B.J. v. G6 Hosp.

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B.J., Plaintiff, v. G6 HOSPITALITY, LLC, et al., Defendants.

No. 22-cv-03765-MMC

United States District Court, N.D. California

May 19, 2023

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS; DENYING AS MOOT MOTION TO STRIKE; AFFORDING PLAINTIFF LEAVE TO AMEND CONTINUING CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

MAXINE M. CHESNEY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court are four motions, filed November 4, 2022: (1) Leisure Hotel Group LLC dba Clarion Inn's “Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint Under Rule 12(b)(6)” (see Dkt. No. 120 (“LMot.”)); (2) Hilton Domestic Operating Company Inc.'s “Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint Under Rule 12(b)(6),” in which G6 Hospitality LLC, Interstate Management Company, LLC, and VWI Concord LLC dba Hilton Concord have joined (see Dkt Nos. 123 (“HMot.”), 126 (“GJoin”) 131 (“IJoin”), 152 (“VJoin”)); (3) Marriott International, Inc. and Residence Inn by Marriott LLC's “Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint” (see Dkt. No. 124 (“MMot.”)); and (4) Choice Hotels International Inc.'s “Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, or in the Alternative, Motion to Strike” (see Dkt. No. 125 (“CMot.”)).^[1] Plaintiff B.J. has filed opposition to each motion (see Dkt. Nos. 132 (“LOpp.”), 134 (“HOpp.”),^[2] 155 (“VOpp.”), 135 (“MOpp.”), 133 (“COpp.”)), to which defendants have replied (see Dkt. Nos. 146 (“LRep.”), 144 (“HRep.”), 149 (“GJoinRep.”); 147 (“IJoinRep.”), 157 (“VJoinRep.”), 148 (“MRep.”), 145 (“CRep.”)). Having read and considered the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the motions, the Court rules as follows.^[3]

BACKGROUND^[4]

Between 2012 and 2016, plaintiff B.J. was “trafficked for commercial sex and suffered severe physical and emotional abuse under duress” at five California hotels: (1) Studio 6 Concord (“Studio 6”), (2) San Ramon Marriott, (3) Residence Inn Pleasant Hill - Concord (“Residence Inn Concord”), (4) Clarion Hotel Concord/Walnut Creek (“Clarion Hotel”), and (5) the Hilton Concord (collectively, “the hotels”). (See SAC ¶¶ 5, 7.) Studio 6 is operated by defendant Concord Inn and Suites LP (“Concord Inn”), a franchisee of defendant G6 Hospitality, LLC (“G6”). (See SAC ¶ 12.) The San Ramon Marriott is owned and operated by defendant Marriott International, Inc. (“Marriott”). (See SAC ¶ 14.) The Residence Inn Concord is operated by defendant Residence Inn by Marriott LLC (“Residence Inn”), a franchisee of Marriott. (See SAC ¶ 15.) The Clarion Hotel is operated by defendant Leisure Hotel Group LLC (“Leisure”), a franchisee of defendant Choice Hotels International, Inc. (“Choice”). (See SAC ¶ 17.) The Hilton Concord is operated by defendant VWI Concord LLC (“VWI”), a franchisee of defendant Hilton Domestic Operating Company, Inc. (“Hilton”), and is managed by defendant Interstate Hotels and Resorts, Inc. (“Interstate”). (See SAC ¶¶ 19, 20.)^[5]

“B.J. met her trafficker through Facebook[,]” (see SAC ¶ 39), and, the trafficker, “[u]nder the guise of seeking a romantic partnership,” promised B.J. “shelter, support, and a better life.” (See SAC ¶ 39.) In particular, after “learn[ing] [B.J.] had been trafficked as a minor and was in the process of being evicted from her home,” B.J.'s trafficker “preyed on her vulnerable position and coerced B.J. to meet him so he could help take care of her and her kids while they fought the eviction.” (See SAC ¶ 40.) “What followed were years of physical, sexual, and psychological abuse designed to control B.J. and prevent her escape from sexual servitude carried out at the hotels owned, operated, supervised, and/or branded by defendants.” (See SAC ¶ 40.) “B.J.'s trafficker imposed a strict and cruel ‘quota' system,” whereby “he forced B.J. to be sold to enough buyers that she earned his stated daily minimum which varied from day to day.” (See SAC ¶ 41.) If B.J. failed to meet the daily quota, “it rolled over to the next day,” and she “was not allowed to leave the hotel rooms in which she was trafficked for any reason, including to see and look after her children and feed herself[.]” (See SAC ¶ 41.)

B.J. alleges defendants “ignore[d] the open and obvious signs and presence of commercial sex trafficking on their properties and in the hotels[,]” including signs of B.J.'s trafficking (see SAC ¶ 3), took no action to ensure B.J.'s safety (see SAC ¶¶ 51,60, 62, 67, 70, 72, 78, 82, 86, 88, 90), and instead “profited from the sex trafficking of B.J. and knowingly or negligently aided and engaged with her trafficker in his sex trafficking venture” by “renting rooms to B.J.'s traffickers”^[6] that defendants “kn[ew], or should have known, that [the traffickers] were using . . . to harbor sex trafficking victims, physically assault them, and subject them to repeated exploitation as they [were] forced into sexual servitude” (see SAC ¶¶ 338-39).

Based on the above allegations, B.J. asserts as against each defendant causes of action under, respectively, the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (“TVPRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 1595, and the California Trafficking Victims Protection Act (“CVPTA”), Cal. Civ. Code § 52.5.

LEGAL STANDARD

Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory." See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). Rule 8(a)(2), however, "requires only 'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). Consequently, "a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations." See id. Nonetheless, "a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than . . . a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." See id. (internal quotation, citation, and alteration omitted).

In analyzing a motion to dismiss, a district court must accept as true all material allegations in the complaint and construe them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See NL Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986). "To survive a motion to dismiss," however, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual material, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level," Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, and courts "are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation," see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation and citation omitted).

DISCUSSION

By the instant motions, defendants seek an order dismissing the above-titled action in its entirety, on the asserted ground that B.J. has not stated a claim for relief against them under either the TVPRA or the CVPTA.

A. CVTPA

At the outset, plaintiff, in each of her oppositions to the instant motions, “concedes” the CVTPA claim should be dismissed as against all moving and joining defendants. (See LOpp. at 1 n.1, HOpp. at 1 n.2, VOpp. at 1 n.2, MOpp. at 1 n.1, COpp. at 1 n.1.) Accordingly, the Court turns to the question of whether B.J. has stated a claim under the TVPRA.

B. TVPRA

The Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act “creat[es] criminal offenses for forced labor and sex trafficking[,]” see J.C. v. Choice Hotels Int'l.' Inc., 2020 WL 6318707, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2020); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1591,^[7]and, in addition to the criminal prohibition, “provides sex-trafficking victims with a civil cause of action,” see Doe #1 v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., 21 F.4^th 714, 723 (9^th Cir. 2021), against both the perpetrator of the trafficking and those who benefit therefrom, as follows:

An individual who is a victim of a violation of this chapter may bring a civil action against the perpetrator (or whoever knowingly benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value from participation in a venture which that person knew or should have known has engaged in an act in violation of this chapter) in an appropriate district court of the United States and may recover damages and reasonable attorneys fees.

See § 1595(a).

To state a § 1595(a) claim under a beneficiary theory, a plaintiff must allege facts plausibly establishing that the defendant(s) “(1) knowingly benefitted (2) from participation in a venture (3) that they knew or should have known has engaged in trafficking the plaintiff.” See J.M. v. Choice Hotels Int'l, Inc., 2022 WL 10626493, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2022) (internal quotation and citation omitted). “A plaintiff may satisfy these elements in one of two ways.” See H.G. v. Inter-Cont'l Hotels Corp., 489 F.Supp.3d 697, 704 (E.D. Mich. 2020). Specifically, such plaintiff may “show that the defendant's own acts, omissions, and state of mind establish each element[,]” i.e., that such defendant is directly liable under the statute, or “impute to the defendant the acts, omissions, and state of mind of the agent of the defendant[,]” i.e., that the defendant is indirectly, or vicariously, liable under the statute. See id.

Here, B.J. advances both direct and vicarious theories of liability under § 1595. In particular, she advances a direct theory of liability against Marriott and the Franchisee defendants, and vicarious theories of liability against the Franchisor Defendants. Defendants contend B.J. fails to allege sufficient facts to support the elements of a TVPRA claim under any theory. The Court first turns to B.J.'s direct beneficiary liability claims.

a. Direct Beneficiary Liability Claims

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