Anderson v. England

359 F.Supp.2d 213

Peter ANDERSON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Gordon R. ENGLAND, Secretary of the Navy, Defendant.

No. 3:03CV116(MRK).

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

March 9, 2005.

Jonathan L. Gould, Hartford, CT, Stephen G. Denigris, Law Offices of Stephen G. Denigris, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.

Lisa E. Perkins, U.S. Attorney's Office, Hartford, CT, for Defendant.

RULING

KRAVITZ, District Judge.

This case arises out of alleged gender-based harassment instigated by a female employee of the United States Navy, Lieutenant Pamela Coleman, against her male co-workers and subordinates, Plaintiffs Peter A. Anderson, Philip Kujawski, and Christopher R. Wells. Plaintiffs claim that Lieutenant Coleman's words and actions created a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., which should be imputed to the Defendant, Gordon R. England, the Secretary of the Navy.¹ Currently pending before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [doc. # 31]. For the reasons stated below, the Court DENIES Defendant's motion with respect to Officer Kujawski and Sergeant Wells, and GRANTS Defendant's motion with respect to Captain Anderson.

I.

Summary judgment is appropriate only when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(b). A genuine issue of fact exists when "a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party, and facts are material to the outcome if the substantive law renders them so." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If the moving party carries its burden, the party opposing summary judgment "may not rest upon mere allegations or denials," rather the opposing party must "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). The Court must draw all ambiguities and inferences in favor of the plaintiffs. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. However, to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). "If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

II.

The basic facts of this case are not in serious dispute. The Defendant, Gordon R. England, is the Secretary of the Navy. The Navy maintains a military and civilian police force (the "Security Department") at the Naval Submarine Base New London (the "Submarine Base"), in Groton Connecticut. Def.'s Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement [doc. # 33], at ¶ 1. Plaintiffs claim that the source of the alleged gender-based harassment in this case was a female supervisory police officer in the Security Department, Lieutenant Pamela Coleman. See Compl. [doc. # 1], at ¶¶ 18-19. At all relevant times, Lieutenant Coleman and Captain Anderson were employed by the Navy as supervisory police officers in the Security Department at the Submarine Base. Def.'s Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement [doc. # 33], at ¶¶ 7, 10. Sergeant Wells and Officer Kujawski were employed by the Navy as subordinate officers in the Security Department at the Submarine Base. Id. at ¶¶ 24, 31. Lieutenant Coleman supervised Sergeant Wells for approximately three months, though the exact time period is disputed. Compare id. at ¶ 25 (estimating that Sergeant Wells worked on Lieutenant Coleman's shift for less than three months); with Pls.' Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement [doc. # 37], at ¶ 25 (estimating that Sergeant Wells worked on Lieutenant Coleman's shift for three to six months). Lieutenant Coleman did not directly supervise either Captain Anderson or Officer Kujawski. Plaintiffs present evidence of alleged gender-based statements and harassment initiated by Lieutenant Coleman on the grounds and in various buildings of the Submarine Base, including an area known as the "smoking tree" — a designated area for employees to smoke. See, e.g., id. at ¶¶ 5, 15, 17, 33, 34; see also Def.'s Mem. in Support of Mot. for Summ. J. [doc. # 32], at 4.

III.

To prevail on a gender-based hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must establish two elements:

"(1) that the workplace was permeated with discriminatory intimidation that was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [his or] her work environment, and (2) that a specific basis exists for imputing the conduct that created the hostile environment to the employer."

Mack v. Otis Elevator Co., 326 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir.2003) (quoted in Petrosino v. Bell Atlantic, 385 F.3d 210, 221 (2d Cir.2004)). The Court will address each element in turn.

A.

The first element of a hostile work environment claim "has both an objective and subjective component: `the misconduct must be severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment, and the victim must also subjectively perceive that environment to be abusive.'" Petrosino, 385 F.3d at 214 (quoting Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 148 (2d Cir.2003)).

Drawing all ambiguities and inferences in favor of the Plaintiffs, as the Court must on a motion for summary judgment, the Court concludes that all three Plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence to allow a trier of fact to conclude that they subjectively perceived their work environment in the Security Department as hostile. Specifically, Plaintiffs assert that the alleged gender-based harassment and discrimination they claim to have been subjected to made it difficult for them to work in the Security Department, made them feel humiliated, made them feel that their job security was threatened and that they should seek job relocation, and made them seek medical attention for various stress related illnesses arising from the harassment. See Pls.' Opp'n to Mot. for Summ. J. [doc. # 36], at 4; Compl. [doc. # 1] at ¶¶ 31-37. "Determinations as to the weight to accord evidence or credibility assessments of witnesses are improper on a motion for summary judgment as such are within the sole province of the jury." Easterling v. Connecticut, 356 F.Supp.2d 103, 104 (D.Conn. 2005) (citing Hayes v. N.Y. City Dep't of Corr., 84 F.3d 614, 619 (2d Cir.1996)). At this stage of the proceeding, therefore, Officer Kujawski, Sergeant Wells, and Captain Anderson have provided sufficient evidence to satisfy the subjective prong of the hostile work environment test.

As for the objective prong of the first element of a hostile work environment claim, the Second Circuit has instructed district courts as follows:

The matter of whether the conduct alleged was so "severe or pervasive" as to create "an objectively hostile or abusive work environment," is to be decided based on the totality of the circumstances, in light of such factors as the "frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance."

Patterson v. County of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 227 (2d Cir.2004) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 & 23, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993)). The Second Circuit has also repeatedly cautioned district courts about setting the bar too high. As that court recently commented:

While the standard for establishing a hostile work environment is high, we have repeatedly cautioned against setting the bar too high, noting that "[w]hile a mild, isolated incident does not make a work environment hostile, the test is whether the harassment is of such quality or quantity that a reasonable employee would find the conditions of her employment altered for the worse."

Terry, 336 F.3d at 148 (alteration and emphasis in the original) (quoting Whidbee v. Garzarelli Food Specialties, Inc., 223 F.3d 62, 70 (2d Cir.2000)) (quoted in Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 150 (2d Cir.2004)).

Here, there is substantial evidence that the work environment of the Security Department at the Submarine Base was a generally hostile one, largely due to the words and actions of Lieutenant Coleman. In fact, the Navy's own investigation of an official complaint brought against Lieutenant Coleman found that she had "created a hostile work environment which affects all who must work around her" due to the fact she "is always cussing, using the `F-word'.... [and] uses inappropriate language and behavior on the job and creates stress for other employees." See Pls.' Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement [doc. # 37], Exhibit G, Commander Navy Region Northeast — Office of the Inspector General, Command Inquiry Completion Report on Hotline Complaint Number HL-00-103, at 2-3. All parties agree that Lieutenant Coleman was the subject of frequent complaints made by both male and female co-workers about her abrasive personality and use of profanity and vulgarity in the workplace. Def.'s Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement [doc. # 33], at ¶ 9.

However, a hostile work environment, alone, is not enough to satisfy the first element of a hostile work environment claim. Plaintiffs must also show that Lieutenant Coleman subjected them to the hostile work environment because of their gender. The reason for this is that Title VII only prohibits "discriminat[ion]... because of ... sex." Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79-80, 118 S.Ct. 998, 140 L.Ed.2d 201 (1998) (emphasis in original). Miserable working...