Lake v. Putnam

316 Mich.App. 247

894 N.W.2d 62

LAKE

v.PUTNAM.

Docket No. 330955.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted June 14, 2016, at Detroit.

Decided July 5, 2016, at 9:10 a.m.

American Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan (by Jay D. Kaplan, Livonia, Daniel S. Korobkin, and Michael J. Steinberg) and Sarah Zearfoss and Naomi J. Woloshin, Ann Arbor, for Michelle Lake.

Anne Argiroff PLC, Farmington Hills (by Anne Argiroff ) and Francie L. Novar PLLC, Ann Arbor (by Francie L. Novar ) for Kerri Putnam.

Amici Curiae: University of Michigan Child Advocacy Law Clinic (by Frank E. Vandervort ) for Children's Trauma Assessment Center, Michigan Chapter of the National Association of Social Workers, and Michigan League for Public Policy.

Before: METER, P.J., and SHAPIRO and O'BRIEN, JJ.

O'BRIEN, J.

Defendant, Kerri Putman, appeals by leave granted the circuit court's October 26, 2015 order denying her summary-disposition motion. Lake v. Putnam, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered January 28, 2016 (Docket No. 330955). On appeal, defendant additionally challenges the circuit court's November 18, 2015 order awarding plaintiff, Michelle Lake, parenting time with defendant's biological child. We reverse the October 26, 2015 summary-disposition order, vacate the November 18, 2015 parenting-time order, and remand this matter for entry of an order granting summary disposition in defendant's favor.

Plaintiff and defendant were in a romantic relationship from 2001 until 2014. During their relationship, defendant was artificially inseminated and gave birth to the minor child at issue in this case. Shortly after the parties' relationship ended, defendant denied plaintiff's requests to spend time with the child. In light of this refusal, plaintiff filed this lawsuit, seeking parenting time with the child. Defendant filed a summary-disposition motion, arguing that plaintiff, as an unrelated third party, lacked standing to seek parenting time with the child. The circuit court denied defendant's motion on October 26, 2015, and on November 18, 2015, the circuit court awarded plaintiff supervised parenting time with the minor child. Defendant subsequently applied for leave to appeal the circuit court's October 26, 2015 order, and we granted her application.

A circuit court's decision on a summary-disposition motion is reviewed de novo. Spiek v. Dep't of Transp., 456 Mich. 331, 337, 572 N.W.2d 201 (1998). "Whether a party has legal standing to assert a claim constitutes a question of law that we review de novo." Heltzel v. Heltzel, 248 Mich.App. 1, 28, 638 N.W.2d 123 (2001). Similarly, whether a parent has a sufficient basis to assert parental rights under the equitable-parent doctrine also constitutes a question of law that we review de novo. Killingbeck v. Killingbeck, 269 Mich.App. 132, 141, 711 N.W.2d 759 (2005). As it relates specifically to "the resolution of a child custody dispute," Michigan's Child Custody Act, MCL 722.21 et seq., provides that "all orders and judgments of the circuit court shall be affirmed on appeal unless the trial judge made findings of fact against the great weight of evidence or committed a palpable abuse of discretion or a clear legal error on a major issue." MCL 722.28.

On appeal, defendant argues that the circuit court erred by denying her summary-disposition motion because plaintiff lacks standing to pursue parenting time with the child. We agree.

Generally, a party has standing so long as he or she "has some real interest in the cause of action" or its subject matter. In re Anjoski, 283 Mich.App. 41, 50, 770 N.W.2d 1 (2009) (quotation marks and citations omitted). "However, this concept is not given such a broad application in the context of child custody disputes involving third parties, or any individual other than a parent[.]" Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).

This Court and our Supreme Court have specifically and unequivocally held that "a third party does not have standing by virtue of the fact that he or she resides with the child and has a ‘personal stake’ in the outcome of the litigation." Id. at 50–51, 770 N.W.2d 1, citing Bowie v. Arder,

441 Mich. 23, 42, 490 N.W.2d 568 (1992). Indeed, a third party may not "create a custody dispute by simply filing a complaint in circuit court alleging that giving legal custody to the third party is in the child's best interests...." Id. at 51, 770 N.W.2d 1 (quotation marks, citations, and brackets omitted). "Rather, under the Child Custody Act the Legislature has limited standing for third parties to two circumstances"—under MCL 722.26b (establishing standing for third-party guardians or limited guardians under certain circumstances) or MCL 722.26c(1)(b) (establishing standing for third parties who satisfy all of the following: the minor child's biological parents never married, one of the child's parents has died or is missing and the other parent does not have legal custody, and the third person is related to the child). Id.

In this case, it is undisputed that plaintiff is a third person, see MCL 722.22(k) (defining "third person" as "an individual other than a parent"), not a parent, see MCL 722.22(i) (defining "parent" as "the natural or adoptive parent of a child"). Therefore, as a third person, plaintiff must satisfy the standing requirements under MCL 722.26b or MCL 722.26c(1)(b). She simply does not. Because plaintiff is not a parent or a third party with standing under the Child Custody Act, she lacks standing to create a custody dispute. Sinicropi v. Mazurek, 273 Mich.App. 149, 177, 729 N.W.2d 256 (2006). Accordingly, because the circuit court erred by concluding that plaintiff had standing to pursue parenting time with the child, we reverse its October 26, 2015 order denying defendant's summary-disposition motion, vacate its November 18, 2015 order awarding plaintiff parenting time, and remand this matter for entry of an order granting summary disposition in defendant's favor.

On appeal, plaintiff argues that "she has standing to bring this suit" because she "asserts a right to custody and parenting time ... under Michigan's equitable-parent doctrine." Under the equitable-parent doctrine, a husband who is not the biological father of a child born or conceived during wedlock may, nevertheless, be considered that child's natural father if three requirements are satisfied: (1) the husband and the child must mutually acknowledge their father-child relationship, or the child's mother must have cooperated in the development of that father-child relationship before the divorce proceedings commenced, (2) the husband must express a desire to have parental rights to the child, and (3) the husband must be willing to accept the responsibility of paying child support. Van v. Zahorik, 460 Mich. 320, 330, 597 N.W.2d 15 (1999) ; Atkinson v. Atkinson, 160 Mich.App. 601, 608–609, 408 N.W.2d 516 (1987). "Once it is determined that a party is an equitable parent, that party becomes endowed with both the rights and responsibilities of a parent." York v. Morofsky, 225 Mich.App. 333, 337, 571 N.W.2d 524 (1997). Plaintiff claims that because she satisfies the three requirements in Van and Atkinson, she is the child's equitable parent. She is incorrect.

While plaintiff claims that she satisfies all requirements under the equitable-parent doctrine, she ignores one crucial, and dispositive, requirement for the equitable-parent doctrine to apply—the child must be born in wedlock. Van, 460 Mich. at 330, 597 N.W.2d 15 (stating that the equitable-parent doctrine applies only "to a child born or conceived during the marriage"). The child at issue in this case was not born or conceived during a marriage. In fact, it is undisputed that the parties were never married. Therefore, the equitable-parent doctrine does not apply. Had the parties married in another jurisdiction, for example, our conclusion might be different. See, e.g., Stankevich v. Milliron (On Remand), 313 Mich.App. 233, 240–241, 882 N.W.2d 194 (2015). While we acknowledge that the issue presented in this case is complex, we simply do not believe it is within courts' discretion to, at the request of one party and in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 192 L.Ed.2d 609 (2015), retroactively transform an unmarried couple's past relationship into marriage for the purpose of custody proceedings. Stated differently, it is, in our view, improper for a court to impose, several years later, a marriage on a same-sex unmarried couple simply because one party desires that we do so.

On appeal, plaintiff asks that we follow Ramey v. Sutton, 2015 OK 79, 362 P.3d 217 (2015), a case that is admittedly similar to the one at bar. In that case, a same-sex couple ended their relationship after eight-and-a-half-years. Id. at ¶ 6. During their relationship, one of the parties, Kimberly Sutton, was artificially inseminated and gave birth to a child. Id. Upon their separation, Charlene Ramey filed a lawsuit against Sutton, requesting that she be recognized as the child's legal parent for parenting-time and custody determinations. Id. at ¶ 17. Sutton objected, arguing that Ramey lacked standing because the two were never married. Id. The Oklahoma Supreme Court agreed with Ramey and recognized her "as being in loco parentis to [the parties'] child and ... entitled to a best interests of the child hearing." Id. Plaintiff asks that this Court reach the same conclusion, but we cannot do so for several reasons.

First, Oklahoma's in loco parentis status does not only apply to married couples; rather, it appears to apply to anyone "who has assumed the status and obligations of a parent without a formal adoption." See Workman v. Workman, 1972 OK 74, ¶ 10, 498 P.2d 1384 (1972) (quotation marks and citation omitted), overruled on other grounds by Unah By and Through Unah v. Martin, 1984 OK 2, 676 P.2d 1366 (1984). Michigan's equitable-parent doctrine, on the other hand, applies...