Ansonia Hous. Auth. v. Parks

211 Conn.App. 528

273 A.3d 245

ANSONIA HOUSING AUTHORITY

v.Daryl PARKS

AC 44894

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Considered January 5, 2022

Officially released April 5, 2022

J.L. Pottenger, Jr., with whom were Richard Tenenbaum, and Alexandra Gonzalez and Ann Sarnak, certified legal interns, in support of the motion.

Andrew Marchant-Shapiro, Hamden, in opposition to the motion.

Bright, C. J., and Elgo and Suarez, Js.

BRIGHT, C. J.

In this summary process action, the plaintiff, Ansonia Housing Authority, appeals from the judgment of dismissal and the denial of its motion to reargue the dismissal. The defendant, Daryl Parks, moves to dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that the plaintiff failed to timely appeal from the judgment of dismissal pursuant to General Statutes § 47a-35. The plaintiff opposes the motion on the grounds that (1) the five day appeal period set forth in § 47a-35 applies only to an appeal brought by a tenant and is not applicable to an appeal brought by a landlord, and (2) its motion to reargue created a new appeal period for the judgment of dismissal. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that § 47a-35 is applicable to landlords and tenants alike and that the plaintiff's motion to reargue does not save the appeal from dismissal because it was not timely filed.¹

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our review. The plaintiff leased the property located at 70 Woodlawn Avenue, Unit 65 in Ansonia (premises) to the defendant. The defendant occupied the premises and agreed to pay $350 per month for rent. On January 13, 2020, the plaintiff sent the defendant a pretermination notice for nonpayment of rent. The defendant did not respond to the pretermination notice. On February 7, 2020, the plaintiff served the defendant with a notice to quit possession for nonpayment of rent. The defendant did not quit possession. The plaintiff then served the defendant with a summary process summons and complaint on February 15, 2020, seeking immediate possession of the premises.

The defendant filed an answer to the complaint on February 19, 2020. On March 18, 2020, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the summary process action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that the pretermination notice was defective. The plaintiff objected to the motion to dismiss on April 16, 2020. On March 24, 2021, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the defective pretermination notice and dismissed the action.

On April 12, 2021, nineteen days after the court rendered the judgment of dismissal, the plaintiff filed a motion to reargue, which the court denied on August 10, 2021. The plaintiff filed this appeal on August 13, 2021, challenging the court's judgment of dismissal and its denial of the motion to reargue. The defendant moved to dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on timeliness grounds on November 12, 2021,² and the plaintiff objected.

We begin by setting forth the relevant legal principles that apply to summary process proceedings. "Summary process is a special statutory procedure designed to provide an expeditious remedy. ... It enable[s] landlords to obtain possession of leased premises without suffering the delay, loss and expense to which, under the common-law actions, they might be subjected by tenants wrongfully holding over their terms. ... Summary process statutes secure a prompt hearing and final determination. ... Therefore, the statutes relating to summary process must be narrowly construed and strictly followed." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Young v. Young , 249 Conn. 482, 487–88, 733 A.2d 835 (1999).

"Appeals in summary proceedings are governed by the statutes specifically relating thereto rather than statutes relating to appeals generally. ... Thus, parties must comply with the five day appeal period pursuant to § 47a-35, rather than with the general twenty day appeal period provided in Practice Book § 63-1 (a). The requirement that appeals in summary process actions comply with § 47a-35 is jurisdictional. ... Therefore, compliance with its mandate is a necessary prerequisite to an appellate court's subject matter jurisdiction." (Citations omitted; emphasis added; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 488–89, 733 A.2d 835 ; see also HUD/Barbour-Waverly v. Wilson , 235 Conn. 650, 657, 668 A.2d 1309 (1995).

I

We first address the plaintiff's claim that the five day appeal period set forth in § 47a-35 applies only to a defendant tenant, and not to a plaintiff landlord.

The plaintiff's claim raises a question of statutory interpretation. "When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. ... In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply. ... In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Jobe v. Commissioner of Correction, 334 Conn. 636, 648, 224 A.3d 147 (2020).

General Statutes § 47a-35 provides in relevant part:

"(a) Execution shall be stayed for five days from the date judgment has been rendered, provided any Sunday or legal holiday intervening shall be excluded in computing such five days.

"(b) No appeal shall be taken except within such five-day period. If an appeal is taken within such period, execution shall be stayed until the final determination of the cause, unless it appears to the judge who tried the case that the appeal was taken solely for the purpose of delay or unless the defendant fails to give bond, as provided in section 47a-35a. ..."

In addressing whether the statutory five day period constitutes a limit on this court's subject matter jurisdiction, our Supreme Court held that "[i]n light of the plain language of § 47a-35, the fact that the summary process statutes are in derogation of common law and the legislative policy in favor of the swift resolution of disputes between landlords and tenants regarding rights of possession, we conclude that an appeal pursuant to § 47a-35 must be brought within five days of the rendering of a summary process judgment." HUD/Barbour-Waverly v. Wilson , supra, 235 Conn. at 659, 668 A.2d 1309.

These same principles apply with equal force to the issue of whether the five day period applies only to appeals taken by a tenant and not to appeals taken by a landlord. The plain language of § 47a-35 (b) is clear and unambiguous: the words "[n ]o appeal shall be taken" include appeals by any party, including a landlord such as the plaintiff. (Emphasis added.) Furthermore, the legislative policy, in favor of the swift resolution of summary process actions, as reflected in the plain language of the statute, applies whether the appeal is brought by the landlord or the tenant. See Henry Knox Sherrill Corp. v. Randall , 33 Conn. Supp. 522, 523, 358 A.2d 159 (App. Sess. 1976) (rejecting argument that five day appeal period in summary process actions applies only to appeals taken by tenant). Accordingly, the plaintiff was subject to the five day appeal period of § 47a-35.³

II

Next, we address whether the plaintiff's filing of a motion to reargue in the trial court affects our analysis. We conclude that, because the motion to reargue was filed outside of the statutory five day appeal period, it does not.

The court rendered a judgment of dismissal in the underlying summary process action on March 24, 2021. Pursuant to § 47a-35, the plaintiff was required to appeal from the judgment of dismissal no later than March 30, 2021.⁴ Although the plaintiff did not file its appeal by March 30, 2021, it did file a motion to reargue in the trial court on April 12, 2021. The plaintiff contends that its motion to reargue gave rise to a new appeal period from the judgment. We are not persuaded.

Under Practice Book § 63-1 (c) (1),⁵ if a motion that would render the judgment ineffective is filed within the appeal period, a new appeal period begins when the court issues a ruling on the motion. A motion to reargue is one such motion. In Young v. Young , supra, 249 Conn. at 496, 733 A.2d 835, our Supreme Court held that a timely motion to reargue filed within the five day appeal period "tolled the five day appeal period in § 47a-35" until the motion to reargue was denied. In its analysis, the court specifically noted that the motion to reargue was filed within the five day appeal period. Id., at 490 n.17, 733 A.2d 835.

In the present case, however, the plaintiff filed its motion to reargue on April 12, 2021, nineteen days after the judgment of dismissal was rendered and thirteen days after the five day appeal period expired on March 30, 2021. Thus, unlike in Young , the plaintiff's motion to reargue was not filed within the appeal period and, therefore, the denial of that motion on August 10, 2021, did not give rise to a new appeal period from the judgment of dismissal. Accepting the plaintiff's argument that an untimely motion to reargue gives rise to a new appeal period from the underlying judgment would allow a party, through its own actions, to confer jurisdiction on this court when it otherwise would not exist pursuant to the statute. For that reason, even though the plaintiff filed this appeal within five days from the denial of the motion to reargue, allowing an appeal from the judgment of dismissal pursuant to the denial would circumvent the jurisdictional appeal period...