Bartal v. Borough of Laureldale

515 F.Supp.2d 556

Matthew L. BARTAL, Plaintiff v. BOROUGH OF LAURELDALE, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 05-CV-00105.

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

June 5, 2007.

Brooke M. Boyer, Reading, PA, for Plaintiff.

Christopher P. Gerber, Exton, PA, for Defendant.

OPINION

JAMES KNOLL GARDNER, District Judge.

This matter is before the court on Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, which motion was filed November 15, 2006¹ and Defendant Borough of Laureldale's Motion for Summary Judgment, which motion was filed November 20, 2006.² For the reasons expressed below, I grant defendant's motion and deny plaintiff's motion and dismiss plaintiff's three-count Complaint.

SUMMARY OF DECISION

The First Count of plaintiff's Complaint is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It is a civil action seeking money damages for an alleged violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1, cl. 2. More specifically, plaintiff Matthew L. Bartal alleges that defendant Borough of Laureldale wrongfully deprived him of his statutorily-conferred property interest in his employment as a Borough Police Officer by terminating his employment and by not hiring him as a fulltime officer at the conclusion of his probationary period.

For the purposes of a Section 1983 action, the federal court looks to state law to determine whether plaintiff has a legitimate entitlement to, and hence a property interest in, his government job. I granted defendant's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the First Court of plaintiff's Complaint because I concluded that plaintiff never successfully completed his probationary period as police officer. This is because prior to the close of plaintiff's one-year probationary period, defendant took administrative steps to remove him from service as an active duty police officer, as it was entitled to do.

In that regard, I concluded that if presented with the question, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would hold that defendant had a brief and reasonable period of time after the close of plaintiff's probationary period to evaluate his performance and fitness for a tenured position and would extend his probationary period briefly for this limited purpose.

The Second Count of plaintiff's Complaint alleges a cause of action for a violation of Pennsylvania's Local. Agency Law. 2 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 105-106, 551-555, 751-754. The Third Count is a cause of action for a violation of The Borough Code of Pennsylvania. Act of February 1, 1966, P.L. (1965) 1656, No. 581, §§ 101-1199, as amended, 53 P.S. §§ 45101-46199.

I granted defendant's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the Second and Third Counts of plaintiff's Complaint because, having determined that all federal-question claims must be dismissed, the remaining two claims sound in state law. I concluded that there is no federal jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Accordingly, I declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims.

Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment seeks an award of summary judgment solely on the First Count of plaintiff's Complaint and solely on the issue of defendant's liability. For the foregoing reasons, I deny plaintiff's motion in its entirety.

JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction is based upon federal-question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This court has supplemental jurisdiction over the pendent state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

VENUE

Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because the events giving rise to plaintiff's claims allegedly occurred in the Borough of Laureldale, Berks County, Pennsylvania, which is located in this judicial district.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must determine whether "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation v. Scottsdale Insurance Company, 316 F.3d 431, 433 (3d Cir.2003). Only facts that may affect the outcome of a case are "material". Moreover, all reasonable inferences from the record are drawn in favor of the nonmovant. Anderson, supra.

Although the movant has the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of genuine issues of material fact, the non-movant must then establish the existence of each element on which it bears the burden of proof. Watson v. Eastman Kodak Company, 235 F.3d 851, 858 (3d Cir.2000). A plaintiff cannot avert summary judgment with speculation or by resting on the allegations in his pleadings, but rather must present competent evidence from which a jury could reasonably find in his favor. Ridgewood Board of Education v. N.E. for M.E., 172 F.3d 238, 252 (3d Cir.1999); Woods v. Bentsen, 889 F.Supp. 179, 184 (E.D.Pa.1995).

FACTS

Upon consideration of the pleadings, depositions, record papers and affidavits submitted in this action, and the statements and counter-statements of undisputed material facts filed by the parties in conjunction with their respective cross-motions for summary judgment, the relevant facts are as follows.

On April 15, 2003 plaintiff Matthew L. Bartal was hired as a probationary fulltime police office by defendant Borough of Laureldale, Berks County, Pennsylvania. Pursuant to Pennsylvania law, all original civil service appointments to a Borough police force are subject to "a probationary period of not less than six months, and not more than one year". 53 P.S. § 46186. Moreover, section 26 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the Borough of Laureldale and the Police Association provides that a police officer's probationary period continues for a period of one year from the date an officer is appointed.

On May 5, 2003 plaintiff was charged with criminal trespass, a felony, pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A § 3503(a)(1)(i); summary criminal mischief pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A § 3503(a)(5); disorderly conduct pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A § 5503(a); and two counts of summary harassment pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A § 2709(a)(1). The charges were filed in response to a report of an attempted break-in at a private home in Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, which occurred on April 17, 2003 when plaintiff was off duty.

Defendant alleges that on June 23, 2003 plaintiff pled guilty to disorderly conduct, harassment, and mischief resulting in damage to property pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A § 3304. Defendant also alleges that plaintiff paid fines and restitution on those charges. However, plaintiff maintains that he pled guilty only to a single summary charge of criminal mischief, and that he did so on the advice of the Borough of Laureldale. In addition to a fine or fines, plaintiff also paid restitution for damage done to the victim's door in the amount of $274.54.

Plaintiff received a letter dated March 18, 2004 from the President of the Borough Council of Laureldale informing plaintiff that it was necessary to extend his probationary period past April 15, 2007. The letter stated that "due to the two (2) felony trespass counts being re-filed by Lebanon County, PA against you and your brother, it is necessary for Borough Council to extend your probationary period past April 15, 2004." The letter also stated that the Borough Council has "been informed by the Pennsylvania State Police" that plaintiff had been denied access to the Commonwealth Law Enforcement Assistance Network ("CLEAN"), the system by which police officers perform basic checks of the criminal history and driving history of suspects.

Plaintiff also received a letter dated April 14, 2004 (one day before the one-year anniversary of plaintiff's employment) from the Mayor of the Borough of Laureldale which placed plaintiff on administrative leave without pay pending further action by the Borough Council.

On April 19, 2004, the Borough Council of Laureldale voted to terminate plaintiff's employment. Plaintiff alleges he did not receive any notice that this meeting would address his employment as a police officer. By letter dated April 20, 2004, the President of the Borough Council informed plaintiff that his employment had been terminated on April 19, 2004 because the "Borough Council had previously extended your probationary status" and the "Council feels that [it] is in everyone's best interest to terminate your employment, although Borough Council would reconsider your application."

On November 20, 2004, plaintiff's attorney wrote a letter to the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission requesting a civil service hearing concerning plaintiff's termination. By letter dated December 27, 2004, the attorney for the Borough of Laureldale responded to plaintiff's hearing request and informed plaintiff that the Borough would not authorize the Borough Civil Service Commission to convene a Civil Service Hearing.

On January 10, 2005, plaintiff initiated this action by filing a Complaint alleging that his civil rights had been abrogated in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Pennsylvania's Local Agency Law, and The Borough Code of Pennsylvania.

DISCUSSION

First Count

The First Count of plaintiff's Complaint is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It alleges a violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2. More specifically, plaintiff alleges that he was wrongfully deprived of his statutorily-conferred property interest in his employment. This is a claimed violation of procedural due process.

In determining whether a claim under procedural due process exists, the court applies a two-step. analysis. First, the court determines whether the asserted individual interests are encompassed within the Fourteenth...