Zuckerman v. Bevin

565 S.W.3d 580

Fred ZUCKERMAN, as Representative of the General Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers Local Union No. 89, et al., Appellants

v.Matthew G. BEVIN, in His Official Capacity as Governor of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, et al., Appellees

2018-SC-000097-TG

2018-SC-000098-TG

2018-CA-000289-MR

Supreme Court of Kentucky.

NOVEMBER 15, 2018

Petition for Rehearing Denied February 14, 2019

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS: FRED ZUCKERMAN, AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE GENERAL DRIVERS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS LOCAL UNION NO. 89 AND WILLIAM LONDRIGAN, AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE KENTUCKY STATE AFL-CIO, ITS AFFILIATED UNIONS AND MEMBERS, William E. Johnson, Johnson Bearse, LLP, Irwin H. Cutler, Jr., Benjamin S. Basil, Matthew P. Lynch, Priddy Cutler Naake & Meade PLLC, Robert Matthew Colone, Teamsters Local 89, David O'Brien Suetholz, Devon Nora Ros Oser, Branstetter Stranch & Jennings PLLC.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: MATTHEW G. BEVIN, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS GOVERNOR OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, Mark Stephen Pitt, Stephen Chad Meredith, Matthew Kuhn, Office of the Governor.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: DERRICK K. RAMSEY, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE KENTUCKY LABOR CABINET, Michael Gary Swansburg, Jr.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES BARRY BRIGHT, JACOB PURVIS, AND WILLIAM PURVIS, William L. Messenger, National Right to Work Foundation, Richard Lynn Masters, Masters, Mullins, & Arrington.

COUNSEL FOR AMICUS CURIAE: KENTUCKY CENTER FOR ECONOMIC POLICY, Pamela Joy Pendorf Thomas.

COUNSEL FOR AMICI CURIAE: INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA; UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA; UNITED STEEL, PAPER AND FORESTRY, RUBBER, MANUFACTURING, ENERGY, ALLIED INDUSTRIAL AND SERVICE WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION; AND KENTUCKY PIPE TRADES ASSOCIATION: Kevin Crosby Burke, Jamie Kristin Neal, Burke Neal PLLC, Tony Oppegard

OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE VANMETER

Under Section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C.¹ § 164(b), Congress authorized states to enact right-to-work laws, i.e. , laws that prohibit union shop agreements and agency shop agreements. In 2017, Kentucky's legislature passed, and the Governor signed, 2017 HB² 1, commonly referred to as the Kentucky Right to Work Act, 2017 Ky. Acts ch. 1, § 15 (the "Act").

Significantly, this Act amended KRS³ 336.130(3) to provide that no employee is required to become, or remain, a member of a labor organization, or to pay dues, fees, or assessments to a labor organization. The Act's stated goal was "to attract new business and investment into the Commonwealth as soon as possible." 2017 Ky. Acts ch. 1, § 14. The issue we must decide in this case is whether the Franklin Circuit Court erred in dismissing constitutional challenges to the validity of the Act, specifically that it violated the Kentucky Constitution's provisions requiring equal protection of the laws, prohibiting special legislation, prohibiting takings without compensation, and that it was improperly designated as emergency legislation. We hold that the trial court did not err and therefore affirm the Franklin Circuit Court's Order dismissing the challenges to the Act.

I. Factual Background.

Bills virtually identical to 2017 HB 1 were introduced in almost every session of the legislature beginning in 2000⁴ but never passed. Governor Bevin, as a candidate in 2015, actively campaigned on a platform of "right to work." Matt Bevin for Governor, https://www.mattbevin.com/issues (last visited Aug. 30, 2018). Following his election, he encouraged the electorate in 2016 to support legislative candidates who similarly favored "right to work." When the membership and leadership of the House changed with the 2016 election, the new majority's top priorities were the passage of a number of bills, including 2017 HB 1.

The House Economic Development and Workforce Investment Committee convened a hearing on HB 1 on January 4, 2017. At the hearing, proponents of the Bill testified in support of the Bill.⁵ Their testimony included statistics that right-to-work states experience superior economic development and superior employment growth in both union and non-union jobs, specifically referring to Michigan, Indiana, and Tennessee. They cited Kentucky's disadvantage in attracting certain new employers to locate in the state due to the Commonwealth's status as a non-right-to-work state. In addition, Speaker Jeff Hoover referred to a study by Dr. Jeffrey Eisenach that concluded right-to-work greatly benefited job creation, specifically "[p]rivate sector employment grew by 17.4 percent in right-to-work states between 2001 and 2013."⁶ Mr. David Adkisson referred to an LSU⁷ study which reported that one-third of businesses looking to expand or relocate indicated that right-to-work was important. Mr. Kevin Grove spoke to his experience in attracting industrial development to the Louisville metropolitan area, and the advantage accruing to across-the-river Indiana due to that state's enactment of right-to-work legislation in 2012. The witnesses opposing the Bill, Ms. Anna Baumann and Mr. Bill Londrigan, provided testimony to refute the statistics and claims of the proponents. Much of this testimony is contained in Appellants' brief in this Court and accompanying attachments. 2017 HB 1 was quickly passed, largely on a partisan basis, and signed into law on an emergency basis.⁸

In May 2017, Fred Zuckerman, et al. ,⁹ filed an action in Franklin Circuit Court against the Commonwealth¹⁰ challenging the Act on several Kentucky constitutional grounds. Thereafter, Barry Bright, Jacob Purvis and William Purvis filed a motion, which the trial court granted, to intervene as defendants on the side of the Commonwealth.

In June 2017, the Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss. The Unions subsequently filed a motion for partial summary judgment. After a September 2017 hearing, the trial court issued its Order denying the Unions' motion and granting the Commonwealth's motion. The Unions appealed. Because this case involves significant and important constitutional issues of great and immediate public importance, we granted transfer of the case from the Court of Appeals. CR¹¹ 74.02.

II. Standard of Review.

This case involves a facial challenge to the constitutionality of the Act under the Kentucky Constitution. We recognize, of course, that all laws "contrary to this Constitution, shall be void." KY. CONST. § 26. "Our functions are to determine the constitutional validity and to declare the meaning of what the legislative department has done. We have no other concern." Johnson v. Commonwealth ex rel. Meredith , 291 Ky. 829, 833, 165 S.W.2d 820, 823 (1942). Furthermore, "an [a]ct should be held valid unless it clearly offends the limitations and prohibitions of the constitution.... [A]lways the burden is upon one who questions the validity of an Act to sustain his contentions." Id. at 833-34, 165 S.W.2d at 823. "In considering an attack on the constitutionality of legislation, this Court has continually resolved any doubt in favor of constitutionality rather than unconstitutionality." Hallahan v. Mittlebeeler , 373 S.W.2d 726, 727 (Ky. 1963) (citing Reynolds Metal Co. v. Martin , 269 Ky. 378, 381-82, 107 S.W.2d 251, 253 (1937) ). We have also held that "the propriety, wisdom and expediency of statutory enactments are exclusively legislative matters." Hallahan , 373 S.W.2d at 727 (citing Craig v. O'Rear , 199 Ky. 553, 557, 251 S.W. 828, 830 (1923) ). Further,

courts are not at liberty to declare a statute invalid because, in their judgment, it may be unnecessary, or opposed to the best interests of the state.... [A]n act will not be declared void on the ground that it is opposed to the spirit supposed to pervade the Constitution, or is against the nature and spirit of the government, or is contrary to the general principles of liberty, or the genius of a free people.

Craig , 199 Ky. at 557-58, 251 S.W. at 830 (citations omitted).

Since the issues involve questions of law, our review is de novo , and we do not defer to conclusions of the trial court. Adams v. Sietsema , 533 S.W.3d 172, 177 (Ky. 2017).

III. Labor-Management Background.

A detailed history of Labor-Management relations would unduly prolong this opinion, but an overview is helpful to the analysis of the issues before us, particularly because 1) the Unions base their challenges under the Kentucky Constitution, in part, on "the letter and the spirit of the document,"¹² and 2) right-to-work laws are explicitly authorized under federal law. 29 U.S.C. § 164(b).

A. Kentucky Labor Law History to 1890.

Trade or labor unions in Kentucky were initially formed in the more urbanized areas of Louisville, Northern Kentucky, i.e. , Covington and Newport, and in the coal fields of Eastern Kentucky. See generally John Hennan, Toil, Trouble, Transformation: Workers and Unions in Modem Kentucky , 113 R EG . OF THE K Y . H IST . S OC'Y 233, 236-37 (2015) (attributing this formation to the post-Civil War period, although some scholars believe union activity existed in antebellum Kentucky). The first reported Kentucky case we have found involving a trade organization was Sayre v. Louisville Union Benevolent Ass'n , 62 Ky. (1 Duv.) 143, 145-46 (1863), in which the court generally recognized the right of workingmen to combine for their own protection and to obtain such wages as they choose to demand, but also noted combinations that prejudice the public by unduly elevating or depressing wages, tolls, or prices of any merchantable commodity are indictable as conspiracies. Four years later, the court decided Lee v. Louisville Pilot Benevolent & Relief Ass'n , 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 254 (1867). In Lee , the court affirmed the right of the organization to charge and collect dues, since "[t]he presumed object of the tariff was uniformity of charges, harmony, efficiency, and fidelity, and not unjust monopoly, or the extortion of exorbitant fees." Id. at 255.

Surprisingly, in the period pre-dating the 1890-91 Kentucky...