Anthony v. Parx Casino

190 A.3d 605

Curtis ANTHONY, Appellant

v.PARX CASINO, Parx Casino and Racing, Park Casino Design, Inc., Greenwood Gaming and Entertainment, Inc., Greenwood Racing, Inc., Philadelphia Park Casino, and Philadelphia Park Casino and Racetrack

No. 2904 EDA 2017

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted April 30, 2018

Filed June 12, 2018

Christopher R. Durso, Philadelphia, for appellant.

Andrew J. Kramer, Norristown, for appellee.

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., LAZARUS, J., and DUBOW, J.

OPINION BY LAZARUS, J.:

Curtis Anthony appeals from the trial court's order sustaining Appellees', Parx Casino, Parx Casino and Racing, Park Casino Design, Inc., Greenwood Gaming and Entertainment, Inc., Greenwood Racing, Inc., Philadelphia Park Casino, and Philadelphia Park Casino and Racetrack (collectively, Parx), preliminary objections and transferring venue of the underlying negligence action to Bucks County. After careful review, we affirm.

Parx, the largest casino gaming complex in Pennsylvania, is located at 2999 Street Road, Bensalem, Bucks County, Pennsylvania. Parx is owned and operated by Greenwood Gaming and Entertainment, Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary of Greenwood G & E Holding, Inc., which, in turn, is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Greenwood Racing, Inc. Greenwood Racing, Inc., is also the parent company of multiple subsidiaries, including City Turf Club Op Co., which operates as the Turf Club in Philadelphia County. Neither Greenwood Gaming and Entertainment, Inc., nor Greenwood Racing are involved in the operation of the Turf Clubs.

On June 14, 2017, Anthony filed a complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia against Parx alleging that in October 2015 he sustained serious injuries while visiting the casino when he "was caused to trip, slip, stumble and/or fall by reason of a broken and defective walkway and curb" that Parx negligently failed to maintain, inspect, and repair. Anthony Complaint, 6/4/17, at ¶¶ 14–19. On July 12 2017, Parx filed preliminary objections alleging improper venue pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1006(e) (improper venue raised by preliminary objection) and 2179 (venue for personal injury actions). After Anthony filed several responses to Parx's preliminary objections, the court entered an order sustaining Parx's objections and ordering that the litigation be transferred, at Anthony's cost, to the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County.

Anthony filed a timely notice of appeal and court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. He raises the following issues for our consideration:

(1) Under Pa.R.C.P. 2179(a)(2), can venue in a particular county be established over a parent corporation based upon the business activities of its subsidiary or sister corporation?

(2) Under Pa.R.C.P. 2179(a)(2), can venue in a particular county be established based upon a corporation's efforts, through financial investment and litigation, to open a casino in that county?

Appellant's Brief, at 3–4.

Our scope and standard of review in venue transfer cases is well-settled:

[A] trial court's decision to transfer venue will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. A [p]laintiff's choice of forum is to be given great weight, and the burden is on the party challenging the choice to show it was improper. However, a plaintiff's choice of venue is not absolute or unassailable. Indeed, if there exists any proper basis for the trial court's decision to grant a petition to transfer venue, the decision must stand.

Fritz v. Glen Mills Schools , 840 A.2d 1021, 1023 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation omitted).

Anthony alleges that the trial court erred in transferring venue of the case to Bucks County where venue properly lies in Philadelphia based upon Parx's sister corporations' business contacts.

Rule of Civil Procedure 2179 provides that an action against a corporation may be brought in and only in:

(1) the county where its registered office or principal place of business is located;

(2) a county where it regularly conducts business;

(3) the county where the cause of action arose;

(4) a county where the transaction or occurrence took place out of which the cause of action arose[.]

Pa.R.C.P. 2179(a).

In Wimble v. Parx Casino & Greenwood Gaming & Entm't, Inc. , 40 A.3d 174 (Pa. Super. 2012), the plaintiff presented our Court with the same issue regarding whether he could bring suit against Parx in Philadelphia County after sustaining injuries from tripping over a defective electrical cord at the casino. Similarly, the trial court granted Parx's preliminary objections and transferred venue of the case to Bucks County, the site of the accident and also where Greenwood Gaming's corporate activities solely take place. Id. at 178. On appeal, plaintiff made the same argument as Anthony does here to keep venue in Philadelphia, claiming that Greenwood Gaming conducts business in Philadelphia County through subsidiary corporations such as Keystone Turf Club, Inc. Id. at 177–78. In Wimble , we rejected the argument that sister corporations should be attributed to Greenwood Gaming for purposes of determining venue, id. at 178, concluding they are considered separate and distinct legal entities. Id. Accordingly, we reject the same argument proposed by Anthony as we are bound to follow Wimble as binding precedent. Simply put, a corporation is not subject to venue based solely upon the business activities of a sister corporation in the jurisdiction in question.¹

In his next issue, Anthony asserts that the court erred in transferring venue...