Allen v. Peoria Park Dist., Corp.

2012 IL App (3d) 110197

968 N.E.2d 1199

360 Ill.Dec. 446

Frederick V. ALLEN and William T. Franklin, Plaintiffs–Appellees,

v.PEORIA PARK DISTRICT, a Municipal Corporation, Defendant–Appellant (Gregory R. James, Jr., Contemnor–Appellant).

No. 3–11–0197.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District.

April 24, 2012.

Gregory R. James, Devlin J. Schoop, Laner, Muchin, Dombrow, Becker, Levin & Tominberg, Chicago, Edward F. Dutton (argued), Park District Risk Management Agency, Lisle, for appellants.

William Gregory (argued), Koth & Gregory, Bloomington, for appellees.

OPINION

Presiding Justice SCHMIDT delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

[360 Ill.Dec. 447]¶ 1 Plaintiffs-appellees, Frederick B. Allen and William T. Franklin, were seasonal employees of defendant-appellant Peoria Park District. They filed suit against defendant, alleging breach of contract and personal injury in connection with the termination of their employment. The trial court granted plaintiffs' combined motions under sections 2–615 and 2–619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2–615, 2–619 (West 2010)), dismissing all counts with leave to amend within 90 days. Plaintiffs alleged that their terminations may have somehow been illegal, but they had no facts to support this suspicion. They could not file an amended complaint without discovery first. Over defendant's objection, the trial court ordered that discovery could proceed. Plaintiffs failed to file an amended complaint but did seek discovery from defendant. Defendant sought a protective order, arguing that it was improper to allow discovery while no complaint was before the court. The trial court denied the protective order and at lead counsel, appellant-contemnor Gregory R. James Jr.'s request, held him in civil contempt so that he could immediately appeal the discovery issue. Defendant and contemnor appeal the trial court's order allowing discovery and the finding of contempt.

¶ 2 FACTS

¶ 3 Plaintiffs, seasonal employees, filed suit against the Peoria Park District. They made two claims: breach of contract and personal injury. Plaintiffs' complaint included the following allegations. In December of 2008, as had happened in previous years, plaintiffs received a seasonal layoff. Defendant indicated to them that they would be rehired. Early in April of 2009, plaintiffs contacted defendant about when they would begin work again. Defendant told them that they were terminated. Defendant told Allen that he was terminated for improper use of park district equipment, which occurred on June 10, 2008. Franklin was told that his termination was due to budget constraints and the incident which occurred on June 10, 2008. On April 21, 2009, defendant informed the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund that plaintiffs had resigned.

¶ 4 Plaintiffs alleged that the incident from June 10 was resolved on June 11, without termination. They further claim that between the date of their layoff and April of 2009, they could not have violated any of defendant's policies contained in the employee manual, as they were not working for defendant during that time. Therefore, they claim that their termination by defendant was contrary to defendant's policies as outlined in the employee manual. Plaintiffs' complaint also stated that their termination may have been illegal for other unknown reasons, but admitted that they did not have proof of any such illegality. They hoped to obtain proof during discovery.

¶ 5 Defendant filed a motion to dismiss both counts. Defendant argued that the complaint should be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to section 2–615 as the employee manual stated they were at-will employees with no contractual right to employment; therefore, they failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The employee manual states in relevant part:

“You are employed with the Peoria Park District on an at-will basis, and nothing contained in this policy manual is intended to provide or guarantee you with employment for any specific period of time. As an at-will employee of the Park District you are free to terminate your employment at any time, with or without cause or notice, and the Park District retains the same right. None of the policies or procedures contained in this policy manual are intended by reason of their publication to confer any right or privileges upon you, or to entitle you to remain employed by the District.

This at-will employment relationship can only be modified by a written contract signed by the employee and approved by the Board of Trustees.

* * *

THIS PERSONNEL POLICY MANUAL IS NOT AN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT. NOTHING CONTAINED IN THIS MANUAL OR ANY WRITTEN OR ORAL STATEMENT CONTRADICTING, MODIFYING, INTERPRETING, EXPLAINING OR CLARIFYING ANY PROVISION OF THE MANUAL IS INTENDED TO CREATE OR SHALL CREATE ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS THAT ARE BINDING UPON EITHER THE PARK DISTRICT OR YOU. * * * THIS AT–WILL EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP CAN ONLY BE MODIFIED BY A WRITTEN CONTRACT * * *.”

¶ 6 Defendant also argued that the complaint should be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to section 2–619 as the claims were barred by the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/1–101 to 10–101 (West 2010)); the complaint was filed more than one year after plaintiffs were terminated. The trial court granted defendant's motion on July 13, 2010. The trial court's order dismissed both counts, granted plaintiffs 90 days to file an amended complaint, and stated the parties were allowed to proceed with discovery. The order did not state the grounds upon which the court granted the motion.

¶ 7 Plaintiffs have never filed an amended complaint. On August 23, plaintiffs served interrogatories and a request to produce on defendant. On August 27, defendant filed a motion for a protective order, arguing that plaintiffs had no right to discovery since no complaint was on file with the court. The trial court denied the protective order. Defendant's lead counsel then requested the trial court hold him in contempt so that he could appeal the order of discovery. The trial court held lead counsel in civil contempt and fined him $25. This appeal followed.

¶ 8 ANALYSIS

¶ 9 A court order that does not dispose of an entire proceeding, which finds a person in contempt of court and imposes a monetary fine, is appealable without the need for the trial court to make a special finding. Ill. S.Ct. R. 304(b)(5) (eff. Feb. 26, 2010). “Review of the contempt finding necessarily requires review of the order upon which it is based.” Norskog v. Pfiel, 197 Ill.2d 60, 69, 257 Ill.Dec. 899, 755 N.E.2d 1 (2001). A discovery order is generally “reviewed for a manifest abuse of discretion.” Id. at 70, 257 Ill.Dec. 899, 755 N.E.2d 1. But where the question to be decided is one of law, our review is de novo. Id. at 71, 257 Ill.Dec. 899, 755 N.E.2d 1. The question we must decide in this appeal is whether a trial court can order discovery when there is no complaint on file. This is a question of law, which we review de novo.

¶ 10 Plaintiffs rely on Illinois Supreme Court Rule 201(d), which says that prior to the point that “all defendants have appeared or are required to appear,” no discovery shall be initiated without leave of the court. Ill. S.Ct. R. 201(d) (eff. July 1, 2002). They argue that since they initiated discovery after the point at which defendant had appeared, it was proper. While Rule 201(d) states that discovery cannot be initiated without leave of the court prior to the appearance, or time for appearance, of all defendants, that does not mean that there cannot be other limitations to the initiation of discovery. For example, Supreme Court Rule 201(b)(1) states, “[e]xcept as provided in these rules, a party may obtain by discovery full disclosure regarding any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action.” Ill. S.Ct. R. 201(b)(1) (eff. July 1, 2002). Our supreme court has stated that “Rule 201(b)(1) is founded on the basic premise that the objective of discovery is the ‘expeditious and final determination of controversies in accordance with the substantive rights of the parties.’ [Citation.] Thus, discovery should only be utilized to ‘illuminate the actual issues in the case.’ [Citation.]” (Emphasis added.) Owen v. Mann, 105 Ill.2d 525, 530, 86 Ill.Dec. 507, 475 N.E.2d 886 (1985). The Owen court recognized that with no complaint on file, the trial court could not determine whether the discovery request was “relevant to any issue in the case.” Id. It held that it is improper for the trial court to order discovery with no complaint on file. Id.

¶ 11 Plaintiffs seek to avoid the holding in Owen by citing to appellate court cases that held that in the circumstances of those cases, it was improper to dismiss the complaint for a failure to plead sufficient facts. Those cases are simply not on point. The only issues before this court are the finding of contempt and, as required to address the contempt finding, the propriety of the discovery order. Whether or not the trial court properly dismissed the original complaint is not before us, but plaintiffs admitted in the trial court and in this court that they could not file an amended complaint, as they had no facts to support a cause of action.

¶ 12 We recognize that there are limited circumstances where discovery is allowed prior to the filing of a complaint. Rule 224 allows someone who has been injured, but needs to identify who may be liable for damages, to file an independent action seeking a court order allowing limited discovery. Beale v. EdgeMark Financial Corp., 279 Ill.App.3d 242, 215 Ill.Dec. 905, 664 N.E.2d 302 (1996). Plaintiffs took no such action in this case, nor could they. Plaintiffs in this case seek discovery to determine whether a wrong occurred, not who committed a known wrong.

¶ 13 Without citation to authority, plaintiffs argue that defendant's request for a...