Zhornitsky v. Yale Sch. of Med.

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SIMON ZHORNITSKY, Plaintiff, v. YALE SCHOOL OF MEDICINE and CONNECTICUT MENTAL HEALTH CENTER, Defendants

No. 3:24-CV-00018 (KAD)

United States District Court, D. Connecticut

November 25, 2024

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE: MOTIONS TO DISMISS [ECF NOS. 10, 22]

KARI A. DOOLEY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Simon Zhornitsky (“Plaintiff” or “Zhornitsky”) brings this employment and education discrimination case against both Yale School of Medicine (“Yale”) and the Connecticut Mental Health Center (“CMHC”) (collectively “Defendants”). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants were his joint employers and discriminated against him based on his sex. His claims arise out of Yale's Title IX investigation into his conduct as it pertained to a CMHC employee and the eventual shortening of the term of his employment contract. Both Yale and CMHC filed motions to dismiss, which Plaintiff opposes. For the reasons that follow, CMHC's motion is GRANTED. Yale's motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

Standard of Review

To survive a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Legal conclusions and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” are not entitled to a presumption of truth. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Nevertheless, when reviewing a motion to dismiss, the court must accept well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draw “all reasonable inferences in the non-movant's favor.” Interworks Sys. Inc. v. Merch. Fin. Corp., 604 F.3d 692, 699 (2d Cir. 2010).

Allegations and Procedural History

Plaintiff Dr. Simon Zhornitsky is a doctor operating in New Haven, Connecticut, and he is a former Yale employee. Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶ 5. Zhornitsky was hired by Yale in November 2016 to work as an associate research scientist for Dr. Chiang-Shan Ray Li, who was assigned to work at the Connecticut Mental Health Center. Id. In February 2017, Zhornitsky began interacting with a CMHC employee named Joanna Perez. Id. ¶¶ 7-8. Perez was not a Yale employee, nor is she a party to this case. Id. ¶ 8. Between 2017 and 2022, Zhornitsky sent private messages to Perez through Instagram, which Perez did not respond to. Id. ¶¶ 10-11. However, Zhornitsky believed that Perez was responding to his messages through her other public posts, and thus, he continued messaging Perez. Id. ¶ 12.

In March 2022, Zhornitsky was contacted by CMHC police and Yale's Title IX coordinator, Jason Killheffer, about his messages to Perez. Id. ¶ 13. Perez asked that Zhornitsky be notified that she no longer wanted him to send her messages or have any contact with her. Id. Zhornitsky immediately and fully complied with the request and never contacted Perez. Id. ¶ 14. Two months later, in May 2022, Perez filed another complaint against Zhornitsky, causing Killheffer to open a Title IX investigation. Id. ¶¶ 15-16. Killheffer reviewed copies of the Instagram messages Zhornitsky had sent to Perez, but the investigation did not substantiate any violations and no disciplinary measures were taken. Id. ¶¶ 16-17.

The following month, in June 2022, Dr. Gustavo Angarita became Zhornitsky's new supervisor, and he began working on the third floor of the CMHC. Id. ¶ 18. However, he continued performing some of his job duties, such as drawing blood, on the second floor. Id. ¶ 19. On September 12, 2022, Zhornitsky was performing a blood and urine test on a patient on the second floor, and while he was waiting for the patient to exit the bathroom, Perez walked by Zhornitsky on the way to her office. Id. ¶ 20. The two did not interact. Id. A week later, on September 19, 2022, Zhornitsky received an email from Killheffer to attend a Zoom meeting with him. Id. ¶ 21. At the Zoom meeting, Killheffer told Zhornitsky that Perez had filed another complaint against him for “hanging around the outpatient office,” and as a result, CMHC had banned Zhornitsky from the building, pending another investigation. Id. Zhornitsky explained that he was only on the second floor to perform his job duties, which his supervisor confirmed; however, Yale said that they nevertheless could not force CMHC to revoke its ban. Id. ¶ 22. Eventually, the CMHC removed the ban on Zhornitsky's access to the building, but he remained banned from the CMHC garage and the second floor. Id. ¶ 24. On November 22, 2022, Perez sent an email to Killheffer regarding Zhornitsky's return to the CMHC building, in which she indicated that she was still concerned about future incidents, and that she would “like to have this process completed ASAP.” Id. ¶ 25. Killheffer took no action on this email. Id. ¶ 26.

Approximately two months later, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination against Yale with the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (“CHRO”). Yale was notified of the filing of the charge on January 9, 2023. Id. ¶ 27. That same day, Diane Cornelius Charles, Yale's deputy Title IX coordinator, initiated a Title IX sexual misconduct complaint against Zhornitsky on behalf of Perez. Id. Zhornitsky objected to the complaint, and requested the ability to file his own Title IX complaint against Perez, but Yale advised him that he could not do so “because Perez was not a student, employee or a member of any Yale University program.” Id. ¶¶ 34, 36. During the investigation, Yale “did not investigate Perez's [November 2022 email], instead it tore through each and every pre-March 2022, Instagram message that Plaintiff had sent to Perez on her non-affiliated personal business Instagram account and classified those private messages as substantiating a charge of sexual harassment.” Id. ¶ 37. Yale also disregarded the prior three Title IX investigations and complaints and their respective findings. Id. ¶¶ 38, 40.

Yale's Title IX investigation resulted in findings that substantiated a charge of sexual harassment, and as a result, Plaintiff was “suspended, banned from his work location and forced out of his employment with Yale.” Id. ¶¶ 37, 41. Specifically, Zhornitsky's contract was only renewed for a six-month term “instead of the customary one (1) year term.” Id. ¶ 64. Plaintiff was denied interviews within Yale's psychiatry department and could not apply for positions that were located in the CMHC building. Id.

Plaintiff filed the present Complaint on January 4, 2024. He asserts six causes of action. As against CMHC, he asserts: gender discrimination under Title VII (Count 3); retaliation under Title VII (Count 4); breach of contract (Count 5); a “due process” violation, asserted under Title IX (Count 6); and intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count 7). As against Yale, he asserts: gender discrimination under Title IX (Count 1); gender discrimination under Title VII (Count 2); retaliation under Title VII (Count 4); breach of contract (Count 5); a Title IX due process violation (Count 6), and intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count 7). CMHC and Yale separately move to dismiss all claims against them.

Discussion

I. CMHC's Motion to Dismiss

a. Counts 5 and 7: Breach of Contract and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED)

Plaintiff asserts common-law breach of contract and IIED claims against the CMHC. CMHC argues that these claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and the sovereign immunity afforded thereunder, insofar as CMHC is an “arm of the state.” The Court agrees. The Eleventh Amendment provides that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. “The Eleventh Amendment has been interpreted as also barring suits in federal court against a state brought by that state's own citizens.” Mary Jo C. v. N.Y. State & Loc. Ret. Sys., 707 F.3d 144, 151 (2d Cir. 2013). This immunity extends not only to the State itself but “to state agents and state instrumentalities that are, effectively, arms of a state.” Woods v. Rondout Valley Centr. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 466 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 2006) (quotation marks omitted). Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit “applies regardless of the nature of the relief sought,” except in circumstances “where the state has consented to be sued or Congress has abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Lee v. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 939 F.Supp.2d 160, 165 (D. Conn. 2013) (quotations omitted).

The Second Circuit has identified two sets of overlapping factors to consider when determining whether an entity is an “arm of the state” that is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Mancuso v. N.Y. State Thruway Auth., 86 F.3d 289, 293 (2d Cir. 1996); Clissuras v City Univ. of N.Y., 359 F.3d 79, 82 (2d Cir. 2004) (per curiam). The Mancuso factors require a court to consider: “(1) how the entity is referred to in the documents that created it; (2) how the governing members of the entity are appointed; (3) how the entity is funded; (4) whether the entity's function is traditionally one of local or state government; (5) whether the...