Zeigler v. State

948 F.Supp.2d 271

Jason ZEIGLER, Individually and in his capacity as Court Appointed Attorney for Indigent Citizens in the County of Onondaga together with all of those similarly situated and Jeff Witkowski, Individually as well as the representative of all of those similarly situated, Plaintiffs,

v.The State of NEW YORK; The Office of Court Administration of the Unified Court System; Hon. James Tormey, Individually and in his official capacity as District Administrative Judge of the Fifth Judicial District; and Onondaga County, Defendants.

No. 5:11–cv–037.

United States District Court, N.D. New York.

June 7, 2013.

Office of Jeffrey R. Parry, Jeffrey R. Parry, Esq., of Counsel, Liverpool, NY, for Plaintiffs.

Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General for the State of New York, C. Harris Dague, Esq., Ass't Attorney General, of counsel, Albany, NY, for Defendants State of New York, Office of Court Administration of the Unified Court System, and Hon. James Tormey.

Onondaga County Department of Law, Carol L. Rhinehart Esq., of Counsel, Syracuse, NY, for Defendant Onondaga County.

New York Civil Liberties Union, Corey L. Stoughton, Esq., of Counsel, New York, NY, for Amici Curiae Hurrell–Harring Class.

MEMORANDUM–DECISION and ORDER

DAVID N. HURD, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs, a putative class of appointed attorneys for indigent criminal defendants in Onondaga County, New York, represented by plaintiff Jason Zeigler (“Zeigler”) (the “attorney class”), and a putative class of indigent criminal defendants in local courts within Onondaga County, New York, represented by Jeff Witkowski (“Witkowski”) (the “criminal defendant class”) bring this action for money damages and declaratory relief against defendants the State of New York (the “State”); the Office of Court Administration of the Unified Court System (“OCA”); Hon. James Tormey (“Judge Tormey”), individually and in his official capacity as District Administrative Judge of the Fifth Judicial District (collectively the “State defendants”); and Onondaga County (the “County”) (the State defendants and the County collectively “defendants”) asserting claims under the United States Constitution pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and state law.

The State defendants and the County separately moved for judgment on the pleadings dismissing the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) (“Rule ––––”). Plaintiffs opposed and the State defendants replied. Finally, the “Hurrell–Harring Class,” as Amici Curiae, submitted a brief in opposition to the County's motion. Oral argument was heard on Tuesday, July 17, 2012 in Utica, New York. Decision was reserved.¹

II. BACKGROUND

The facts upon which this action is based are summarized briefly below. Facts set forth in the amended complaint will be taken as true for the purpose of these motions.

New York County Law Article 18–B was enacted following the United States Supreme Court's decision in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (holding that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments require that states provide counsel to indigent criminal defendants charged with a felony offense) and the New York Court of Appeals' decision in People v. Witenski, 15 N.Y.2d 392, 259 N.Y.S.2d 413, 207 N.E.2d 358 (1965) (finding that court must inform defendants of right to assignment of counsel). Article 18–B was enacted to put into operation a plan that would provide both representation to indigent persons charged with a crime and a means to compensate the attorneys assigned to represent those individuals.

Article 18–B requires each county or municipality to have “a plan for providing counsel to persons charged with a crime [for which a sentence of imprisonment is authorized] ... who are financially unable to obtain counsel.” N.Y. County Law § 722. Section 722 provides four options for such a plan: (1) an office of a public defender; (2) a private legal aid society or bureau organized and operating for the provision of indigent defense counsel; (3) a plan of a bar association utilizing private attorneys on rotating panels; or (4) a plan using a combination of any of these options. Id. § 722(1)-(4).

The County has contracted with the Onondaga County Bar Association Assigned Counsel Program, Inc. (“ACP”) to administer the bar association plan option. Ziegler Aff., June 8, 2012, Ex. B Part 1 (the “contract”). The bar association plan is set out in ACP's “Handbook of Policies, Rules and Procedures” (the “Plan”), which calls for panels of attorneys who have agreed to its terms. Ziegler Aff., June 8, 2012, Ex. B Parts 2–3. Various courts throughout the County are charged with appointing attorneys from these panels to represent indigent criminal defendants who qualify for free legal services. The panel attorneys then submit vouchers for their services to ACP, which reviews the vouchers and forwards them to the appropriate trial court judge for approval.

State law sets compensation rates for attorneys practicing pursuant to Article 18–B plans and compensation of attorneys assigned pursuant to the Plan is fixed by the trial court judge in accordance with rates established by the New York Legislature. N.Y. County Law § 722–b. While courts maintain the inherent power to assign any particular counsel to an indigent criminal defendant, only those attorneys appointed pursuant to the Plan are compensatedby the County. In other words, a court may not order that an attorney not assigned pursuant to the Plan be compensated.

Zeigler and those similarly situated are attorneys licensed to practice in New York who serve pursuant to the Plan to provide legal representation to indigent criminal defendants in the County.² Ziegler contends he is a party to a contract with the County, pursuant to which all participating ACP attorneys must agree to in order to serve on the panel. Witkowski and those similarly situated are or were indigent criminal defendants who have been assigned legal representation in the County pursuant to the Plan.³ Plaintiffs assert that defendants created, oversee, and control the Plan.

Plaintiffs argue the Plan suffers from systemic deficiencies like inadequate compensation, lack of resources, lack of representation, and overly stringent eligibility policies. Because of these deficiencies, plaintiffs allege indigent criminal defendants confront critical stages of criminal proceedings including arraignment, without counsel, or with counsel who fail to meaningfully represent them. Plaintiffs specifically attack several aspects of the Plan.

First, they allege they are deprived of the right to counsel by defendants' implementation of the Plan via two distinct arraignment methods, each of which is unconstitutional. The first method is employed in city courts in Syracuse, New York. Plaintiffs allege Judge Tormey instituted a process by which “arraigning attorneys” are assigned to a criminal defendant only for the purpose of arraignment; the attorney withdraws from the client immediately after the arraignment is completed. According to Witkowski, this is unconstitutional and deprives the criminal defendant class of their right to counsel because the “arraigning attorney” does not have time to learn about the case, meet the client, or engage in meaningful motion practice, thus the representation is inadequate and falls below accepted standards contemplated by the Sixth Amendment. Plaintiffs also take issue with the post-arraignment process in city courts. Following the withdrawal of the “arraigning attorney,” a panel attorney is provisionally assigned but his/her work may not commence until the defendant is deemed to qualify for legal services by the County, a process plaintiffs claim takes too long, is too stringent, and should be performed by a court. According to plaintiffs, during the qualification process, the defendant is without representation in violation of the Sixth Amendment.

The second allegedly unconstitutional arraignment method occurs in county courts. There, defendants are arraigned with no counsel at all (the prosecutor is not present either). As a result, defendants do not receive counsel prior to the grand jury indictment process, in violation of their Fifth Amendment rights.

Plaintiffs next describe a “core attorney” system within the city courts in which groups of lawyers are devoted exclusively to one judge for purposes of assignments. Plaintiffs argue this system is illegal because the law requires rotation among attorneys. Further, plaintiffs contend the system is unconstitutional because it favors attorneys who expedite cases, and disfavors those who zealously represent their clients, like Zeigler. The pressure to minimize adequate representation, in conjunction with pressure to adjourn court appearances, results in additional Sixth Amendment violations.

Finally, plaintiffs take issue with the compensation of Plan attorneys. In addition to extremely low pay rates, plaintiffs contend that the review and payment of attorney submitted vouchers actually deters attorneys from providing necessary representation because the County is slow to process vouchers and does not pay for certain legal services, in violation of the law.

III. DISCUSSION

In summary, plaintiffs claim that the Plan violates the constitutional rights of participating attorneys and indigent criminal defendants and that defendants breached certain contractual obligations concerning the Plan. They specifically allege the following causes of action in the amended complaint: (1) deprivation of rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments pursuant to § 1983, relating to the arraignment processes and the other ways in which the Plan denies the right to counsel; ⁴ (2) deprivation of rights under the First, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments pursuant to § 1983, alleging defendants retaliated against plaintiffs for exercising their Sixth Amendment rights; specifically that attorneys who protest the Plan, both...