Allen v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.

475 F.Supp.3d 413

Charles T. ALLEN, Jr., Plaintiff,

v.COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:19-CV-01130

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania.

Signed August 1, 2020

Karl E. Osterhout, Hannalore B. Merritt, Osterhout Berger Disability Law, LLC, Oakmont, PA, for Plaintiff.

Samuel S. Dalke, U.S. Attorney's Office, Harrisburg, PA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

KAROLINE MEHALCHICK, United States Magistrate Judge

Plaintiff Charles T. Allen, Jr. ("Allen") brings this action under Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), for judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the "Commissioner") denying his application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. For the following reasons, the undersigned shall order the Commissioner's decision be VACATED and REMANDED .

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 28, 2011, Allen filed a Title II application for disability insurance benefits alleging a disability onset date of March 1, 2002. (Doc. 11-2, at 105). In his application, Allen alleges he is disabled due to PTSD, depression, insomnia, nerve damage in his right hand, and a surgery-induced infection in his right hand. (Doc. 11-7, at 4). Allen was born on May 13, 1947, and was fifty-four years old on the alleged disability onset date.¹ (Doc. 11-16, at 18).

On May 18, 2011, Allen's claim was denied at the initial level of administrative review. (Doc. 11-4, at 6). Allen filed a timely request for a hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ") on June 15, 2011, and on July 26, 2012, Allen appeared and testified at an administrative hearing before ALJ Randy Riley. (Doc. 11-3, at 2; Doc. 11-5, at 10). The ALJ denied Allen's claim in a written decision dated August 14, 2012. (Doc. 11-2, at 111). After the Appeals Council denied Allen's request for review, he appealed to the United States District Court which remanded the claim for a new hearing on October 7, 2014. (Doc. 11-18, at 12-18). On May 21, 2015, Allen's case was re-heard, and again his claim was denied. (Doc. 11-17, at 2; Doc. 11-18, at 35). However, the Appeals Council remanded this decision and a third hearing was held on February 23, 2018. (Doc. 11-17, at 30; Doc. 11-18, at 41). This most recent hearing again resulted in a denial of benefits by ALJ Theodore Burock on June 13, 2018. (Doc. 11-16, at 26). Allen requested review of ALJ Burock's decision by the Appeals Council, but the Appeals Council denied the request. (Doc. 11-16, at 2).

Allen initiated the instant action on July 2, 2019. (Doc. 1). The Commissioner responded on September 23, 2019, providing the requisite transcripts from Allen's disability proceedings. (Doc. 10; Doc. 11). The parties then filed their respective briefs, with Allen raising one narrow basis for remand. (Doc. 14; Doc. 21; Doc. 22).

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

To receive benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, a claimant must demonstrate an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). To satisfy this requirement, a claimant must have a severe physical or mental impairment that makes it impossible to do his or her previous work or any other substantial gainful activity that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A) ; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a).² Additionally, a claimant must be insured for disability insurance benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(a) ; 20 C.F.R. § 404.131.

A. ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW

In evaluating whether a claimant is disabled, the "Social Security Administration, working through ALJs, decides whether a claimant is disabled by following a now familiar five-step analysis." Hess v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. , 931 F.3d 198, 200–01 (3d Cir. 2019). The "burden of proof is on the claimant at all steps except step five, where the burden is on the Commissioner of Social Security." Hess , 931 F.3d at 201 ; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a)(1). Thus, if the claimant establishes an inability to do past relevant work at step four, the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five to show that jobs exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant could perform consistent with his or her residual functional capacity, age, education, and past work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a)(1).

B. JUDICIAL REVIEW

The Court's review of a determination denying an application for benefits is limited "to considering whether the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence." Katz v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. , 798 Fed.Appx. 734, 736 (3d Cir. 2019). Substantial evidence "does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, but rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Pierce v. Underwood , 487 U.S. 552, 565, 108 S.Ct. 2541, 101 L.Ed.2d 490 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance of the evidence but more than a mere scintilla. Richardson v. Perales , 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971).

A single piece of evidence is not substantial if the ALJ ignores countervailing evidence or fails to resolve a conflict created by such evidence. Mason v. Shalala , 994 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir. 1993). In an adequately developed factual record, substantial evidence may be "something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent [the ALJ's decision] from being supported by substantial evidence." Consolo v. Fed. Maritime Comm'n , 383 U.S. 607, 620, 86 S.Ct. 1018, 16 L.Ed.2d 131 (1966). "In determining if the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence the court must scrutinize the record as a whole." Leslie v. Barnhart , 304 F. Supp. 2d 623, 627 (M.D. Pa. 2003).

The question before the Court, therefore, is not whether Allen is disabled, but whether the Commissioner's determination that Allen is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a correct application of the relevant law. See Arnold v. Colvin , No. 3:12-CV-02417, 2014 WL 940205, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2014) ("[I]t has been held that an ALJ's errors of law denote a lack of substantial evidence."); Burton v. Schweiker , 512 F. Supp. 913, 914 (W.D. Pa. 1981) ("The [Commissioner]’s determination as to the status of a claim requires the correct application of the law to the facts."); see also Wright v. Sullivan , 900 F.2d 675, 678 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that the scope of review on legal matters is plenary). "In determining if the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence the court must scrutinize the record as a whole." Leslie v. Barnhart , 304 F. Supp. 2d 623, 627 (M.D. Pa. 2003). If "the ALJ's findings of fact ... are supported by substantial evidence in the record," the Court is bound by those findings. Knepp v. Apfel , 204 F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 2000).

III. THE ALJ'S DECISION ³

In his written decision, the ALJ determined that "[Allen] has not been disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act at any time from the alleged onset date through the date of this decision." (Doc. 11-16, at 25). Further, the ALJ determined that Allen was capable of performing medium work with various limitations discussed infra. (Doc. 11-16, at 21). The ALJ reached this conclusion after proceeding through the five-step sequential analysis required by the Social Security Act. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).

A. STEP ONE

At step one of the five-step analysis, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant is engaging in substantial gainful activity ("SGA"). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If a claimant is engaging in SGA, the claimant is not disabled, regardless of age, education, or work experience. SGA is defined as work activity requiring significant physical or mental activity and resulting in pay or profit. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). In making this determination, the ALJ must consider only the earnings of the claimant. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1574.

Here, the ALJ determined that Allen had not engaged in SGA since March 1, 2002, the alleged onset date. (Doc. 11-16, at 15). The ALJ's analysis proceeded to step two.

B. STEP TWO

At step two, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has a medically determinable impairment, or combination of impairments, that is severe and meets the 12-month duration requirement. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If the ALJ determines that the claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that significantly limits his or her "physical or mental ability to do basic work activities," the ALJ will find that the claimant does not have a severe impairment and is therefore not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). If a claimant establishes a severe impairment or combination of impairments, the ALJ analysis continues to the third step.

Here, the ALJ concluded that Allen had the following severe impairments: polysubstance abuse, post-traumatic stress disorder , cervical spondylosis, and acromioclavicular joint hypertrophy. (Doc. 11-16, at 15).

C. STEP THREE

At step three, the ALJ must determine whether the severe impairment or combination of impairments meets or equals the medical equivalent of an impairment listed in the version of 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 that was in effect on the date of the ALJ's decision. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). The sections in this appendix are commonly referred to as "listings." If the ALJ determines that the claimant's impairments meet these listings, then the claimant is considered disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d).

After considering listings 1.02, 1.04, and 12.15, the ALJ determined that Allen's impairments did not meet or equal the severity of a listed...