merits of the underlying dispute. With regard to the second prong, a right is important if the interests that would go unprotected without immediate appeal are significant relative to the efficiency interests served by the final order rule. Notably, the rights must be deeply rooted in public policy going beyond the particular litigation at hand. With regard to the third prong, a right sought to be asserted on appeal will be "irreparably lost" if, as a practical matter, forcing the putative appellant to wait until final judgment before obtaining appellate review will deprive the appellant of a meaningful remedy.

Commonwealth v. Magee, 177 A.3d 315, 319-320 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citations, ellipsis, and some quotation marks omitted).

Keesee, 230 A.3d at 1131-32.

Counsel noted that the facts of the instant appeal are "virtually identical to those in Keesee." Response to Rule to Show Cause, 7/24/23, at 3. Counsel argued that the April 20, 2023 order satisfies the collateral order doctrine. As explained in Appellants' response:

First, the trial court's denial of Appellants' Motion to Stay Proceedings can be decided without reaching the merits of the underlying litigation, which involves affirmative claims of employment discrimination, sexual harassment, and retaliation, and counterclaims of conversion, unjust enrichment, fraud, and civil conspiracy. Second, denial of the Motion to Stay Proceedings implicates Appellants' Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination, which courts in the Commonwealth have consistently held is the type of privilege that is deeply rooted in public policy and too important to be denied review. Third, Appellants' rights against self-incrimination would be irreparably lost if review was postponed until final judgment, as Appellants would either need to forgo testifying on their behalf in the civil action or risk providing answers that might incriminate them in the pending criminal proceedings. As such the trial court's Order denying Appellants' Motion to Stay Proceedings satisfies the collateral order doctrine and this Court has jurisdiction over the appeal.

Id.

By order entered on August 2, 2023, this Court acknowledged counsel's response to our July 10, 2023 rule to show cause and noted, "[a]ccordingly, the rule is discharged and this appeal shall proceed." Order, 8/2/23, at 1. However, the parties were advised that the ruling "is not binding on this Court, as a final determination as to the propriety of the appeal." Id. The parties were advised that the issue could be revisited by this merits panel and that the parties should be prepared to address the issue in their briefs or at the time of oral argument. Id. ^[3]

We agree with Appellants and their Keesee analysis see Appellants' Response to Rule to Show Cause, 7/24/23, at 3, and conclude that the April 20, 2023 order is appealable under Pa.R.A.P. 313. First, the trial court's order denying the motion to stay is separable from the main cause of action and can be resolved without reaching the merits of the underlying litigation. Second, denial of the motion to stay implicates deeply-rooted Fifth Amendment rights. Third, Appellants' rights against self-incrimination would be irreparably lost if review were...