Zions Bancorporation, NA v. Schwab

537 P.3d 273

ZIONS BANCORPORATION, NA, Appellant,

v.Sarah N. SCHWAB, Appellee.

No. 20220584-CA

Court of Appeals of Utah.

Filed September 21, 2023

James K. Tracy, Joshua L. Lee, Salt Lake City, Taylor C. Jaussi, KC Hooker, and David M. McGrath, Salt Lake City, Attorneys for Appellant

Judge Ryan M. Harris authored this Opinion, in which Judges Gregory K. Orme and John D. Luthy concurred.

Opinion

HARRIS, Judge:

¶1 Zions Bancorporation, NA (Zions) obtained a judgment against Sarah N. Schwab in 2005. Eight years later, in 2013, Zions utilized the Renewal of Judgment Act (the Act) to renew its judgment against Schwab. Another eight years after that, in 2021, Zions sought to renew its judgment a second time. The district court denied Zions's motion to renew the judgment, concluding that the Act does not allow for a second renewal. Zions appeals that decision, asserting that the court erroneously interpreted the Act. Schwab did not file an appellate brief, and therefore Zions's arguments stand unopposed.

After review of those arguments, we conclude that Zions has made at least "a prima facie showing of a plausible basis for reversal." AL-IN Partners, LLC v. LifeVantage Corp. , 2021 UT 42, ¶ 19, 496 P.3d 76 (quotation simplified). Zions has thus satisfied its burden of persuasion in this appeal, and we therefore reverse the district court's determination and remand for the court to enter an order granting Zions's request for a second renewal of judgment. But our conclusion is a non-merits disposition; we make no precedential determinations regarding the meaning of the Act's language.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Schwab opened a new bank account with Zions in 2004. Upon creation of the account, Schwab and Zions entered into a "Deposit Agreement" outlining the terms and conditions of their arrangement. The Deposit Agreement required Schwab to repay any amount that is overdrawn from the account. It also required that Schwab pay 18% annual interest on any overdraft amount, and that Schwab reimburse Zions for reasonable attorney fees and collection costs if Schwab does not comply with the agreement.

¶3 That same year, Schwab overdrew $4,816.96 from her account. Zions requested that Schwab repay this amount, but Schwab was unwilling or unable to do so.

¶4 In 2005, Zions sued Schwab for breach of contract, and sought to obtain a judgment for the overdraft amount, accrued interest, attorney fees, and collection costs. A few months later, the parties entered into a court-approved settlement agreement; under the terms of that agreement, Schwab acknowledged that she was indebted to Zions in the amount set forth in the complaint and that she would pay Zions $100 per month until the debt was paid in full. In exchange, Zions agreed to dismiss the case after receiving full payment. The agreement provided that if Schwab did not make any payment on time, the court was authorized to enter judgment against Schwab in the amount owed plus accrued interest, attorney fees, and collection costs.

¶5 After making only one payment, Schwab defaulted on the agreement. Zions then asked the court to enter a judgment against Schwab pursuant to the terms of the agreement. The court granted Zions's request, entering judgment (the Original Judgment) in October 2005 in the total amount of $6,126.95, consisting of "the principal sum of $4,716.96, plus accrued interest thereon in the amount of $875.99," collection costs of $126.50, and attorney fees of $407.50. The Original Judgment also provided for "accruing interest on the principal amount at the rate of 18.00% per annum," and contained a provision allowing for augmentation "in the amount of reasonable costs and attorney's fees expended in collecting said judgment."

¶6 Zions claims that, after obtaining the Original Judgment, it "began efforts to collect" on it but "was unable to collect enough funds to satisfy the Judgment in full" before the expiration of the Original Judgment's eight-year term. During this time, Zions obtained a writ of garnishment, but it is unclear what other collection methods, if any, Zions employed.

¶7 In 2013, just prior to the eight-year anniversary of the Original Judgment's entry date, Zions filed a motion to renew the judgment, invoking the Act. The district court granted this motion and entered a renewed judgment (the Renewed Judgment). In the Renewed Judgment, the court also updated the amounts Schwab owed—including interest, attorney fees, and collection costs—so that the total judgment amount was increased to $12,991.46.

¶8 Over the next eight years, Zions claims that it "continued its collection efforts but still was unable to collect enough funds to satisfy" the Renewed Judgment. So in 2021, just prior to the sixteen-year anniversary of entry of the Original Judgment, Zions again moved for renewal of judgment. Zions again relied on the Act, which provides that a "court of record may renew a judgment issued by a court if," among other things, "the motion is filed before the statute of limitations on the original judgment expires." Utah Code § 78B-6-1802(2). Schwab did not register any opposition to Zions's motion.

¶9 But this time, the district court refused to sign the new renewed judgment (the Second Renewed Judgment) that Zions submitted, explaining in a "[n]ote from the Court" as follows: "[The] Original [J]udgment issued in 2005 and statute of limitations has expired. Per [the Act], [a] motion must be filed before the statute of limitations on the ORIGINAL [J]udgment expires." (Emphasis in original.) Zions then filed a motion for reconsideration, taking issue with the court's interpretation of the Act and claiming that, "by operation of the Renew[ed] Judgment, the expiration date of the Original Judgment was extended to October 13, 2021. Therefore, the 2021 [m]otion filed by Zions on October 6, 2021 was filed prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations on the Original Judgment." (Emphasis in original.) Zions also argued that the court's interpretation of the Act "would necessarily result in placing an artificial cap of one renewal for any given judgment," which "is clearly contrary to the plain language and intent of [the Act], which imposes no limit on the number of times a judgment can be renewed."

¶10 The court disagreed and denied Zions's motion for reconsideration, offering its view that the eight-year "statute of limitations on the [O]riginal [J]udgment expired" in 2013 and that, therefore, Zions's 2021 motion for a second renewal had not been filed before the statute of limitations on the Original Judgment expired. The court believed that it was "following the holding of" Gildea v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. , 2015 UT 11, 347 P.3d 385, in which our supreme court held that a judgment's duration period and the statute of limitations associated with that judgment "are two different, but concurrent" time frames, see Gildea , 2015 UT 11, ¶ 13, 347 P.3d 385. The district court interpreted Gildea as mandating the conclusion that "extending the duration of a judgment does not extend the statute of limitations on the judgment."

¶11 Zions timely appealed the court's denial of its second motion for renewal of judgment. Schwab did not file an appellate brief and has not otherwise participated in this appeal.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶12 Zions claims that the district court erred in refusing to renew its judgment against Schwab for a second time. In particular, it claims that the court erred "in interpreting [the Act] to mean that renewal of an original judgment does not renew the limitations period on that judgment." "We review questions of statutory interpretation for correctness, affording no deference to the district court's legal conclusions." Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P'ship , 2011 UT 50, ¶ 12, 267 P.3d 863 (quotation simplified).

¶13 But here, Schwab did not submit an appellate brief or otherwise appear to contest the positions Zions is taking. In circumstances like these, as discussed more fully below, Zions is only required to "establish a prima facie showing of a plausible basis for reversal." AL-IN Partners, LLC v. LifeVantage Corp. , 2021 UT 42, ¶ 19, 496 P.3d 76 (quotation simplified).

ANALYSIS

¶14 In this case, because Schwab did not file an appellate brief, Zions's claims on appeal stand uncontested. An appellee's failure to file an appellate brief "does not amount to an automatic default and consequent reversal of the lower court," Farman-Rava v. Blu Auto Transport LLC , 2021 UT App 93, ¶ 5 n.2, 498 P.3d 24 (quotation simplified), and it is not "a confession of error on the part of the appellee," State v. Sorbonne , 2020 UT App 48, ¶ 16 n.3, 462 P.3d 409, aff'd , 2022 UT 5, 506 P.3d 545. In such situations, we still must "consider whether [the appellant] has carried [its] burden of persuasion on appeal." Id.

¶15 But in cases like this one, an appellant's burden of persuasion is significantly lower. To satisfy that burden in a case in which its arguments stand unopposed, an appellant need only establish "a prima facie showing of a plausible basis for reversal." AL-IN Partners , 2021 UT 42, ¶ 19, 496 P.3d 76 (quotation simplified); see also Mitchell v. Arco Indus. Sales , 2023 UT App 70, ¶ 22, 533 P.3d 394 ("Our supreme court has previously held that it is appropriate to rule in favor of an appellant if the appellant establishes a prima facie showing of a plausible basis for reversal and the appellee fails to brief the argument." (quotation simplified)). "This is a lower standard than the typical burden of persuasion on appeal." AL-IN Partners , 2021 UT 42, ¶ 19, 496 P.3d 76. An appellant who meets this burden is entitled to reversal of the challenged decision in that appellant's individual case. But in such instances, given the lack of adversarial briefing on the matter at hand, we often indicate that our reversal "is a non-merits decision that is not intended to have precedential value." See, e.g. , Mitchell , 2023 UT App 70, ¶ 22 n.2, 533 P.3d 394 (quotation...