Bay County Prosecutor v. Nugent

740 N.W.2d 678

276 Mich. App. 678

BAY COUNTY PROSECUTOR, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Richard Alexander NUGENT, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 267069.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted June 5, 2007, at Lansing.

Decided July 3, 2007, at 9:00 a.m.

Released for Publication October 26, 2007.

Joseph K. Sheeran, Prosecuting Attorney, and John C. Keuvelaar, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the plaintiff.

Smith & Brooker, P.C. (by George B. Mullison), Bay City, for the defendant.

Before: TALBOT, P.J., and MARK J. CAVANAGH and METER, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court's dismissal of its complaint to revoke defendant's acknowledgment of parentage. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

On June 25, 2004, Amy Dyjak gave birth to a son. Dyjak was dating defendant Richard A. Nugent, who was married but in the process of seeking a divorce. Defendant signed an affidavit of parentage acknowledging his paternity of Dyjak's son. Defendant had undergone a vasectomy three to four years before the child was conceived; however, he believed that he could be the child's biological father because his previous girlfriend had also claimed that he impregnated her before she suffered a miscarriage.

In September 2004, defendant learned that there was a possibility that his 14-year-old son was actually the biological father of Dyjak's son. Dyjak was arrested and charged with criminal sexual conduct for engaging in sexual relations with defendant's son. In April 2005, a deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis was performed and revealed that defendant's son was, in fact, the biological father.

In August 2005, Dyjak pleaded no contest to one count of second-degree criminal sexual conduct. As part of her plea agreement, she voluntarily relinquished her parental rights to the child. Plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint in the circuit court seeking to revoke defendant's acknowledgment of parentage under MCL 722.1011. The matter was transferred to the family division of the circuit court and consolidated with related actions that were pending in that court.¹ Plaintiff claimed that because defendant erroneously believed that he was the child's biological father when he signed the affidavit of parentage, a "mistake of fact" existed that justified the revocation of defendant's acknowledgment of parentage. Defendant conceded that he was not the biological father; however, he contested the revocation because he wanted to remain the legal father.

The trial court determined that, under MCL 722.1011, defendant's son did not have any right to challenge defendant's acknowledgment of parentage. The trial court also determined that there was no basis for plaintiff to bring the action on behalf of defendant's son. Because defendant intended to be the child's father when he signed the affidavit of parentage, and because he intended to remain as the father after he learned that he was not the biological father, there was no mistake of fact that would justify revocation of defendant's acknowledgment of parentage. Thus, the trial court dismissed plaintiff's complaint with prejudice. This appeal followed.

Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in concluding that a mistake in fact was not established. We agree.

We review the trial court's factual findings for clear error. See In re Erickson Estate, 202 Mich.App. 329, 331, 508 N.W.2d 181 (1993). "A finding is said to be clearly erroneous when the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Id. The trial court's application of the law to the facts is reviewed de novo. See In re Eggleston Estate, 266 Mich.App. 105, 112, 698 N.W.2d 892 (2005). Statutory interpretation is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. In re McEvoy, 267 Mich.App. 55, 59, 704 N.W.2d 78 (2005).

"`The paramount rule of statutory interpretation is that we are to effect the intent of the Legislature. Tryc v. Michigan Veterans' Facility, 451 Mich. 129, 135, 545 N.W.2d 642 (1996). To do so, we begin with the statute's language. If the statute's language is clear and unambiguous, we assume that the Legislature intended its plain meaning, and we enforce the statute as written. People v. Stone, 463 Mich. 558, 562, 621 N.W.2d 702 (2001). In reviewing the statute's language, every word should be given meaning, and we should avoid a construction that would render any part of the statute surplusage or nugatory. Altman v. Meridian Twp., 439 Mich. 623, 635, 487 N.W.2d 155 (1992).'" [AFSCME v. Detroit, 468 Mich. 388, 399, 662 N.W.2d 695 (2003), quoting Omelenchuk v. City of Warren, 466 Mich. 524, 528, 647 N.W.2d 493 (2002) (citation omitted).]

The Acknowledgment of Parentage Act (APA), MCL 722.1001 et seq., provides that "[i]f a child is born out of wedlock, a man is considered to be the natural father of that child if the man joins with the mother of the child and acknowledges that child as his child by completing a form that is an acknowledgment of parentage." MCL 722.1003(1).

An acknowledgment signed under this act establishes paternity, and the acknowledgment may be the basis for court ordered child support, custody, or parenting time without further adjudication under the paternity act.... The child who is the subject of the acknowledgment shall bear the same relationship to the mother and the man signing as the father as a child born or conceived during a marriage and shall have the identical status, rights, and duties of a child born in lawful wedlock effective from birth. [MCL 722.1004.]

There is no dispute that Dyjak and defendant executed the acknowledgment of parentage consistently with the requirements of the APA. Thus, the acknowledgment established paternity, and defendant was legally considered the natural father of Dyjak's son. See MCL 722.1003(1); MCL 722.1004. A man who signs an acknowledgment of parentage becomes the child's "legal parent." Killingbeck v. Killingbeck, 269 Mich.App. 132, 143-144, 711 N.W.2d 759 (2005).

But MCL 722.1011 provides, in part:

(1) The mother or the man who signed the acknowledgment, the child who is the subject of the acknowledgment, or a prosecuting attorney may file a claim for revocation of an acknowledgment of parentage....

(2) A claim for revocation shall be supported by an affidavit signed by the claimant setting forth facts that constitute 1 of the following:

(a) Mistake of fact.

It is clear that defendant's son, himself, did not have any right to initiate an action to revoke defendant's acknowledgment of parentage. Under MCL 722.1011(1), "only the mother, the man who signed the acknowledgment, the child, or a prosecuting attorney can file a claim for revocation." Sinicropi v. Mazurek, 273 Mich.App. 149, 168, 729 N.W.2d 256 (2006). It appears undisputed that plaintiff initiated this action on behalf of defendant's son. Presumably, plaintiff had motive to initiate this action because, unless and until the acknowledgment of parentage was properly revoked, neither plaintiff nor defendant's son could proceed with a paternity action under the Paternity Act. See id. at 163, 729 N.W.2d 256; see, also, MCL 722.714(2).

Under MCL 722.1011(1), plaintiff is expressly authorized to initiate an action to revoke defendant's acknowledgment of parentage. Nothing in the APA precludes plaintiff from initiating the action on behalf of the child's biological father. We "may read nothing into an unambiguous statute that is not within the manifest intent of the Legislature as derived from the words of the statute itself." Roberts v. Mecosta Co. Gen. Hosp., 466 Mich. 57, 63, 642 N.W.2d 663 (2002). Thus, on the basis of the plain language of MCL 722.1011, plaintiff had authority to initiate this action on behalf of defendant's son, and the motive for doing so was irrelevant.

We also conclude that the trial court erred in holding that plaintiff failed to establish a mistake of fact. See MCL 722.1011(2)(a). The APA does not define "mistake of fact." But there is no indication of a legislative intent to alter the meaning the term "mistake of fact" has acquired in our law, and thus we turn to other cases that have construed it. See Ford Motor Co. v. City of Woodhaven, 475 Mich. 425, 439-440, 716 N.W.2d 247 (2006). "Mistake of fact" has been defined as "`a misunderstanding, misapprehension, error, fault or ignorance of a material fact, a belief that a certain fact exists when in truth and in fact it does not exist.'" Sentry Ins. v. ClaimsCo Int'l, Inc., 239 Mich. App. 443, 447, 608 N.W.2d 519 (2000), quoting Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Williams, 330 Mich. 275, 279, 47 N.W.2d 607 (1951). In Woodhaven, supra at 440, 716 N.W.2d 247, our Supreme Court, quoting Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed.), held that "mistake of fact" was "`[a] mistake about a fact that is material to a transaction.'" Because we opine that "mistake of fact" is a technical term that has acquired a peculiar meaning under the law, the recent Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed.) definition of "mistake of fact" — "[a] mistake about a fact that is material to a transaction; any mistake other than a mistake of law" — is most helpful. See Woodhaven, supra at 440, 716 N.W.2d 247.

Plaintiff established that when defendant signed the affidavit of parentage, defendant believed that he was the biological father of the child. Plaintiff also established that a DNA test later determined that defendant's son, and not defendant, was the biological father. Presentation of the unchallenged DNA evidence was sufficient to establish a mistake of fact. See Sinicropi, supra at 176 n. 14, 729 N.W.2d 256. Regardless of whether defendant intended to be the father when he signed the affidavit of parentage, and whether he intended to remain the legal father after he learned that he was not the child's biological father, the evidence established that defendant's decision to acknowledge paternity in this case was based, at least in part, on a mistaken...