Anderson v. Hansen

47 F.4th 711

Katherine ANDERSON; Jason Anderson, Plaintiffs - Appellees

v.Jeffrey HANSEN, Defendant - Appellant

No. 21-2719

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: April 12, 2022

Filed: August 30, 2022

Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the appellant was Elizabeth C. Carver, of Saint Louis, MO. The following attorneys also appeared on the appellant brief; Douglas P. Dowd, of Saint Louis, MO., Clayton L. Dowd, of Saint Louis, MO., James F. Bennett, of Saint Louis, MO., Arsenio L. Mims, of Saint Louis, MO.

Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the appellee was Justin M. Plaskov, of Denver, CO. The following attorneys also appeared on the appellee brief; Amy Collignon Gunn, of Saint Louis, MO., Denison R. Goodrich-Schlenker, of Denver, CO.

Before SMITH, Chief Judge, WOLLMAN and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.

SMITH, Chief Judge.

Katherine and Jason Anderson, independent contractors of American Family Life Insurance Company of Columbus (Aflac), alleged that Jeffrey Hansen, an Aflac employee, sexually assaulted Katherine in her hotel room during a work conference in St. Louis, Missouri. The Andersons filed suit against Hansen, asserting tort claims for battery, assault, false imprisonment, and loss of consortium, among others. Hansen moved to compel arbitration of the claims, claiming that he is a third-party beneficiary under the Andersons’ Arbitration Agreements with Aflac. The district court¹ denied the motion as to the aforementioned claims, holding that they did not arise under or relate in any way to the arbitration agreements. Hansen appeals, arguing that the claims fall within the scope of the arbitration agreements. We affirm.

I. Background²

Katherine and Jason Anderson were independent contractors for Aflac in Colorado. Katherine attended an Aflac work conference on August 29–30, 2018, in St. Louis, Missouri. Hansen, a W-2 Business Development Manager for Aflac in Minnesota, also attended the conference. According to the Andersons, Katherine attended the first portion of the conference on August 29. After the attendees were dismissed for the evening, Katherine joined other attendees for dinner, followed by drinks at a bar where Hansen purchased Katherine a drink. After an evening of drinking, Katherine returned to her hotel room. After midnight on August 30, Hansen forcibly entered Katherine's hotel room and raped her.

Based on the incident, the Andersons’ counsel sent Aflac a demand letter setting forth "claims against A[flac] for negligent hiring, retention, and supervision, and for Title VII violations." Appellant's Add. at 27. While "the exact allegations against Aflac are not part of the record in this case," Aflac ultimately settled with the Andersons. Anderson v. Hansen , 550 F. Supp. 3d 725, 727 (E.D. Mo. 2021).

After settling with Aflac, the Andersons filed suit against Hansen. Relevant to the present appeal, the Andersons raised tort claims for battery, assault, false imprisonment, and loss of consortium.³ In response, Hansen moved to compel arbitration based on Arbitration Agreements contained in the Andersons’ Associate's Agreements. The Andersons’ Arbitration Agreements provided:

[T]he parties agree that any dispute arising under or related in any way to this Agreement ("Dispute"), to the maximum extent allowed under the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), shall be subject to mandatory and binding arbitration, including any Dispute arising under federal, state or local laws, statutes or ordinances ... or arising under federal or state common law .... It is further agreed that, in any Dispute between the parties, all past and present officers, stockholders, employees, associates, coordinators, agents and brokers of Aflac, who are alleged to be liable or may be liable in any manner to either party based upon the same allegations made against a party to this Agreement, are intended to be third-party beneficiaries of this Arbitration Agreement with full rights to enforce it. Associate also understands and agrees that, regardless of whether Aflac is a party, this Arbitration Agreement shall be applicable to any dispute between Associate and any past and present officers, stockholders, employees, associates, coordinators, agents and brokers of Aflac.

R. Doc. 47-4, at 19–20, 43–44.

In his motion to compel, Hansen argued that he is a third-party beneficiary under the Arbitration Agreements and, therefore, the entire action must be submitted to arbitration. The Andersons responded that Hansen had waived any right he may have to arbitration and, in the alternative, their claims fell outside the scope of the Arbitration Agreements.

Relevant to the present appeal, the district court rejected the Andersons’ argument that Hansen had waived his right to arbitration. But the court also denied Hansen's motion to compel arbitration of the Andersons’ tort claims for battery, assault, false imprisonment, and loss of consortium. The court held that those claims "are not claims ‘arising under or related in any way to’ the Associate's Agreements." Anderson , 550 F. Supp. 3d at 731. Instead, the court reasoned, the "claims [were] for an alleged sexual assault and ‘rest on independent ... grounds, which have no relation to the terms of the Agreement and in no way depend on its existence.’ " Id. at 732 (second alteration in original) (quoting Zetor N. Am., Inc. v. Rozeboom , 861 F.3d 807, 811 (8th Cir. 2017) ). The court explained that the Andersons’ allegations that Hansen "drugged Katherine Anderson at a bar and proceeded to forcibly rape her in a hotel room. ... are not in any way related to Katherine Anderson's role as a Regional Sales Coordinator for Aflac." Id. The court determined with " ‘positive assurance’ that there is no reasonable interpretation of the Arbitration Agreements pursuant to which the aforementioned claims could be subject to arbitration." Id. (quoting Parm v. Bluestem Brands, Inc. , 898 F.3d 869, 873–74 (8th Cir. 2018) ).

II. Discussion

On appeal, Hansen argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to compel arbitration on the Andersons’ tort claims for battery, assault, false imprisonment, and loss of consortium because those claims are related to the Andersons’ Associate's Agreements with Aflac. Specifically, Hansen argues that the claims "touch matters covered by the arbitration provision" and therefore are subject to arbitration. Appellant's Br. at 9 (quoting Parm , 898 F.3d at 874 ).

The Federal Arbitration Act vests us with jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal. See 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(B) ("An appeal may be taken from ... an order ... denying a petition under section 4 of this title to order arbitration to proceed ....").

We review de novo the district court's denial of a motion to compel arbitration based on contract interpretation. If the district court's order concerning arbitrability is based on factual findings, we review such findings for clear error. Arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit. The Federal Arbitration Act limits a district court's initial role in any challenge to an arbitration agreement to 1) whether the agreement for arbitration was validly made and 2) whether the arbitration agreement applies to the dispute at hand, i.e., whether the dispute falls within the scope of the arbitration agreement.

Unison Co. v. Juhl Energy Dev., Inc. , 789 F.3d 816, 818 (8th Cir. 2015) (cleaned up).

Here, neither party disputes the validity of the Arbitration Agreements; instead, they disagree about whether the Arbitration Agreements apply to the Andersons’ claims.

We must liberally construe a valid arbitration clause, resolving any doubts in favor of arbitration unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. In making this determination, we must decide whether the arbitration clause is broad or narrow. If the clause is broad, the liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements requires that a district court send a claim to arbitration as long as the underlying factual allegations simply touch matters covered by the arbitration provision.

Id. (cleaned up).

The Arbitration Agreements provide that

any dispute arising under or related in any way to this Agreement ("Dispute"), to the maximum extent allowed under the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), shall be subject to mandatory and binding arbitration, including any Dispute arising under federal, state or local laws, statutes or ordinances ... or arising under federal or state common law ....

R. Doc. 47-4, at 19–20, 43–44 (emphasis added).

"The Andersons do not dispute that the arbitration clause at issue is broad." Appellees’ Br. at 7. "Because the arbitration clause is broad, we must ... determine whether the underlying factual allegations touch on matters covered by the arbitration clause." Unison Co. , 789 F.3d at 819. The factual allegations underlying the Andersons’ claims for battery, assault, false imprisonment, and loss of consortium pertain to Hansen's alleged sexual assault of Katherine.

As the district court correctly observed, we have not previously "addressed whether tort claims for sexual assault arise out of or are related to an employment contract." Anderson , 550 F. Supp. 3d at 731. But our sister circuits have considered "arbitration provision[s] and factual allegations similar to those in the present case." Doe v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd. , 657 F.3d 1204, 1215 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Jones v. Halliburton Co. , 583 F.3d 228 (5th Cir. 2009) ).

For example, in Doe , the Eleventh Circuit held that an arbitration provision limited to claims "relating to or in any way arising out of or connected with the Crew Agreement, these terms, or services performed for the Company" did not extend to tort claims based on allegations that a coworker sexually assaulted the plaintiff in a crewmember's cabin...