Alungbe v. Board of Trustees of Conn. State Univ.

283 F.Supp.2d 674

Dr. Gabriel D. ALUNGBE, Plaintiff, v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF CONNECTICUT STATE UNIVERSITY (CSU) SYSTEM, Dr. William J. Ciges, Jr., Central Connecticut State University, Dr. Richard L. Judd, Dr. Pearl W. Bartelt, Dr. Zdzislaw B. Kremens, Dr. Merle W. Harris, Dr. John W. Shumaker, Dr. George R. Muirhead, Dr. Karen C. Beyard, Dr. John R. Wrigt, Dr. Andrew W. Baron, Mr. Lennard F. Lema, Mr. Daryll C. Dowty, Defendants.

No. 3:01 CV 0503(GLG).

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

September 4, 2003.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Joseph A. Moniz, Moniz, Cooper & McCann, Hartford, CT, for plaintiff.

Sharon A. Scully, Joseph A. Jordano, Attorney General's Office Employment Rights Hartford, CT, for defendants.

OPINION

GOETTEL, District Judge.

The plaintiff, Dr. Gabriel D. Alungbe, has filed this action against the defendant Board of Trustees of Connecticut State University System ("the Board"), Central Connecticut State University ("Central"), and numerous administrators of the University. In Counts One through Three, he alleges that the Board and Central violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and Connecticut's Fair Employment Practices Act, Conn. Gen.Stat. § 46a-58 and § 46a-60 et seq., ("CFEPA"), by failing to promote him due to his race (non Anglo-Saxon) and national origin (Nigerian) and in retaliation for his previous complaints of racial discrimination. In Counts Four through Six, he alleges that various University officials¹ violated CFEPA by harassing, humiliating, and failing to promote him, and that they negligently and intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon him. As relief, he seeks compensatory damages, punitive damages, a retroactive promotion to associate professor and salary adjustment, a promotion to full professor, an injunction prohibiting the defendants from harassing and intimidating him on the basis of his race and/or national origin and from retaliating against him, and costs and attorney's fees.

Pursuant to Rule 56, Fed.R.Civ.P., the defendants have moved for summary judgment [Doc. No. 24] on all counts. The defendants' motion for summary judgment will be granted as to all counts except Count One, for which it will be granted in part and denied in part.

BACKGROUND

The plaintiff, Dr. Gabriel B. Alungbe, began working at Central as an Assistant Professor in the Department of Engineering Technology in January 1991. On December 16, 1996, he was granted tenure, and in August 1997, he was appointed Chairperson of the Department of Engineering Technology.

The plaintiff alleges that in 1991, several of the individual defendants misrepresented his qualifications to an accreditation evaluation team, in an effort to embarrass and humiliate him. Further misrepresentations about the number of publications by the plaintiff occurred in 1995. The plaintiff claims that defendant Wright refused to fund international travel requests of the plaintiff in 1994, despite the fact that travel requests of white Anglo-Saxon faculty members were funded. The plaintiff also complains that some of the individual defendants scheduled him to teach courses outside of his area of expertise, that he was assigned more new courses to teach than any Anglo-Saxon white faculty member in the School of Technology,² and that he was assigned to teach every week-day during the 1995 spring semester, thus limiting his ability to perform research.

Commencing in April 23, 1996, the plaintiff began complaining to the Affirmative Action Director at Central about the racial discrimination to which he had allegedly been subjected by defendant Wright, the Dean of the School of Technology at Central. After one of his summer classes with an enrollment of only five students was canceled, in August of 1996, he filed an informal complaint of discrimination with the Affirmative Action Office and with the Ombudsman's Office at Central against defendant Wright. From 1995 to 1997, defendant Wright did not recommend the plaintiff for promotion.³ In June 1997, the plaintiff was notified by letter of the results of the investigation of his complaints of discrimination: namely, a finding of no discrimination. The letter further advised the plaintiff that to address the "perception" that a discriminatory climate exists in the School of Technology, Central had hired a diversity consultant to investigate this situation. The consultant issued a 17-page "Diversity Climate Audit Report" addressing numerous areas needing improvement.

In July 1997, the plaintiff filed with Central another formal complaint of racial discrimination by defendant Wright. In February 1998, he was again advised of a finding of no discrimination.

Additionally, since the 1995-96 academic year, the plaintiff has applied for promotion from Assistant Professor to Associate Professor on six occasions.⁴ Each time his application has been denied.

At Central, the promotion process is governed by the collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") between the Connecticut State University Association of University Professors ("AAUP") and the Board. Five criteria are considered in the evaluation process: (i) load credit activity; (ii) creative activity; (iii) productive service to the department or university; (iv) professional activity; and (v) years in rank. The process begins during the fall of the academic year during which a professor is seeking a promotion.⁵ Between November and March, the Department Evaluation Committee ("DEC"), the dean of the applicant's school, and the university-wide Promotion and Tenure Committee ("P & T") independently review the professor's application for promotion and independently make recommendations to the university president. The president then makes a recommendation to the Board by April 15th. The Board announces its promotion actions by May 15th.

During the 1999-2000 school year, the plaintiff received recommendations for promotion to Associate Professor from his DEC, Dean, and P & T, but Central President Judd did not recommend that the plaintiff be promoted. In response, the plaintiff made an oral affirmative action complaint to the Director of Affirmative Action at Central alleging that President Judd had discriminated against him by denying his request for a promotion. On June 5, 2000, the Board approved defendant Judd's decision not to promote the plaintiff.

During the 2000-01 school year, the DEC recommended the plaintiff for promotion, but neither Dean Kremens nor President Judd recommended the plaintiff for promotion. The plaintiff was not promoted.

On August 1, 2000, the plaintiff dual-filed a complaint of discrimination with the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities ("CCHRO") and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) against the Board, Central, President Judd, and Dean Wright.⁶ The plaintiff alleges that on or about December 14, 2000, defendant Kremens retaliated against him by again not recommending him for promotion. That same day, the CCHRO dismissed the plaintiff's complaint, and on January 5, 2001, it released its jurisdiction of the plaintiff's complaint to the EEOC. The EEOC adopted the CCHRO's findings on July 31, 2001, dismissing the EEOC complaint and issuing a notice of a right to sue.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard for granting a motion for summary judgment is well-established. A moving party is entitled to summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The burden of establishing that there is no genuine factual dispute rests with the moving party. See Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd. P'ship, 22 F.3d 1219, 1223 (2d Cir. 1994). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff as the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

At the same time, when a motion is made and supported as provided in Rule 56, Fed.R.Civ.P., the non-moving party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of the moving party's pleadings, but instead must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). In other words, the non-moving party must offer such proof as would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict in its favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir.2000). This Court's "function at this stage is to identify issues to be tried, not decide them." Graham, 230 F.3d at 38.

In the context of employment discrimination cases where intent and state of mind are at issue, the Second Circuit has cautioned that summary judgment should be granted sparingly, because careful scrutiny of the factual allegations may reveal circumstantial evidence to support the required inference of discrimination. Id. (internal citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

I. Federal Claims—Title VII

The plaintiff alleges that the Board and Central violated Title VII by failing to promote him because of his race and national origin (Count One) and by retaliating against him for bringing previous complaints of racial discrimination (Count Two).

A. Statute of Limitations

Title VII requires that, before bringing suit under the statute, a plaintiff must first file a complaint with the EEOC or with a state equal employment agency within 180 or 300 days, respectively, of the alleged discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); Quinn v. Green Tree Credit Corp., 159 F.3d 759, 765 (2d Cir. 1998). This requirement functions as a statute of limitations, barring any discriminatory incidents not timely brought before the EEOC or state agency. Quinn,...