Barrall v. Bd. of Trs. of John A. Logan Cmty. Coll.

2020 IL 125535

182 N.E.3d 81

450 Ill.Dec. 635

Cheryl BARRALL et al., Appellees,

v.The BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF JOHN A. LOGAN COMMUNITY COLLEGE, Appellant.

Docket No. 125535

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Opinion filed December 17, 2020.

Rhett T. Barke and Don E. Prosser, of Gilbert, Huffman, Prosser, Hewson & Barke, Ltd., and Edward J. Kionka, both of Carbondale, for appellant.

Loretta K. Haggard, of Schuchat, Cook & Werner, of St. Louis, Missouri, for appellees.

OPINION

JUSTICE THEIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 At issue in this appeal is whether section 3B-5 of the Public Community College Act (Act) ( 110 ILCS 805/3B-5 (West 2016) ) permits the board of trustees for a community college to lay off tenured faculty members and then, within the statutory recall period, hire adjunct instructors to teach courses that the laid-off faculty members are competent to teach. We conclude that it does not; therefore, we affirm the appellate court's judgment.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 In early March 2016, the Board of Trustees of John A. Logan Community College (Board and College, respectively) voted to reduce the number of full-time faculty members that the College would employ during the 2016-17 school year. Accordingly, 27 tenured faculty members,¹ including the 7 plaintiffs, received layoff notices as set forth in the Act. See id. In late May 2016, the Board and a labor organization that represented plaintiffs entered into a settlement agreement regarding various matters related to the reduction in the workforce.

¶ 4 In September 2017, plaintiffs petitioned the Williamson County circuit court for a writ of mandamus , arguing that the Board violated section 3B-5 of the Act, which establishes procedures following a reduction in the number of faculty members. The last sentence in that section provides:

"For the period of 24 months from the beginning of the school year for which the faculty member was dismissed, any faculty member shall have the preferred right to reappointment to a position entailing services he is competent to render prior to the appointment of any new faculty member; provided that no non-tenure faculty member or other employee with less seniority shall be employed to render a service which a tenured faculty member is competent to render." Id.

¶ 5 Plaintiffs' claim centered on the second clause of the sentence. They alleged that, during the 2016-17 school year, the Board employed adjunct instructors to teach courses that plaintiffs had previously taught. Plaintiffs further alleged that enough work existed to employ them full-time for that school year, had the Board not hired adjunct instructors to teach their courses. By September 2017, six of the plaintiffs had been recalled to full-time teaching positions. Thus, plaintiffs' petition sought back pay, benefits, and an order recalling the remaining plaintiff to a full-time faculty member position. Plaintiffs also asked the court to permanently enjoin the Board from laying off tenured faculty members and, during the two-year recall period, employing adjunct instructors or other "non-teaching staff" to render services that laid-off faculty members are competent to render.

¶ 6 In November 2017, the Board moved to dismiss the petition under section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure ( 735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2016) ). First, the Board argued that plaintiffs' claim was barred by the settlement agreement executed in May 2016. Second, based on Biggiam v. Board of Trustees of Community College District No. 516 , 154 Ill. App. 3d 627, 107 Ill.Dec. 120, 506 N.E.2d 1011 (1987), the Board claimed that it was entitled to lay off plaintiffs and employ part-time adjunct faculty to teach their courses. Plaintiffs opposed the Board's dismissal motion, arguing that the settlement agreement did not preclude their claim and that Biggiam was distinguishable.

¶ 7 The trial court granted the Board's motion to dismiss. The court determined that the settlement agreement did not bar plaintiffs' claim; however, it found itself "bound to follow Biggiam ." Plaintiffs appealed.

¶ 8 The appellate court noted that, under section 3B-5, " ‘no non-tenure faculty member or other employee with less seniority shall be employed to render a service which a tenured faculty member is competent to render.’ " 2019 IL App (5th) 180284, ¶ 11, 440 Ill.Dec. 374, 153 N.E.3d 173 (quoting 110 ILCS 805/3B-5 (West 2016) ). The court explained that the rights conferred by section 3B-5 are commonly referred to as "bumping rights." Id. ¶ 1.

¶ 9 As a general matter, when there is a reduction in force in a workplace that operates under a seniority system, workers with greater seniority whose jobs are abolished have the right to displace (or bump) workers with less seniority from a position for which both are qualified. See Hancon v. Board of Education of Barrington Community Unit School District No. 220 , 130 Ill. App. 3d 224, 228, 85 Ill.Dec. 679, 474 N.E.2d 407 (1985). This process is known as "bumping." See Peters v. Board of Education of Rantoul Township High School District No. 193 , 97 Ill. 2d 166, 171, 73 Ill.Dec. 450, 454 N.E.2d 310 (1983).

¶ 10 In this case, the appellate court found that the relevant questions were whether adjunct instructors were " ‘other employee[s] with less seniority’ " within the meaning of the Act and whether plaintiffs had the right to displace, or bump, adjunct instructors from individual courses, rather than from teaching positions. 2019 IL App (5th) 180284, ¶ 11, 440 Ill.Dec. 374, 153 N.E.3d 173. The court noted that, under the Act, "faculty member" means " ‘a full time employee’ " of the district " ‘regularly engaged in teaching or academic support services, but excluding supervisors, administrators and clerical employees.’ " Id. ¶ 12 (quoting 110 ILCS 805/3B-1 (West 2016) ). The words "employee" and "seniority" were not statutorily defined. Therefore, the appellate court afforded them their plain and ordinary meanings.

¶ 11 The appellate court noted that the word "employee" means one who is " ‘employed by another.’ " Id. (quoting Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 408 (1983)). Adjunct instructors are employed by the Board to teach courses. Accordingly, the court found that they fell within this definition. Id. The court noted that the plain and ordinary meaning of the term "seniority" is " ‘a privileged status attained by length of continuous service.’ " Id. (quoting Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 1071 (1983)). Adjunct, or part-time, instructors are hired on a term basis, and they do not accrue seniority. Id. The court observed that plaintiffs, tenured faculty members with a vested contract right in continued employment, had more seniority than employees who had no seniority. Id. Accordingly, the appellate court ruled that adjunct instructors were other " ‘employee[s] with less seniority’ " within the meaning of the provision. Id.

¶ 12 The appellate court rejected the Board's argument that, because the first clause of the last sentence in section 3B-5 applied to faculty members, the second clause, which is at issue here, must also apply to faculty members. Id. ¶¶ 13-14. The court reasoned that "the legislature deliberately chose to use broader language throughout the second clause," which "demonstrates that it intended that clause to have broader application than the first clause." Id. ¶ 14. Further, the appellate court determined that the legislature's intent in enacting the section, as shown by the legislative history, was to protect teachers "from the arbitrary and sometimes capricious actions of some * * * community colleges." Id. ¶ 15 (quoting 81st Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, June 18, 1979, at 99 (statements of Representative Getty)).

¶ 13 The court observed that "[t]he result urged by the defendant in this case would give tenured faculty members priority over less senior tenured faculty members and faculty members who do not yet have tenure, while allowing colleges to replace them with employees with the least seniority—adjunct instructors." Id. ¶ 35. It found that such a result would be absurd. Id. The appellate court recognized that the court in Biggiam had reached a different conclusion; however, it determined that the case was both factually distinguishable and wrongly decided. Id. ¶¶ 16, 25, 29.

¶ 14 The dissenting justice found it "clear from the plain language of the statute" that the provision "was meant to apply to those faculty members who are able to accrue any seniority and does not apply to the adjunct instructors." Id. ¶ 43 (Welch, J., dissenting). The dissent also disagreed with the majority's conclusion that construing the statute in the way that the defendant proposed would evade the purposes of tenure. Id. ¶ 44.

¶ 15 We granted the Board's petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(a) (eff. Oct. 1, 2019).

¶ 16 ANALYSIS

¶ 17 The question before us is whether section 3B-5 of the Act prohibits the Board from laying off tenured faculty members and then hiring adjunct instructors to teach courses that the tenured faculty formerly taught. Statutory construction presents a question of law that this court reviews de novo . Van Dyke v. White , 2019 IL 121452, ¶ 45, 433 Ill.Dec. 153, 131 N.E.3d 511. When presented with an issue of statutory construction, our primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent. Oswald v. Hamer , 2018 IL 122203, ¶ 10, 425 Ill.Dec. 626, 115 N.E.3d 181. "All other rules of statutory construction are subordinate to this cardinal principle." Id. The most reliable indicator of legislative intent is the language of the statute itself, which we give its plain and ordinary meaning. Van Dyke , 2019 IL 121452, ¶ 46, 433 Ill.Dec. 153, 131 N.E.3d 511. If the meaning of an enactment is unclear from the statutory language, this court may also consider the purpose behind the law and the evils that the law was designed to remedy. Palm v. Holocker , 2018 IL 123152, ¶ 21, 433 Ill.Dec. 104, 131...