Zinman v. L.A. Fitness Int'l LLC

COREY J. ZINMAN, Plaintiff, v. L.A. FITNESS INTERNATIONAL LLC, Defendant.

Case No. 21-cv-20315-BLOOM/Otazo-Reyes

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

June 21, 2021

OMNIBUS ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS, MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND, AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendant L.A. Fitness International LLC's ("Defendant") Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, ECF No. [8] ("Motion to Dismiss"), Plaintiff Corey J. Zinman's ("Plaintiff") Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint, ECF No. [15] ("Motion for Leave to Amend"), and Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions Regarding Submission of False or Misleading Statements by Defendant's Attorney Jessica Debono Anderson, ECF No. [30] ("Motion for Sanctions") (collectively, "Motions"). The Court has carefully reviewed the Motions, the record in this case, the applicable law, and is otherwise fully advised. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion to Dismiss is granted, the Motion for Leave to Amend is denied, and the Motion for Sanctions is denied.

I. BACKGROUND

On January 26, 2021, pro se Plaintiff initiated this action against Defendant, alleging religious discrimination in violation of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1967, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a et seq. ("Title II"). ECF No. [1]; see also ECF No. [6] ("Amended Complaint"). On or about December 11, 2019, Plaintiff became a member of Defendant's gym located in Palm Beach County, Florida. ECF No. [6] ¶ 8. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Defendant implemented a policy at its gym that requires "facial coverings both to enter and exit as well as to move about [its] facility[.]" Id. ¶ 9. According to the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff objected to Defendant's facial covering policy on the basis of his religion. Id. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that complying with Defendant's policy requires him to "obey[] the affirmative commands of [another] being but the Almighty Himself" and qualifies as "idolatry" in violation of Judaic law. Id. ¶¶ 20-23.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant initially accommodated his religious beliefs and his objection to the policy, and "offered him the full and equal enjoyment of their goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations despite [Plaintiff's refusal] to wear a facial covering." Id. ¶ 10. However, on December 15, 2020, Defendant's management "publicly harassed" Plaintiff for his failure to wear a facial covering, contacted law enforcement to remove Plaintiff from the premises, and terminated Plaintiff's membership. Id. ¶¶ 11-14. According to the Amended Complaint, although management insisted that Plaintiff wear a facial covering, they "allow[ed] other similarly situated individuals both to enter and exit as well as move about the facility without facial coverings." Id. ¶ 24.

Palm Beach County Emergency Order 2020-012,¹ provides that "[f]acial coverings must be worn by all persons, other than those specifically exempted in Section 4e. while obtaining any good or service or otherwise visiting or working in any business or establishment, including entering, exiting and otherwise moving around within the establishment." Order No. 2020-012 § 4(a). Included in the persons specifically exempt from wearing facial coverings are those "for whom wearing a facial covering conflicts with their religious beliefs or practices[.]" Id. § 4(e). Thus, according to Plaintiff, Defendant "was under no legal obligation to discriminate against [him] for refusing to wear a facial covering and did so completely of their own volition." ECF No. [6] ¶ 23.

Based on the foregoing allegations, Plaintiff alleges a claim against Defendant for intentional discrimination under Title II, and seeks monetary damages, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. at 7-10.² On April 4, 2021, Defendant filed its Motion to Dismiss, seeking dismissal of the Amended Complaint with prejudice on the bases that Plaintiff: (1) cannot state a claim under Palm Beach County's emergency orders;³ (2) failed to allege that Defendant is a place of public accommodation within the meaning of Title II; (3) failed to comply with the notice requirements under Title II prior to initiating this action; (4) failed to state a claim for discrimination under Title II; and (5) lacks standing to seek injunctive relief. See generally ECF No. [8]. Plaintiff filed a Response to the Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. [13] ("Response"), to which Defendant filed a Reply, ECF No. [16] ("Reply"). Thereafter, Plaintiff separately moved for leave to file a second amended complaint, ECF No. [15]; see also ECF Nos. [27] & [29].

On May 19, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Rule 11 Motion for Sanctions,⁴ which accuses Defendant's counsel of making several allegations in both the Motion to Dismiss and Reply "which she either knew or should have known had no factual or legal basis." ECF No. [30] at 2. Defendant filed a Response in Opposition, ECF No. [34], contending that Defendant's counsel has not engaged in any conduct that violates Rule 11, and requests that the Court exercise its discretionary authority to sanction Plaintiff for his improper use of Rule 11. Plaintiff then filed a Reply in Support of his Motion for Sanctions, ECF No. [39].

The Motions are ripe for consideration.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

a. Rule 12(b)(6)

A pleading in a civil action must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although a complaint "does not need detailed factual allegations," it must provide "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that Rule 8(a)(2)'s pleading standard "demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation"). Nor can a complaint rest on "'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

When reviewing a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), a court, as a general rule, must accept the plaintiff's allegations as true and evaluate all plausible inferences derived from those facts in favor of the plaintiff. See Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. S. Everglades Restoration Alliance, 304 F.3d 1076, 1084 (11th Cir. 2002); AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Infinity Fin. Grp., LLC, 608 F. Supp. 2d 1349, 1353 (S.D. Fla. 2009). However, this tenet does not apply to legal conclusions, and courts "are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Thaeter v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff's Office, 449 F.3d 1342, 1352 (11th Cir. 2006). Moreover, "courts may infer from the factual allegations in the complaint 'obvious alternative explanations,' which suggest lawful conduct rather than the unlawful conduct the plaintiff would ask the court to infer." Am. Dental Ass'n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 682).

A court, in considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, "may consider only the complaint itself and any documents referred to in the complaint which are central to the claims." Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc., 555 F.3d 949, 959 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir. 1997)); see also Maxcess, Inc. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 433 F.3d 1337, 1340 n.3 (11th Cir. 2005) ("[A] document outside the four corners of the complaint may still be considered if it is central to the plaintiff's claims and is undisputed in terms of authenticity." (citing Horsley v. Feldt, 304 F.3d 1125, 1135 (11th Cir. 2002))).

b. Rule 11 Sanctions

"The purpose of Rule 11 is to deter baseless filings in district court and thus streamline the administration and procedure of federal courts." Peer v. Lewis, 606 F.3d 1306, 1311 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing 2 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 11.03 (3d ed. 2010)). "When an attorney files a pleading in federal court, the attorney signs the pleading to certify that, among other things, (1) the pleading is not being presented for an improper purpose; (2) the legal contentions are warranted by existing law or a nonfrivolous argument to change existing law; and (3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or will likely have evidentiary support after discovery." Peer, 606 F.3d at 1311 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)). In assessing the propriety of Rule 11 sanctions, this Court asks: "(1) whether the party's claims are objectively frivolous, and (2) whether the person who signed the pleadings should have been aware that they were frivolous." Id. (quoting Byrne v. Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075, 1105 (11th Cir. 2001)).

III. DISCUSSION

a. Failure to State a Claim

Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1967 prohibits discrimination in places of public accommodation. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a. Specifically, Section 2000a, provides that "[a]ll persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a). To state a prima facie case under Title II, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he:

(1) is a member of a protected class; (2) attempted to contract for services and afford [himself] the full benefits and enjoyment of a public accommodation; (3) was denied the full benefits or enjoyments of a public accommodation; and (4) such services were available to similarly situated persons outside [his] protected class who received full benefits or who were treated better.

Benton v. Cousins Properties, Inc., 230 F. Supp. 2d 1351, 1382 (N.D. Ga. 2002), aff'd, 97 F. App'x 904 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Additionally, Section...